MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


THIRTY-EIGHTH  CONGRESS,  SECOND  SESSION. 
CONGRESS  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES. 

In  the  House  of  Representatives,  January  10,  1865. 

On  motion  of  Mr.  Orth, 

Resolved ,  That  the  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  he  required  to  inquire  into  and 
report  all  the  facts  connected  with  the  late  attack  of  the  third  regiment  of  Colorado  volun¬ 
teers,  under  Colonel  Chivington,  on  a  village  of  the  Cheyenne  tribe  of  Indians,  near 
Fort  Lyon. 

Attest :  - ,  Clerk. 


The  Joint  Committee  on  the  Conduct  of  the  War  submit  the  fol¬ 
lowing  report : 

In  the  summer  of  1864  Governor  Evans,  of  Colorado  Territory, 
as  acting  superintendent  of  Indian  affairs,  sent  notice  to  the  various 
bands  and  tribes  of  Indians  within  his  jurisdiction  that  such  as  de¬ 
sired  to  be  considered  friendly  to  the  whites  should  at  once  repair  to 
the  nearest  military  post  in  order  to  be  protected  from  the  soldiers 
who  were  to  take  the  field  against  the  hostile  Indians. 

About  the  close  of  the  summer,  some  Cheyenne  Indians,  in  the 
neighborhood  of  the  Smoke  Hills,  sent  word  to  Major  Wynkoop,  the 
commandant  of  the  post  of  Fort  Lyon,  that  they  had  in  their  pos¬ 
session,  and  were  willing  to  deliver  up,  some  white  captives  they  had 
purchased  of  other  Indians.  Major  Wynkoop,  with  a  force  of  over 
100  men,  visited  those  Indians  and  received  the  white  captives.  On 
his  return  he  was  accompanied  by  a  number  of  tL3  chiefs  and  leading- 
men  of  the  Indians,  whom  he  had  invited  to  visit  Denver  for  the 
purpose  of  conferring  with  the  authorities  there  in  regard  to  keeping- 
peace.  Among  them  were  Black  Kettle  and  White  Antelope  of  the 
Cheyennes,  and  some  chiefs  of  the  Arapahoes.  The  council  was 
held,  and  these  chiefs  stated  that  they  were  friendly  to  the  whites, 
and  always  had  been,  and  that  they  desired  peace.  Governor  Evans 
and  Colonel  Chivington,  the  commander  of  that  military  district,  ad¬ 
vised  them  to  repair  to  Fort  Lyon  and  submit  to  whatever  terms  the 
military  commander  there  should  impose.  This  was  done  by  the 
Indians,  who  were  treated  somewhat  as  prisoners  of  war,  receiving- 
rations,  and  being  obliged  to  remain  within  certain  bounds. 


II 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


All  the  testimony  goes  to  show  that  the  Indians,  under  the  imme¬ 
diate  control  of  Black  Kettle  and  White  Antelope  of  the  Cheyennes, 
and  Left  Hand  of  the  Arapahoes,  were  and  had  been  friendly  to  the 
whites,  and  had  not  been  guilty  of  any  acts  of  hostility  or  depreda¬ 
tion.  The  Indian  agents, 4  the  Indian  interpreter  and  others  examined 
by  your  committee,  all  testify  to  the  good  character  of  those  Indians. 
Even  Governor  Evans  and  Major  Anthony,  though  evidently  willing 
to  convey  to  your  committee  a  false  impression  of  the  character  of 
those  Indians,  were  forced,  in  spite  of  their  prevarication,  to  admit 
that  they  kpew  of  nothing  they  had  done  which  rendered  them  de¬ 
serving  of  punishment. 

A  northern  band  of  the  Cheyennes,  known  as  the  Dog  Soldiers, 
had  been  guilty  of  acts  of  hostility  ;  but  all  the  testimony  goes  to 
prove  that  they  had  no  connexion  with  Black  Kettle’s  band,  but  acted 
in  despite  of  his  authority  and  influence.  Black  Kettle  and  his  band 
denied  all  connexion  with  or  responsibility  for  the  Dog  Soldiers,  and 
Left  Hand  and  his  band  of  Arapahoes  were  equally  friendly. 

These  Indians,  at  the  suggestion  of  Governor  Evans  and  Colonel 
Chivington,  repaired  to  Fort  Lyon  and  placed  themselves  under  the 
protection  of  Major  Wynkoop.  They  were  led  to  believe  that  they 
were  regarded  in  the  light  of  friendly  Indians,  and  would  be  treated 
as  such  so  long  as  they  conducted  themselves  quietly. 

The  treatment  extended  to  those  Indians  by  Major  Wynkoop  does 
not  seem  to  have  satisfied  those  in  authority  there,  and  for  some 
cause,  which  does  not  appear,  he  was  removed,  and  Major.  Scott  J. 
Anthony  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  Fort  Lyon  ;  but  even  Ma¬ 
jor  Anthony  seems  to  have  found  it  difficult  at  first  to  pursue  any 
different  course  towards  the  Indians  he  found  there.  They  were  en¬ 
tirely  within  the  power  of  the  military.  Major  Anthony  having  de¬ 
manded  their  arms,  which  they  surrendered  to  him,  they  conducted 
themselves  quietly,  and  in  every  way  manifested  a  disposition  to  re¬ 
main  at  peace  with  the  whites.  For  a  time  even  he  continued  issu¬ 
ing  rations  to  them  as  Major  Wynkoop  had  done  ;  but  it  was  deter¬ 
mined  by  Major  Anthony  (whether  upon  his  own  motion  or  at  the  sug¬ 
gestion  of  others  does  not  appear)  to  pursue  a  different  course  to¬ 
wards  these  friendly  Indians.  They  were  called  together  and  told 
that  rations  could  no  longer  be  issued  to  them,  and  they  had  better 
go  where  they  could  obtain  subsistence  by  hunting.  At  the  sug¬ 
gestion  of  Major  Anthony  (and  from  one  in  his  position  a  suggestion 
was  equivalent  to  a  command)  these  Indians  went  to  a  place  on  Sand 
creek,  about  thirty-five  miles  from  Fort  Lyon,  and  there  established 
their  camp,  their  arms  being  restored  to  them.  He  told  them  that 
he  then  had  no  authority  to  make  peace  with  them  ;  but  in  case  he 
received  such  authority  he  would  inform  them  of  it.  In  his  testimony 
he  says : 

“  I  told  them  they  might  go  back  on  Sand  creek,  or  between  there 
and  the  headwaters  of  the  Smoky  Hill,  and  remain  there  until  I  re¬ 
ceived  instructions  from  the  department  headquarters,  from  General 
Curtis  ;  and  that  in  case  I  did  receive  any  authority  to  make  peace 
with  them  1  would  go  right  over  and  let  them  know  it.  I  did 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Ill 


not  state  to  them  that  I  would  give  them  notice  in  case  ice  intended  to  at¬ 
tach  them.  They  went  away  with  that  understanding,  that  in  case  I 
received  instructions  from  department  headquarters  I  was  to  let  them 
know  it.M  * 

And  in  order,  as  it  were,  to  render, these  Indians  less  apprehensive 
of  any  danger,  One  Eye,  a  Cheyenne  chief,  was  allowed  to  remain 
with  them  to  obtain  information  for  the  use  of  the  military  author¬ 
ities.  He  was  employed  at  $125  a  month,  and  several  times  brought 
to  Major  Anthony,  at  Fort  Lyon,  information  of  proposed  move¬ 
ments  of  other  and  hostile  bands.  Jack  Smith,  a  half-breed  son  of 
John  S.  Smith,  an  Indian  interpreter,  employed  by  the  government, 
was  also  there  for  the  same  purpose.  A  United  States  soldier  was 
allowed  to  remain  there,  and  two  days  before  the  massacre  Mr.  Smith, 
the  interpreter,  was  permitted  to  go  there  with  goods  to  trade 
with  the  Indians.  Everything  seems  to  have  been  done  to  remove 
from  the  minds  of  these  Indians  any  fear  of  approaching  danger  ; 
and  when  Colonel  Chivington  commenced  his  movement  he  took 
all  the  precautions  in  his  power  to  prevent  these  Indians  learning 
of  his  approach.  For  some  days  all  travel  on  that  route  was  forcibly 
stopped  by  him,  not  even  the  mail  being  allowed  to  pass.  On  the 
morning  of  the  28th  of  November  he  appeared  at  Fort  Lyon  with 
over  TOO  mounted  men  and  two  pieces  of  artillery.  One  of  his  first  acts 
was  to  throw  a  guard  around  the  post  to  prevent  any  one  leaving  it. 
At  this  place  Major  Anthony  joined  him  with  125  men  and  two 
pieces  of  artillery. 

On  the  night  of  the  28th  the  entire  party  started  from  Fort  Lyon, 
and,  by  a  forced  march,  arrived  at  the  Indian  camp,  on  Sand  creek, 
shortly  after  daybreak.  This  Indian  camp  consisted  of  about  100 
lodges  of  Cheyennes,  under  Black  Kettle,  and  from  8  to  10  lodges  of 
Arapahoes  under  Left  Hand.  It  is  estimated  that  each  lodge  con¬ 
tained  five  or  more  persons,  and  that  more  than  one-half  were  women 
and  children. 

Upon  observing  the  approach  of  the  soldiers,  Black-Kettle,  the 
head  chief,  ran  up  to  the  top  of  his  lodge  an  American  flag,  which 
had  been  presented  to  him  some  years  before  by  Commissioner 
Greenwood,  with  a  small  white  flag  under  it.,  as  he  had  been  ad¬ 
vised  to  do  in  case  he  met  with  any  troops  on  the  prairies.  Mr. 
Smith,  the  interpreter,  supposing  they  might  be  strange  troops, 
unaware  of  the  character  of  the  Indians  encamped  there,  advanced 
from  his  lodge  to  meet  them,  but  was  fired  upon,  and  returned  to  his 
lodge. 

And  then  the  scene  of  murder  and  barbarity  began — men,  women, 
and  children  were  indiscriminately  slaughtered.  In  a  few  minutes 
all  the  Indians  were  flying  over  the  plain  in  terror  and  confusion. 
A  few  who  endeavored  to  hide  themselves  under  the  bank  of  the 
creek  were  surrounded  and  shot  down  in  cold  blood,  offering  but 
feeble  resistance.  From  the  sucking  babe  to  the  old  warrior,  all  who 
were  overtaken  were  deliberately  murdered.  Not  content  with  killing 
women  and  children,  who  were  incapable  of  offering  any  resistance, 
the  soldiers  indulged  in  acts  of  barbarity  of  the  most  revolting  char. 


IV 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


acter;  such,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  as  never  before  disgraced  the  acts  of 
men  claiming  to  be  civilized.  No  attempt  was  made  by  the  officers 
to  restrain  the  savage  cruelty  of  the  men  under  their  command,  but 
they  stood  by  and  witnessed  these  acts  without  one  word  of  reproof, 

if  thev  did  not  incite  their  commission.  For  more  than  two  hours  the 

%/' 

work  of  murder  and  barbarity  was  continued,  until  more  than  one 
hundred  dead  bodies,  three-fourths  of  them  of  women  and  children,  lay 
on  the  plain  as  evidences  of  the  fiendish  malignity  and  cruelty  of  the 
officers  who  had  so  sedulously  and  carefully  plotted  the  massacre,  and 
of  the  soldiers  who  had  so  faithfully  acted  out  the  spirit  of  their 
officers. 

It  is  difficult  to  believe  that  beings  in  the  form  of  men,  and  disgracing 
the  uniform  of  United  States  soldiers  and  officers,  could  commit  or 
countenance  the  commission  of  such  acts  of  cruelty  and  barbarity  as 
are  detailed  in  the  testimony,  but  which  your  committee  will  not 
specify  in  their  report.  It  is  true  that  there  seems  to  have  existed 
among  the  people  inhabiting  that  region  of  country  a  hostile  feeling 
towards  the  Indians.  Some  of  the  Indians  had  committed  acts  of 
hostility  towards  the  whites  ;  but  no  effort  seems  to  have  been  made 
by  the  authorities  there  to  prevent  these  hostilities,  other  than  by 
the  commission  of  even  worse  acts.  The  hatred  of  the  whites  to  the 
Indians  would  seem  to  have  been  inflamed  and  excited  to  the  utmost; 
the  bodies  of  persons  killed  at  a  great  distance — whether  by  Indians 
or  not,  is  not  certain — wrere  brought  to  the  capital  of  the  Territory 
and  exposed  to  the  public  gaze  for  the  purpose  of  inflaming  still  more 
the  already  excited  feeling  of  the  people.  Their  cupidity  was  ap¬ 
pealed  to,  for  the  governor  in  a  proclamation  calls  upon  all,  “either 
individually  or  in  such  parties  as  they  may  organize,’7  “to  kill  and 
destroy  as  enemies  of  the  country,  wherever  they  may  be  found,  all 
such  hostile  Indians/7  authorizing  them  to  “hold  to  their  own  private 
use  and  benefit  all  the  property  of  said  hostile  Indians  that  they 
may  capture.77  What  Indians  he  would  ever  term  friendly  it  is 
impossible  to  tell.  His  testimony  before  your  committee  was  char¬ 
acterized  by  such  prevarication  and  shuffling  as  has  been  shown  by 
no  witness  they  have  examined  during  the  four  years  they  have  been 
engaged  in  their  investigations;  and  for  the  evident  purpose  of 
avoiding  the  admission  that  he  was  fully  aware  that  the  Indians  mas¬ 
sacred  so  brutally  at  Sand  creek,  were  then,  and  had  been,  actuated 
by  the  most  friendly  feelings  towards  the  whites,  and  had  done  all 
in  their  power  to  restrain  those  less  friendty  disposed. 

The  testimony  of  Major  Anthony,  who  succeeded  an  officer  disposed 
to  treat  these  Indians  with  justice  and  humanity,  is  sufficient  of  itself 
to  show  how  unprovoked  and  unwarranted  was  this  massacre.  He 
testifies  that  he  found  these  Indians  in  the  neighborhood  of  Fort  Lyon 
when  he  assumed  command  of  that  post;  that  they  professed  their 
friendliness  to  the  whites,  and  their  willingness  to  do  whatever  he  de¬ 
manded  of  them;  that  they  delivered  their  arms  up  to  him;  that  they 
went  to  and  encamped  upon,  the  place  designated  by  him;  that  they 
gave  him  information  from  time  to  time  of  acts  of  hostility  which  were 
meditated  by  other  and  hostile  bands,  and  in  every  way  conducted 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


V 


themselves  properly  and  peaceably,  and  yet  he  says  it  was  fear  and 
not  principle  which  prevented  his  killing  them  while  they  were  com- 
pletel}7  in  his  power.  And  when  Colonel  Chivington  appeared  at 
Fort  Lyon,  on  his  mission  of  murder  and  barbarity,  Major  Anthony 
made  haste  to  accompany  him  with  men  and  artillery,  although  Colonel 
Chivington  had  no  authority  whatever  over  him. 

As  to  Colonel  Chivington,  your  committee  can  hardly  find  fitting 
terms  to  describe  his  conduct.  Wearing  the  uniform  of  the  United 
States,  which  should  be  the  emblem  of  justice  and  humanity;  holding 
the  important  position  of  commander  of  a  military  district,  and  there¬ 
fore  having  the  honor  of  the  government  to  that  extent  in  his  keep 
ing,  he  deliberately  planned  and  executed  a  foul  and  dastardly  mas¬ 
sacre  which  would  have  disgraced  the  veriest  savage  among  those 
who  were  the  victims  of  his  cruelty.  Having  full  knowledge  of  their 
friendly  character,  having  himself  been  instrumental  to  some  extent 
in  placing  them  in  their  position  of  fancied  security,  he  took  advan¬ 
tage  of  their  inapprehension  and  defenceless  condition  to  gratify  the 
worst  passions  that  ever  cursed  the  heart  of  man.  It  is  thought  by 
some  that  desire  for  political  preferment  prompted  him  to  this  cow-" 
ardly  act;  that  he  supposed  that  by  pandering  to  the  inflamed  pas¬ 
sions  of  an  excited  population  he  could  recommend  himself  to  their 
regard  and  consideration.  Others  think  it  was  to  avoid  the  being  sent 
where  there  was  more  of  danger  and  hard  service  to  be  performed; 
that  he  was  willing  to  get  up  a  show  of  hostility  on  the  part  of  the 
Indians  by  committing  himself  acts  which  savages  themselves  would 
never  premeditate.  Whatever  may  have  been  his  motive,  it  is  to  be 
hoped  that  the  authority  of  this  government  will  never  again  be  dis¬ 
graced  by  acts  such  as  he  and  those  acting  with  him  have  been  guilty 
of  committing. 

There  were  hostile  Indians  not  far  distant,  against  which  Colonel 
Chivington  could  have  led  the  force  under  his  command.  Major  An¬ 
thony  testifies  that  but  three  or  four  days7  march  from  his  post  were 
several  hundreds  of  Indians,  generally  believed  to  be  engaged  in 
acts  of  hostility  towards  the  whites.  And  he  deliberately  testifies 
that  only  the  fear  of  them  prevented  him  from  killing  those  who  were 
friendly  and  entirely  within  his  reach  and  control.  It  is  true  that  to 
reach  them  required  some  days  of  hard  marching.  It  was  not  to  be 
expected  that  they  could  be  surprised  as  easily  as  those  on  Sand 
creek;  and  the  warriors  among  them  were  almost,  if  not  quite,  as 
numerous  as  the  soldiers  under  the  control  of  Colonel  Chivington. 
Whatever  influence  this  may  have  had  upon  Colonel  Chivington,  the 
truth  is  that  he  surprised  and  murdered,  in  cold  blood,  the  unsus¬ 
pecting  men,  women,  and  children  on  Sand  creek,  who  had  every 
reason  to  believe  they  were  under  the  protection  of  the  United  States 
authorities,  and  then  returned  to  Denver  and  boasted  of  the  brave 
deeds  he  and  the  men  under  his  command  had  performed. 

The  Congress  of  the  United  States,  at  its  last  session,  authorized 
the  appointment  of  a  commission  to  investigate  all  matters  relating 
to  the  administration  of  Indian  affairs  within  the  limits  of  the  United 
States.  Your  committee  most  sincerely  trust  that  the  result  of  their 


VI 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


inquiry  will  be  the  adoption  of  measures  which  will  render  impossible 
the  employment  of  officers,  civil  and  military,  such  as  have  heretofore 
made  the  administration  of  Indian  affairs  in  this  country  a  byword  and 
reproach. 

In  conclusion,  your  committee  are  of  the  opinion  that  for  the  pur¬ 
pose  of  vindicating  the  cause  of  justice  and  upholding  the  honor  of 
the  nation,  prompt  and  energetic  measures  should  be  at  once  taken 
to  remove  from  office  those  who  have  thus  disgraced  the  government 
by  whom  they  are  employed,  and  to  punish,  as  their  crimes  deserve, 
those  who  have  been  guilty  of  these  brutal  and  cowardly  acts. 

Respectfully  submitted. 

B.  E.  WADE,  Chairman. 


Note. — See  journal  of  committee,  May  4,  1865. 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Testimony  of  Mr.  Jesse  IT.  Leavenworth. 

Washington,  March  13,  1S65. 

Mr.  Jesse  H.  Leavenworth  sworn  and  examined. 

By  the  chairman : 

Question.  Where  do  you  reside  ? 

Answer.  My  home  is  in  the  city  of  Milwaukee,  Wisconsin ;  but  I  am  the 
Indian  agent  of  the  Kiowas,  Camanches,  and  Apache  Indians,  who  roam  over 
the  plains  between  Fort  Larned,  on  the  Sante  Fe  road,  and  the  borders  of 
Mexico,  through  the  western  part  of  Texas. 

Question.  What  do  you  know  about  the  band  of  Indians  said  to  have  been 
massacred  by  a  force  of  troops  under  Colonel  Chivington,  of  Colorado? 

Answer.  I  am  perfectly  acquainted  with  them.  I  have  known  them  intimately 
since  1862.  Being  in  command  of  that  southwestern  frontier,  I  have  constantly 
had  occasion  to  come  in  contact  with  them. 

Question.  What  is  that  band  called  ?  - \ 

Answer.  That  band  is  called  theTCheyennes  ;j  but  there  were  also  ten  lodges 
of  Arapahoes  with  them.  Their  reservation ~ts  on  the  Arkansas  river,  com¬ 
mencing  at  the  Big  Timbers  and  extending  up  the  river  ninety  miles,  and 
bounded  on  the  north  by  the  Big  Sandy.  Fort  Lyon  is  situated  upon  their 
reservation. 

Question.  Is  this  in  the  Territory  of  Colorado  ? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir.  Fort  Lyon  was  my  headquarters  for  nearly  two  years, 
and  I  had  occasion  to  meet  these  Indians  almost  daily.  The  chiefs  Black 
Kettle,  White  Antelope,  and  Big  Jake  have  travelled  with  me  hundreds  and 
bund  red  sYTf  miles.  Left  Hand,  the  second  chief  of  the  Arapahoes,  and  Little 
Haven,  the  first  chief  of  jthe  Arapahoes,  have  been  with  me  on  scouts  and  in 
my  camps  for  months  together.  Left  Lland  was  killed  by  Chivingtou ;  so  I  am 
told  by  the  agent  and  by  others.  His  lodge  happened  to  be  one  of  the  ten.  A 
year  ago  Little  Raven  requested  me  to  try  and  get  the  military  removed  from 
his  reservation,  which  I  did,  through  Mr.  H.  P.  Bennet.  You  will  see  the  cor¬ 
respondence  in  the  report  of  the  Commissioner  of  Indian  Affairs  for  1864.  I 
can  say  that  they  were  always  friendly.  They  have  often  stated  to  me  that 
they  would  not  fight  the  whites  under  any  circumstances.  Left  Lland  particu¬ 
larly  has  sa'd  that  the  whites  might  murder  their  men  and  do  anything  they 
pleased  to  them,  but  they  would  never  fight  the  whites. 

Question.  What  caused  our  troops  to  make  this  attack  upon  them? 

Answer.  I  do  not  know  the  immediate  cause  of  Colonel  Chivington  attacking 
this  village.  I  know  that  a  year  ago  this  spring  Major  Wajler,  of  the  regular 
army,  crossed  the  plains  and  pissed  the  reservation  of  the  Cheyennes  and 
Arapahoes;  and  he  communicated  to  the  Indian  department  that  if  Colonel 
Chivington  was  not  stopped  in  his  course  of  hunting  down  these  Indians  it 
would  get  us  into  a  war  that  would  cost  us  millions  of  dollars.  1  also  saw  from 
the  reports  in  the  papers  that  Lieutenant  Ayres  was  hunting  these  Indians  from 
camp  to  camp.  Knowing  their  disposition,  and  knowing  Lieutenant  Ayres,  having 


4 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


appointed  him  myself  as  a  lieutenant,  I  stated  to  the  Indian  department  that 
if  Colonel  Chivington  was  not  stopped  in  his  course  of  sending  Lieutenant 
Ayres  after  these  Indians  we  should  get  into  a  general  Indian  war  on  the 
frontier. 

Question.  What  was  their  object  in  hunting  these  Indians?  what  cause  was 
there  for  it  ? 

Answer.  I  could  tell  you  the  ostensible  cause,  but  the  real  cause  is  beyond 
my  knowledge.  Colonel  Chivington  was  ordered  by  General  Curtis  to  rendez¬ 
vous  his  forces  last  spring  in  the  southeast  part  of  Colorado  for  the  ostensible 
purpose  of  making  a  raid  into  Texas.  But,  as  they  claimed,  the  Indian  diffi¬ 
culties  prevented  him  from  doing  so,  and  he  kept  his  troops  there  hunting  these 
Indians. 

Question.  You  say  that  these  Indians  were  of  a  remarkably  friendly  disposi¬ 
tion  ? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir. 

Question.  And  inoffensive  towards  our  people  ? 

Answer.  There  never  were  two  bands  of  Indians  more  friendly  to  the  whites 
than  Black  Kettle’s  band  and  White  Antelope’s  band,  and  One  Eye,  who  was 
ttlso  killed  in  this  massacre. 

Question.  Where  were  you  when  this  massacre  took  place? 

Answer.  I  was  between  Fort  Leavenworth  and  the  Camanche  country,  try¬ 
ing  to  meet  the  wild  tribes  of  which  I  was  appointed  the  agent.  I  found  it 
very  difficult  to  get  to  them.  Little  Raven  had  escaped  from  the  massacre  and 
got  into  the  Camanche  country.  He  was  half  a  Camanche  himself,  speaking 
their  language  well,  and  is  now  with  the  Camanches  with  his  band,  and  is  one 
of  the  best  men  there.  I  am  begging  protection  for  him,  if  I  can  get  to  him. 

Question.  Can  you  state  anything  more  in  regard  to  this  massacre? 

Answer.  I  do  not  know  anything  positively,  because  I  was  not  there ;  but  I 
have  my  information  from  persons  who  were  present.  One  of  them,  Captain 
Smith,  is  in  this  city  now.  He  was  there  trading  under  the  authority  of  Major 
Anthony  ;  and  I  think  Major  Anthony  is  also  in  this  city.  He  was  second  in 
command  in  that  expedition.  From  them  you  can  get  more  reliable  information 
than  I  can  give  you,  for  mine  is  hearsay.  I  only  know  that  these  Indians  were 
„  ...of  a  most  friendly  disposition.  Mr.  D.  D.  Colley ~ls~ also  Here;  he  has  been  a 
trader  in  their  camp  for  two  years.  His  father,  Major  Colley,  is  their  agent, 
and  knows  them  intimately ;  better,  if  anything,  than  I  do. 

Question.  Do  you  know  whether  these  Indians  had  ever  committed  any 
depredations  upon  the  whites  ? 

Answer.  I  was  not  aware  that  they  had ;  not  this  particular  band. 


/■ 

Testimony  of  Mr.  John  S.  Smith. 

Washington,  March  14,  1865. 

Mr.  John  S.  Smith  sworn  and  examined. 

By  Mr.  Gooch : 

Question.  Where  is  your  place  of  residence? 

Answer.  Fort  Lyon,  Colorado. 

Question.  What  is  your  occupation  ? 

Answer.  United  States  Indian  interpreter  and  special  Indian  agent. 

Question.  Will  you  state  to  the  committee  all  that  you  know  in  relation  to 
the  attack  of  Colonel  Chivington  upon  the  Cheyenne  and  Arapahoe  Indians  in 
November  last? 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


5 


Answer.  Major  Anthony  was  in  command  at  Fort  Lyon  at  the  time.  Those 
Indians  had  been  induced  to  remain  in  the  vicinity  of  Fort  Lyon,  and  were 
promised  protection  by  the  commanding  officer  at  Fort  Lyon.  The  command¬ 
ing  officer  saw  proper  to  keep  them  some  thirty  or  forty  miles  distant  from  the 
fort,  for  fear  of  some  conflict  between  them  and  the  soldiers  or  the  travelling  popu¬ 
lation,  for  Fort  Lyon  is  on  a  great  thoroughfare.  He  advised  them  to  go  out 
on  what  is  called  kand  creek,  about  forty  miles,  a  little  east  of  north  from  Fort 
Lyon.  Some  days  after  they  had  left  Fort  Lyon,  when  I  had  just  recovered 
from  a  long  spell  of  sickness,  I  was  called  on  by  Major  S.  G.  Colley,  who 
asked  me  if  I  was  able  and  willing  to  -go  out  and  pay  a  visit  to  these  Indians, 
ascertain  their  numbers,  their  general  disposition  toward  the  whites,  and  the 
points  where  other  bands  might  be  located  in  the  interior. 

Question.  What  was  the  necessity  for  obtaining  that  information? 

Answer.  Because  there  were  different  bands  which  were  supposed  to  be  at 
war;  in  fact,  we  knew  at  the  time  that  they  were  at  war  with  the  white  popu¬ 
lation  in  that  country ;  but  this  band  had  been  in  and  left  the  post  perfectly 
satisfied.  I  left  to  go  to  this  village  of  Indians  on  the  26th  of  November  last. 
I  arrived  there  on  the  27th  and  remained  there  the  28th.  On  the  morning  of 
the  29th,  between  daylight  and  sunrise — nearer  sunrise  than  daybreak — a  large 
number  of  troops  were  discovered  from  three-quarters  of  a  mile  to  a  mile  below 
the  village.  The  Indians,  who  discovered  them,  ran  to  my  camp,  called  me  out, 
and  wanted  me  to  go  and  see  what  troops  they  were,  and  what  they  wanted. 
The  head  chief  of  the  nation,  Black  Kettle,  and  head  chief  of  the  Cheyennes, 
was  encamped  there  with  us.  Some  years  previous  he  had  been  presented  with  a 
fine  American  flag  by  Colonel  Greenwood,  a  commissioner,  who  had  been  sent 
out  there.  Black  Kettle  ran  this  American  flag  up  to  the  top  of  his  lodge,  with 
a  small  white  flag  tied  right  under  it,  as  he  had  been  advised  to  do  in  case  he 
should  meet  with  any  troops  out  on  the  prairies.  I  then  left  my  own  camp  and 
started  for  that  portion  of  the  troops  that  was  nearest  the  village,  supposing  I 
could  go  up  to  them.  I  did  not  know  but  they  might  be  strange  troops,  and 
thought  my  presence  and  explanations  could  reconcile  matters.  Lieutenant 
Wilson  was  in  command  of  the  detachment  to  which  I  tried  to  make  my  ap¬ 
proach  ;  but  they  fired  several  volleys  at  me,  and  I  returned  back  to  my  camp 
and  entered  my  lodge.  , 

Question.  Did  these  troops  know  you  to  be  a  white  man  ? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir ;  and  the  troops  that  went  there  knew  I  was  in  the  village. 

Question.  Did  you  see  Lieutenant  Wilson,  or  were  you  seen  by  him? 

Answer.  I  cannot  say  I  was  seen  by  him ;  but  his  troops  were  the  first  to 
fire  at  me. 

Question.  Did  they  know  you  to  be  a  white  man  ? 

Answer.  They  could  not  help  knowing  it.  I  had  on  pants,  a  soldier’s  over¬ 
coat,  and  a  hat  such  as  I  am  wear  ng  now.  I  was  dressed  differently  from  any 
Indian  in  the  country.  On  my  return  I  entered  my  lodge,  not  expecting  to  get 
out  of  it  alive.  I  had  two  other  men  there  with  me  :  one  was  David  Louder- 
bach,  a  soldier,  belonging  to  company  G,  1st  Colorado  cavalry ;  the  other,  a 
man  by  the  name  of  Watson,  who  was  a  hired  hand  of  Mr.  D.  D.  Colley,  the 
son  of  Major  Colley,  the  agent. 

After  I  had  left  my  lodge  to  go  out  and  see  what  was  going  on,  Colonel 
Chivington  rode  up  to  within  fifty  or  sixty  yards  of  where  1  was  camped  ;  he 
recognized  me  at  once.  They  all  call  me  Uncle  John  in  that  country.  He 
said,  “Bun  here,  Uncle  John;  you  are  all  right.”  I  went  to  him  as  fast  as  I 
could.  He  told  me  to  get  in  between  him  and  his  troops, rwho  were  then  coming 
up  very  fast;  I  did  so;  directly  another  officer  who  knew  me — Lieutenant  Bald¬ 
win,  in  command  of  a  battery — tried  to  assist  me  to  get  a  horse;  but  there  was 
no  loose  horse  thereat  the  time.  He  said,  “Catch  hold  of  the  caisson,  and  keep 
up  with  us.” 


6 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


By  this  time  the  Indians  had  fled  ;  had  scattered  in  every  direction.  The 
troops  were  some  on  one  side  of  the  river  and  some  on  the  other,  following  up 
the  Indians.  We  had  been  encamped  on  the  north  side'of  the  river;  I  followed 
along,  holding  on  the  caisson,  sometimes  running,  sometimes  walking.  Finally, 
about  a  mile  above  the  village,  the  troops  had  got  a  parcel  of  the  Indians 
hemmed  in  under  the  bank  of  the  river ;  as  soon  as  the  troops  overtook  them, 
they  commenced  firing  on  them;  some  troops  had  got  above  them,  so  that  they 
were  completely  surrounded.  There  were  probably  a  hundred  Indians  hemmed 
in  there,  men,  women,  and  children  ;  the  most  of  the  m  n  in  the  village  escaped. 

By  the  time  I  got  up  with  the  battery  to  the  place  where  these  Indians  were 
surrounded  there  had  been  some  considerable  firing.  Four  or  five  soldiers  had 
been  killed,  some  with  arrows  and  some  with  bullets.  The  soldiers  continued 
firing  on  these  Indians,  who  numbered  about  a  hundred,  until  they  had  almost 
completely  destroyed  them.  I  think  I  saw  altogether  some  seventy  dead 
bodies  lying  there;  the  greater  portion  wonJen  and  children.  There  may  have 
been  thirty  warriors,  <  Id  and  young ;  the  rest  were  women  and  small  children 
of  diffeient  ages  and  sizes. 

The  troops  at  that  time  were  very  much  scattered.  There  were  not  over 
two  hundred  troops  in  the  main  fight,  engaged  in  killing  this  body  of  Indians 
under  the  bank.  The  balance  of  the  troops  were  scattered  in  different  direc¬ 
tions,  running  after  small  parties  of  Indians  who  were  trying  to  make  their 
escape.  I  did  not  go  to  see  how  many  they  might  have  killed  outside  of  this 
party  under  the  bank  of  the  river.  Being  still  quite  weak  from  my  last  sick¬ 
ness,  I  returned  with  the  first  body  of  troops  that  went  back  to  the  camp. 

The  Indians  had  left  their  lodges  and  property  ;  everything  they  owned.  I 
do  not  think  more  than  one-half  of  the  Indians  left  their  lodges  with  their  arms. 
I  think  there  were  between  800  and  1,000  men  in  this  command  of  Un  ted 
States  troops.  There  was  a  part  of  three  companies  of  the  1st  Colorado,  and  the 
balance  were  what  were  called  100-days  men  of  the  3d  regiment.  I  am  not  able 
to  say  which  party  did  the  most  execution  on  the  Indians,  because  it  was  very 
much  mixed  up  at  the  time. 

We  remained  there  that  day  after  the  fight.  By  11  o’clock,  I  think,  the 
entire  number  of  soldiers  had  returned  back  to  the  camp  where  Colonel  Chi- 
vington  had  returned.  On  their  return  he  ordered  the  soldiers  to  destroy  all 
•the  Indian  property  there,  which  they  did,  with  the  exception  of  what  plunder 
they  took  away  with  them,  which  was  considerable. 

Question.  How  many  Indians  were  there  there? 

Answer.  There  were  100  families  of  Cheyennes,  and  some  six  or  eight  lodges 
of  Arapahoes. 

Question.  How  many  persons  in  all,  should  you  say  ? 

^  Answer:^  About-  500  ;  we  estimate- them  at  five  to  a  lodge. 

Question.  500  men,  women,  and  children? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir. 

Question.  Do  you  know  the  reason  for  that  attack  on  the  Indians  ? 

Answer.  I  do  not  know  any  exact  reason.  I  have  heard  a  great  many  rea¬ 
sons  given.  I  have  heard  that  that  whole  Indian  war  had  been  brought  on  for 
selfish  purposes.  Colonel  Chivington  was  running  for  Congress  in  Colorado, 
and  there  were  other  things  of  that  kind  ;  and  last  spring  a  year  ago  he  was 
looking  for  an  order  to  go  to  the  front,  and  I  understand  he  had  this  Indian 
war  in  view  to  retain  himself  and  his  troops  in  that  country,  to  carry  out  his 
electioneering  purposes. 

Question.  In  what  way  did  this  attack  on  the  Indians  further  the  purpose  of 
Colonel  Chivington? 

Answer.  It  was  said — I  did  not  hear  him  say  it  myself,  but  it  was  said  that  he 
would  do  something;  he  had  this  regiment  of  three-months  men,  and  did  not 
want  them  to  go  out  without  doing  some  service.  Now  he  had  been  told  re- 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


7 


peatedly  by  different  persons — by  myself,  as  well  as  others — where  he  could  find 
the  hostile  bands. 

The  same  chiefs  who  were  killed  in  this  village  of  Cheyennes  had  been  up 
to  see  Colonel  Cliivington  in  Denver  but  a  short  time  previous  to  this  attack. 
He  himself  told  them  that  he  had  no  power  to  treat  with  them;  that  lie  had 
received  telegrams  from  General  Curtis  directing  him  to  fight  all  Indians  he  met 
with  in  that  country.  Still  he  would  advise  them,  if  they  wanted  any  assist¬ 
ance  from  the  whites,  to  go  to  their  nearest  military  post  in  their  country,  give 
up  their  arms  and  the  stolen  property,  if  they  had  any,  and  then  they  would 
receive  directions  in  what  way  to  act.  This  was  told  them  by  Colonel  Chiving- 
ton  and  by  Governor  Evans,  of  Colorado.  I  myself  interpreted  for  them  and 
for  the  Indians. 

Question.  Did  Colonel  Chivington  hold  any  communication  with  these  In¬ 
dians,  or  any  of  them,  before  making  the  attack  upon  them'? 

Answer.  No,  sir,  not  then.  He  had  some  time  previously  held  a  council 
with  them  at  Denver  city.  When  we  first  recovered  the  white  prisoners  from 
the  Indians,  we  invited  some  of  the  chiefs  to  go  to  Denver,  inasmuch  as  they 
had  sued  for  peace,  and  were  willing  to  give  up  these  white  prisoners.  We  prom¬ 
ised  to  take  the  chiefs  to  Denver,  where  they  had  an  interview  with  men  who 
had  more  power  than  Major  Wynkoop  had,  who  was  the  officer  in  command  of 
the  detachment  that  went  out  to  recover  these  white  prisoners.  Governor  Evans 
and  Colonel  Chivington  were  in  Denver,  and  were  present  at  this  council.  They 
told  the  Indians  to  return  with  Major  Wynkoop,  and  whatever  he  agreed  on"" 
doing  with  them  would  be  recognized  by  them. 

I  returned  with  the  Indians  to  Fort  Lyon.  There  we  let  them  go  out  to 
their  villages  to  bring  in  their  families,  as  they  had  been  invited  through  the 
proclamation  or  circular  of  the  governor  during  the  month  of  June,  I  think. 
They  were  gone  some  twelve  or  fifteen  days  from  Fort  Lyon,' and  then  they  re¬ 
turned  with  their  families.  Major  Wynkoop  had  made  them  one  or  two  issues 
of  provisions  previous  to  the  arrival  of  Major  Anthony  there  to  assume  com¬ 
mand.  Then  Major  Wynkoop,  who  is  now  in  command  at  Fort  Lyon,  was  or-  " 
dered  to  Fort  Leavenworth  on  some  business  with  General  Curtis,  I  think. 

Then  Major  Anthony,  through  me,  told  the  Indians  that  he  did  not  have  it 
in  his  power  to  issue  rations  to  them,  as  Major  Wynkoop  had  done.  He  said 
that  he  had  assumed  command  at  Fort  Lyon,  and  his  orders  were  positive  from 
headquarters  to  fight  the  Indians  in  the  vicinity  of  Fort  Lyon,  or  at  any  other 
point  in  the  Territory  where  they  could  find  them.  He  said  that  he  had  under¬ 
stood  that  they  had  been  behaving  very  badly.  But  on  seeing  Major  Wynkoop 
and  others  there  at  Fort  Lyon,  he  was  happy  to  soy  that  things  were  not  as  had 
been  represented,  and  he  could  not  pursue  any  other  course  than  that  of  Ma¬ 
jor  Wynkoop,  except  the  issuing  rations  to  them.  Fie  then  advised  them  to  go 
out  to  some  near  point,  where  there  was  buffalo,  not  too  far  from  Fort  Lyon,  or  they 
might  meet  with  troops  from  the  Platte,  who  would  not  know  them  from  the 
hostile  bands.  This  was  the  southern  band  of  Cheyennes  ;  there  is  another 
band  called’  the  northern  baud.  They  had  no  apprehensions  in  the  world  of 
any  trouble  with  the  whites  at  the  time  this  attack  was  made. 

Question.  Had  there  been,  to  your  knowledge,  any  hostile  act  or  demonstra¬ 
tion  on  the  part  of  these  Indians,  or  any  of  them  ? 

Answer.  Not  in  this  band.  But  the  northern  band,  the  band  known  by  the 
name  of  Dog  soldiers  of  Cheyennes,  had  committed  many  depredations  on  the 
Platte. 

Question  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  Colonel  Chivington  knew  the  friendly 
character  of  these  Indians  before  he  made  the  attack  up  n  them  ? 

Answer.  It  is  my  opinion  that  he  did. 

Question.  On  what  is  that  opinion  based? 

Answer.  On  this  fact,  that  he  stoppedall  persons  from  going  on  ahead  of  him. 


8 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


He  stopped  the  mail,  atid  would  not  allow  any  person  to  go  on  ahead  of  him  at 
the  time  he  was  on  his  way  from  Denver  city  to  Fort  Lyon.  He  placed  a  guard 
around  old  Colonel  Bent,  the  former  agent  there;  he  stopped  a  Mr.  Hagues 
and  many  men  who  were  on  their  way  to  Fort  Lyon.  He  took  the  fort  by  sur¬ 
prise,  and  as  soon  as  he  got  there  he  posted  pickets  all  around  the  fort,  and 
then  left  at  8  o’clock  that  night  for  this  Indian  camp. 

Q.uestion.  Was  that  anything  more  than  the  exercise  of  ordinary  precaution 
in  following  Indians'? 

Answer.  Well,  sir,  he  was  told  that  there  were  no  Indians  in  the  vicinity  of 
Fort  Lyon,  except  Black  Kettle’s  band  of  Cheyennes  and  Left  Hand’s  band  of 
Arapahoes. 

Question.  How  do  you  know  that  ? 

Answer.  I  was  told  so. 

By  Mr.  Buckalew  : 

Question.  Do  you  know  it  of  your  own  knowledge? 

Answer.  I  cannot  say  I  do. 

Question.  You  did  not  talk  with  him  about  it  before  the  attack  ? 

Answer.  No,  sir. 

By  Mr.  Gooch  : 

Question.  When  you  went  out  to  him,  you  had  no  opportunity  to  hold  inter¬ 
course  with  him  ? 

Answer.  None  whatever ;  he  had  just  commenced  his  fire  against  the  Indians. 

Question.  Did  you  have  any  communication  with  him  at  any  time  while  there  ? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir. 

Question.  What  was  it  ? 

Answer.  He  asked  me  many  questions  about  a  son  of  mine,  who  was  killed 
there  afterwards.  He  asked  me  what  Indians  were  there,  what  chiefs  ;  and  I 
told  him  as  fully  as  I  knew. 

By  Mr.  Buckalew  : 

Question.  When  did  you  talk  with  him? 

Answer.  On  the  day  of  the  attack.  He  asked  me  many  questions  about  the 
chiefs  who  were  then1,  and  if  I  could  recognize  them  if  I  saw  them.  I  told  him 
it  was  possible  I  might  recollect  the  principal  chiefs.  They  were  terribly  muti¬ 
lated,  lying  there  in  the  water  and  sand ;  most  of  them  in  the  bed  of  the  creek, 
dead  and  dying,  making  many  struggles.  They  were  so  badly  mutilated  and 
covered  with  sand  and  water  that  it  was  very  hard  for  me  to  tell  one  from  an¬ 
other.  However,  I  recognized  some  of  them — among  them  the  chief  One  Eye, 
who  was  employed  by  our  government  at  $125  a  month  and  rations  to  remain 
in  the  village  as  a  spy.  There  was  another  called  War  Bonnet,  who  was  here 
two  years  ago  with  me.  There  was  another  by  the  name  of  Standing-in-the- 
Water,  and  I  supposed  Black  Kettle  was  among  them,  but  it  was  not  Black 
Kettle.  There  was  one  there  of  his  size  and  dimensions  in  every  way,  but  so 
tremendously  mutilated  that  I  was  mistaken  in  him.  I  went  out  with  Lieu¬ 
tenant  Colonel  Bowen,  to  see  how  many  I  could  recognize. 

By  Mr.  Gooch  : 

Question.  Did  you  tell  Colonel  Chivington  the  character  and  disposition  of 
these  Indians  at  any  time  during  your  interviews  on  this  day  ? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir. 

Question.  What  did  he  say  in  reply  ? 

Answer.  He  said  he  could  not  help  it;  that  his  orders  were  positive  to  attack 
the  Indians. 

Question.  From  whom  did  he  receive  these  orders? 

Answer.  I  do  not  know;  I  presume  from  General  Curtis. 

Question.  Did  he  tell  you  ? 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


9 


Answer.  Not  to  my  recollection. 

Question.  Were  tlie  women  and  children  slaughtered  indiscriminately,  or  only 
so  far  as  they  were  witlrtfre-warriors  ? 

Answer.  IndiscriminaJ 

Questmnr'WereThere  any  acts  of  barbarity  perpetrated  there  that  came  un¬ 
der  your  own  observation  ? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir;  I  saw  the  bodies  of  those  lying  there  cut  all  to  pieces, 
worse  mutilated  than  any  I  ever  saw  before;  the  women  cut  all  to  pieces. 

By  Mr.  Buckalew: 

Question.  How  cut  ? 

Answer.  With  knives;  scalped;  their  brains  knocked  out-;  children  two  or 
three  months  old;  all  ages  lying  there,  from  sucking  infants  up  to. warriors. 

By  Mr.  Gooch  : 

Question.  Did  you  see  it  done  ? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir;  I  saw  them  fall. 

Question.  Fall  when  they  were  killed  ? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir. 

Question.  Did  you  see  them  when  they  were  mutilated  ? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir. 

Question.  By  whom  were  they  mutilated  ? 

Answer.  By  the  United  States  troops. 

Question.  Do  you  know  whether  or  not  it  was  done  by  the  direction  or  con¬ 
sent  of  any  of  the  officers  ? 

•* 

Answer.  I  do  not;  I  hardly  think  it  was. 

By  Mr.  Buckalew  : 

Question.  Whapwas-the  daie-trf-Biakmassacre  ? 

Answer.  On  the  29th  of  November  lastlN 

Question.  -Did-yort-spoak  of  tlaese-barbffiuties  to  Colonel  Chivington  ? 

Answer.  No,  sir;  I  had  nothing  at  all  to  say  about  it,  because  at  that  time 
they  were  hostile  towards  me,  from  the  fact  of  my  being  there.  They  probably 
supposed  that  I  might  be  compromised  with  them  in  some  way  or  other. 

Question.  Who  called  on  you  to  designate  the  bodies  of  those  who  were  killed  ? 

Answer.  Colonel  Chivington  himself  asked  me  if  I  would  ride  out  with 
Lieutenant  Colonel  Bowen,  and  see  how  many  chiefs  or  principal  men  I  could 
recognize. 

Question.  Can  you  state  how  many  Indians  were  killed — how  many  women 
and  how  many  children  ? 

Answer.  Perhaps  one-half  were  men,  and  the  balance  were  women  and  chil¬ 
dren.  I  do  not  think  that  I  saw  more  than  70  lying  dead  then,  as  far  as  I  went. 
But  I  saw  parties  of  men  scattered  in  every  direction,  pursuing  little  bands  of 

Indians. 

Question.  What  time  of  day  or  night  was  this  attack  made  ? 

Answer.  The  attack  commenced  about  sunrise,  and  lasted  until  between  10 
and  11  o’clock.  v  - - - 

Question.  How  large  a  body  of  troops  ? 

Answer.  From  800  to  1,000  men. 


By  Mr.  Gooch  : 

Question.  What  amount  of  resistance  did  the  Indians  make? 

Answer.  I  think  that  probably  there  may  have  been  about  60  or  70  warriors 
who  were  armed  and  stood  their  ground  and  fought.  Those  that  were  unarmed 
got  out  of  the  way  as  they  best  could. 

Question.  How  many  of  our  troops  were  killed,  and  how  many  wounded  ? 
Answer.  There  were  ten  killed  on  the  ground,  and  thirty-eight  wounded; 
four  of  the  wounded  died  at  Fort  Lyon  before  I  came  on  east. 


/ 


10 


MASSACKE  OF  GHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Question.  Were  there  any  other  barbarities  or  atrocities  committed  there 
other  than  those  you  have  mentioned,  that  you  saw1? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir;  I  had  a  half-breed  son  there,  who  gave  himself  up.  He 
started  at  the  time  the  Indians  fled;  being  a  half-breed  he  had  but  little  hope 
of  being  spared,  and  seeing  them  fire  at  me,  he  ran  away  with  the  Indians  for 
the  distance  of  about  a  mile.  During  the  fight  up  there  he  walked  back  to 
my  camp  and  went  into  the  lodge.  It  was  surrounded  by  soldiers  at  the  time. 
He  came  in  quietly  and  sat  down  ;  he  remained  there  that  day,  that  night,  and 
the  next  day  in  the  afternoon  ;  about  four  o’clock  in  the  evening,  as  I  was  sitting 
inside  the  camp,  a  soldier  came  up  outside  of  the  lodge  and  called  me  by  name. 
I  got  up  and  went  out;  he  took  me  by  the  arm  and  walked  towards  Colonel 
Chivington’s  camp,  which  was  about  sixty  yards  from  my  camp.  Said  he, 
“I  am  sorry  to  tell  you,  but  they  are  going  to  kill  your  son  Jack.”  I  knew 
the  feeling  towards  the  whole  camp  of  Indians,  and  that  there  was  no  use  to 
make  any  resistance.  I  said,  “  I  can’t  help  it.”  I  then  walked  on  towards 
where  Colonel  Chivington  was  standing  by  his  camp-fire;  when  I  had  got  within 
a  few  feet  of  him  I  heard  a  gun  fired,  and  saw  a  crowd  run  to  my  lodge,  and 
they  told  me  that  Jack  was  dead. 

Question.  What  action  did  Colonel  Chivington  take  in  regard  to  that  matter? 

Answer.  Major  Anthony,  who  was  present,  told  Colonel  Chivington  that  he 
had  heard  some  remarks  made,  indicating  that  they  were  desirous  of  killing 
Jack;  and  that  he  (Colonel  Chivington)  had  it  in  his  power  to  save  him,  and 
that  by  saving  him  he  might  make  him  a  very  useful  man,  as  he  was  well  ac¬ 
quainted  with  all  the  Cheyenne  and  Arapahoe  country,  and  he  could  be  used 
as  a  guide  or  interpreter.  Colonel  Chivington  replied  to  Major  Anthony,  as  the 
Major  himself  told  me,  that  he  had  no  orders  to  receive  and  no  advice  to  give. 
Major  Anthony  is  now  in  this  city. 

By  Mr.  Buckalew : 

Question.  Did  Chivington  say  anything  to  you,  or  you  to  him,  about  the  firing  ? 

Answer.  Nothing  directly;  there  were  a  number  of  officers  sitting  around 
the  fire,  with  the  most  of  whom  I  was  acquainted. 

Question.  Was  there  any  business  to  transact  at  Chivington’s  camp  when 
you  were  brought  there  ? 

Answer.  None  with  me;  except  that  1  was  invited  to  go  there  and  remain  in 
that  camp,  as  I  might  be  considered  in  danger  of  losing  my  life  if  I  was  away 
from  there. 

By  Mr.  Gooch  : 

Question.  Were  there  any  other  Indians  or  half-breeds  there  at  that  time  ? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir;  Mr.  Bent  had  three  sons  there;  one  employed  as  a  guide 
_  il  for  these  troops  at  the  time,  and  two  others  living  there  in  the  village  with  the 
.»■  Indians;  and  a  Mr.  Gerry  had  a  son  there. 

Question.  Were  there  any  other  murders  after  the  first  day’s  massacre? 

Answer.  There  was  none,  except  of  my  son. 

Question.  Were  there  any  other  atrocities  which  you  have  not  mentioned? 

Answer.  None  that  I  saw  myself.  There  were  two  women  that  white  men 
had  families  by;  they  were  saved  from  the  fact  of  being  in  my  lodge  at  the 
time.  One  ran  to  my  lodge ;  the  other  was  taken  prisoner  by  a  soldier  who 
knew  her  and  brought  her  to  rny  lodge  for  safety.  They  both  had  children. 
There  were  some  small  children,  six  or  seven  years  old,  who  were  taken  prisoners 
near  the  camp.  1  think  there  were  three  of  them  taken  to  Denver  with  these 
troops. 

Question.  Were  the  women  and  children  that  were  killed,  killed  during  the 
figlit  with  the  Indians? 

Answer.  During  the  fight,  or  during  the  time  of  the  attack. 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


11 


Question.  Did  you  see  any  Avomen  or  children  killed  after  the  fight  Avas  over? 

Answer.  None. 

Question.  Did  yon  see  any  Indians  killed  after  the  fight  was  over? 

Answer.  No,  sir. 

By  Mr.  Buckalew : 

Question.  Were  the  warriors  and  women  and  children  all  huddled  together 
when  they  Avere  attacked  ? 

Answer.  They  started  and  left  the  village  altogether,  in  a  body,  trying  to 
escape. 

By  Mr.  Gooch  : 

Question.  Do  you  knoAv  anything  as  to  the  amount  of  property  that  those  In¬ 
dians  had  there  ? 

Answer.  Nothing  more  than  their  horses.  They  Avere  supposed  to  oavu  ten 
horses  and  mules  to  a  lodge ;  that  would  make  about  a  thousand  head  of  horses 
and  mules  in  that  camp.  The  soldiers  drove  off  about  six  hundred  head. 

Question.  Had  they  any  money  ? 

Answer.  I  understood  that  some  of  the  soldiers  found  some  money,  but  I  did 
not  see  it.  Mr.  D.  D.  Colley  had  some  provisions  and  goods  in  the  village  at 
the  time,  and  Mr.  Louderback  and  Mr.  Watson  were  employed  by  him  to  trade 
there.  I  Avas  to  interpret  for  them,  direct  them,  and  see  that  they  Avere  cared 
for  in  the  village.  They  had  traded  for  one  hundred  and  four  buffalo  robes,  one 
fine  mule,  and  two  horses.  This  was  all  taken  away  from  them.  Colonel 
Chivington  came  to  me  and  told  me  I  might  rest  assured  that  he  Avould  see  the 
goods  paid  for.  He  had  confiscated  these  buffalo  robes  for  the  dead  and  Avounded ; 
and  there  was  also  some  sugar  and  coffee  and  tea  taken  for  the  same  purpose. 

I  would  state  that  in  his  report  Colonel  Chivington  states  that  after  this  raid 
on  Sand  creek  against  the  Cheyenne  and  Arapahoe  Indians  he  travelled  north¬ 
east  some  eighty  miles  in  the  direction  of  some  hostile  bands  of  Sioux  Indians. 
Now  that  is  very  incorrect,  according  to  my  knowledge  of  matters;  I  remained  with 
Colonel  Chivington’s  camp,  and  returned  on  his  trail  towards  Fort  Lyon  from 
the  camp  Avhere  he  made  this  raid.  I  went  down  with  him  to  what  is  called  the 
forks  of  the  Sandy.  He  then  took  a  due  south  course  for  the  Arkansas  river, 
and  I  went  to  Fort  Lyon  with  the  killed  and  Avounded,  and  an  escort  to  take  us 
in.  Colonel  Chivington  proceeded  down  the  Arkansas  river,  and  got  within 
eleven  miles  of  another  band  of  Arapahoe  Indians,  but  did  not  succeed  in  over¬ 
taking  them.  He  then  returned  to  Fort  Lyon,  re-equipped,  and  started  imme¬ 
diately  for  Denver. 

Question.  Have  you  spent  any  considerable  portfon  of  your  life  with  the  In¬ 
dians  ? 

Answer.  The  most  of  it. 

Question  How  many  years  have  you  been  with  the  Indians  ? 

Answer.  I  have  been  twenty  seven  successive  years  with  the  Cheyennes  and 
Arapahoes.  Before  that  I  Avai  in  the  country  as  a  trapper  and  hunter  in  the 
Rocky  mountains. 

Question.  For  how  long  time  have  you  acted  as  Indian  interpreter? 

AnsAver.  For  some  fifteen  or  eighteen  years. 

Question.  By  whom  have  you  been  so  employed  ? 

Answer.  By  Major  Fitzpatrick,  Colonel  Bent,  Major  Colley,  Colonel  J.  W. 
‘Whitfield,  and  a  great  deal  of  the  time  for  the  military  as  guide  and  interpreter? 

By  Mr.  Buckalew  : 

Question.  How  many  warriors  were  estimated  in  Colonel  Chivington’s  report 
as  having  been  in  this  Indian  camp? 

AnsAver.  About  nine  hundred. 


12 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Question.  How  many  were  there  ? 

Answer.  About  two  hundred  warriors  ;  they  average  about  two  warriors  to  a 
lodge,  and  there  were  about  one  hundred  lodges. 


Testimony  of  Captain  S.  M.  Robbins. 

Washington,  March  14,  1865. 

Captain  S.  M.  Robbins  sworn  and  examined. 

By  Mr.  Gooch  : 

Question.  What  is  your  position  in  the  army? 

Answer.  I  am  a  captain  of  the  1st  Colorado  cavalry. 

Question.  Were  you  with  Colonel  Chivington  at  the  time  of  the  attack  on  the 
Cheyenne  Indians,  in  November  last  ? 

Answer.  I  was  not. 

Question.  Have  you  any  knowledge  relating  to  that  attack  ? 

Answer.  I  have  no  personal  knowlege  of  anything  that  transpired  at  Sand 
creek. 

Question.  Have  you  any  knowledge  in  relation  to  matters  connected  with 
that  massacre  ? 

Answer.  I  know  about  the  Indian  difficulties  in  that  country,  but  nothing 
with  regard  to  that  particular  difficulty. 

Question.  What  do  you  know  about  that  campaign  ? 

Answer.  I  only  know  that  a  campaign  was  organized  against  the  Indians. 

By  Mr.  Loan  : 

Question.  What  Indians  ? 

Answer.  The  Cheyennes  and  Arapahoes,  and  all  others  that  were  hostile, 
or  were  supposed  to  be  hostile. 

By  Mr.  Gooch  : 

Question.  Do  you  know  under  what  orders  Colonel  Chivington  was  acting  ? 

Answer.  No,  sir.  I  never  saw  any  orders.  I  suppose  that  he  acted  under 
the  authority  of  the  department  commander,  General  Curtis;  but  I  know  nothing 
positively  about  that. 

Question.  Where  were  you  at  the  time  of  this  attack  ? 

Answer.  In  the  city  of  Denver,  Colorado. 

By  Mr.  Loan : 

Question.  Who  was  the  district  commander  at  Denver? 

Answer.  Colonel  Chivington  was. 

Question.  You  were  on  his  staff? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir. 

Question.  In  what  capacity  ? 

Answer.  Chief  of  cavalry. 

Question.  What  was  the  character  of  these  Cheyenne  Indians  on  Sand  creek  ? 

Answer.  I  do  not  know. 

Question.  Do  you  know  whether  they  were  hostile  or  friendly? 

Answer.  I  saw  a  portion  of  their  chiefs  in  the  city  of  Denver,  some  two 
months  before  this  action,  or  massacre,  or  assault  took  place.  They  came  there 
under  an  escort  furnished  by  Major  Wynkoop.  They  came  for  the  purpose  of 
holding  a  consultation  with  the  governor,  who  [  believe  is  acting  superintendent 
of  Indian  affairs  there.  They  were  all  the  tribe  I  ever  saw. 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


13 


Question.  What  bands  were  killed  there  ? 

Answer.  The  Cheyennes  and  Arapahoes  ? 

Question.  What  particular  bands  of  these  Indians  ? 

Answer.  I  merely  know  from,  hearsay  the  names  of  those  chiefs. 

Question.  As  chief  of  cavalry,  on  Colonel  Chivington’s  staff,  do  you  know 
anything  of  the  orders  General  Curtis  sent  him  in  regard  to  this  matter  ? 
Answer.  No,  sir. 

Question.  Do  you  know  anything  about  the  organization  of  the  force  that 
went  out  under  Colonel  Chivington? 

Answer.  I  do. 

Question.  State  it. 

Answer.  It  was  organized  by  direction  of  the  Secretary  of  War,  for  the  pur¬ 
pose  of  operating  in  that  country  against  the  Indians.  It  was  a  hundred-days 
regiment. 

O 

Question.  Was  Colonel  Chivington  the  colonel  of  it? 

Answer.  No,  sir;  Colonel  George  H.  Shoup  was  the  colonel  of  it.  There  was 
great  difficulty  in  furnishing  the  horses  and  ordnance  stores  necessary  to  mount 
and  equip  the  regiment.  Two  months  of  their  time  had  expired  before  they 
were  ready  to  move.  They  moved  from  that  point  about  the  first  of  Novem¬ 
ber.  And  on  the  29th  of  November,  I  think,  this  action  was  fought,  or  this 
massacre  was  made,  at  Sand  creek. 

K  Question.  At  what  time  did  Colonel  Chivington  join  this  command,  and  what 
other  troops  had  he  with  him  ? 

Answer.  He  joined  the  command  in  person,  I  should  think  about  the  15th 
of  November,  and  had  with  him  part  of  six  companies  of  the  1st  regiment  of 
Colorado  volunteers. 

Question.  What  was  his  whole  force  ? 

Answer.  I  should  judge  about  700  men. 

Question.  The  regiment  of  hundred-days  men,  and  the  battalion  of  1st  Colo¬ 
rado  volunteers  ? 

Answer.  The  whole  of  the  hundred  days  regiment  were  not  there.  They  were 
not  all  mounted. 

Question.  Will  you  state  a  little  further  about  the  Indians  that  came  into 
Denver  with  Major  Wynkoop  ?  What  was  the  object  of  their  coming  in? 

Answer.  For  some  time  previous  there  had  been  massacres  of  whites,  in  the 
vicinity  of  Denver,  by  Indians,  as  we  supposed,  and  prisoners  were  taken. 
Some  time  in  August  or  September  Major  Wynkoop,  commanding  at  Fort 
Lyon,  received  information  from  the  Indians  in  the  vicinity  of  Smoky  Hill  that 
they  had  some  white  prisoners  whom  they  were  anxious  to  give  up,  or  exchange 
for  two  Indians  that  were  with  one  of  our  companies  as  scouts.  At  all  events, 
this  communication  from  the  Indians  induced  Major  Wynkoop  to  take  150  men 
and  two  or  three  pieces  of  artillery  and  go  out  there.  He  went  out  there,  and, 
as  I  understood,  when  he  came  back  he  brought  the  white  prisoners  the  Indians 
had  held,  and  a  number  of  their  principal  chiefs  came  with  him  to  Denver — out 
of  the  district  in  which  Major  Wynkoop  was  serving  into  the  district  of  Colo¬ 
rado.  There  they  had  a  consultation  with  Governor  Evans,  of  Colorado, 
Colonel  Chivington,  and  other  prominent  and  leading  men.  The  Indians  made 
statements,  which  I  heard  interpreted  by  Mr.  Smith,  in  regard  to  their  friendly 
feelings  towards  the  whites.  Whether  their  acts  justified  them  or  not  was 
rather  an  open  question.  They  stated  their  desire  for  peace.  My  recollection 
is  that  the  governor  told  them  they  had  levied  war  against  the  United  States, 
or  what  amounts  to  that,  and  that  soon  the  white  soldiers  would  cover  the  plains. 
He  said  that  if  they  were  friendly,  as  they  had  said,  they  must  seek  the  protection 
of  the  military  posts,  for  the  whites  could  not  discriminate  between  Indians  on  the 
plains.  That  their  going  on  the  military  reservations  would  afford  the  best  evi¬ 
dence  of  their  friendly  feelings  towards  the  whites  ;  and  my  understanding  is 


14 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


that  a  portion  of  those  Indians,  if  not  all  of  them,  sought  the  military  reserva¬ 
tion  at  Fort  Lyon  with  that  understanding. 

By  Mr.  Gooch  : 

Question.  Were  they  on  that  military  reservation  when  this  attack  was  made 
on  them  1 

Answer.  No,  sir.  I  suppose  it  was  found  inconvenient  to  have  so  many  of 
them  in  the  vicinity  of  the  post,  on  account  of  their  natural  thieving  propensi¬ 
ties,  and  they  were  ordered  oft*  on  this  Sand  creek,  about  thirty-five  miles  from 
the  fort,  on  their  own  reservation,  where  they  could  hunt. 

Question.  They  were  where  they  had  been  directed,  by  the  military  authori¬ 
ties,  to  go  ? 

Answer.  So  I  understand.  Major  Anthony,  who  is  here,  was  a  portion  of 
the  time  in  command  at  Fort  Lyon,  and  he  could  tell  about  that. 

For  the  information  of  the  committee,  I  should  like  to  say  a  friendly  word,  un¬ 
der  the  circumstances,  in  the  Chivington  interest.  For  a  year  and  a  half  past 
there  has  been  a  state  of  war  existing  between  the  Indians  and  the  whites,  as 
fiir  as  the  opinion  of  the  Indians  was  concerned ;  whether  by  the  authority  of 
the  head  chiefs  or  not  we  cannot  tell.  At  all  events,  the  interruption  of  com¬ 
munication  on  the  Arkansas  route  and  on  the  Platte  route  raised  the  price  of 
everything  consumed  by  the  people  out  here.  And  the  people  emphatically  de¬ 
manded  that  something  should  be  done.  The  point  I  wish  to  make  is,  that  per¬ 
haps  Colonel  Chivington  might  have  been  forced  into  this  by  the  sentiment  of 
the  people. 

Question.  Would  the  sentiment  of  the  people  lead  a  man  to  attack  Indians 
who  were  known  to  be  friendly,  and  who  were  known  to  be  trying  to  avert 
hostilities  ? 

Answer.  I  should  say  it  would.  They  wanted  some  Indians  killed  ;  whether 
friendly  or  not  they  did  not  stop  long  to  inquire. 


Testimony  of  Mr.  D.  D.  Colley. 

_  / 

Washington,  March  14,  18G5. 

Mr.  D.  D.  Colley  sworn  and  examined. 

By  Mr.  Gooch : 

Question.  Where  is  your  place  of  residence  1 
Answer.  At  Fort  Lyon. 

Question.  What  is  your  occupation  ? 

Answer.  I  have  been  trading  with  the  Indians  more  or  less  for  the  last  three 

years. 

* 

Question.  Will  you  state  what  you  know  in  relation  to  the  attack  on  the 
Cheyenne  Indians  by  Colonel  Chivington,  on  the  29th  of  November  last? 

Answer.  I  was  in  St.  Louis  at  that  time.  But  1  was  at  Fort  Lyon  when  two 
Indians  came  in  and  told  Major  Wynkoop  that  they  had  some  white  prisoners. 
They  rode  in  and  rode  up  to  the  major’s  headquarters.  The  major,  as  well  as 
the  balance  of  us,  felt  like  using  them  a  little  rough,  for  we  were  all  feeling  a 
little  hard  towards  the  Indians.  I  went  out  and  saw  they  were  two  Indians  with 
whom  1  was  well  acquainted,  and  who  I  knew  had  been  trying  to  keep  peace 
between  the  Indians  and  the  whites.  Just  as  I  went  up  to  them  the  major 
came  up  and  spoke  very  harsh  to  them,  and  told  them  to  get  down  off*  their 
horses.  I  told  the  major  that  I  knew  them,  and  that  they  were  both  friendly. 
They  then  got  down  off  their  horses  and  went  into  the  major’s  room,  and  told 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


15 


him  that  they  had  some  white  prisoners,  and  that  lie  could  get  them  by  going 
after  them. 

.  The  major  took  his  command  of  12.5  or  150  men,  and  was  gone  about  two 
weeks,  and  brought  the  white  prisoners.  Some  Indians,  I  do  not  know  how  many, 
20  or  30  of  them,  came  back  with  him,  and  went  to  Denver  with  him.  I  went 
there  also.  There  they  had  a  council  with  Colonel  Chivington  and  Governor 
Evans,  and  promises  were  made  to  them.  There  was  also  a  council  held  with 
them  by  Major  Wynkoop.  Major  Anthony,  after  he  took  command  at  Fort 
Lyon,  also  held  a  council  with  them.  It  was  thought  best  to  have  them  come 
in  at  Fort  Lyon.  Major  Wynkoop  promised  them  protection  if  they  would  come 
in,  and  they  came  in  on  the  strength  of  those  promises.  1  talked  with  them 
several  times  after  they  had  brought  their  families  in.  The  major  promised  them 
protection  until  he  could  hear  from  General  Curtis.  Then  if  they  proposed  to 
make  a  treaty,  all  right ;  if  not,  he  would  let  them  go  in  time  to  get  out  of  the 
country. 

Shortly  after  that,  Major  Anthony  took  command  of  Fort  Lyon  by  order  of 
General  Curtis.  He  said  he  was  ordered  to  kill  these  Indians  and  drive  them 
away.  I  told  him  what  promises  had  been  made  them.  They  were  called 
together,  and  they  told  him  that  they  considered  themselves  prisoners  of  war, 
and  that  they  would  not  fight  under  any  circumstances.  1  know  that  a  num¬ 
ber  of  the  chiefs  present  there  had  been  laboring  over  a  year  to  keep  peace  be¬ 
tween  the  Indians  and  whites.  They  told  Major  Anthony  that  he  could  take 
them  out  and  kill  them  if  he  saw  fit.  He  told  them  lie  was  sent  there  to  fight 
Indians.  But  he  would  ask  them  to  give  up  their  arms,  and  some  stock  they 
had  which  belonged  to  the  government;  and  if  they  did  so  he  would  issue  to 
them  prisoners’  rations  until  such  time  as  he  had  other  orders.  And  they  were 
living  there  and  getting  these  rations  until  I  left  Fort  Lyon  to  come  to  St.  Louis. 

Question.  Did  they  comply  with  the  terms  proposed  by  Major  Anthony  ? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir 

Question.  Do  you  know  whether  Colonel  Chivington  was  informed  of  this 
arrangement? 

Answer.  I  know  that  he  was. 

Question.  How  do  you  know  that  ? 

Answer.  Because  the  Indian  agent  told  me  he  had  informed  him. 

Question.  Informed  him  before  lie  made  his  attack? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir.  When  he  came  down  there  to  make  the  attack  he  was 
told  that  the  Indians  were  out  there  under  promise  of  protection.  They  had 
been  at  the  post  until  a  short  time  before,  when  they  had  moved  out  on  the  Big 
Sandy  at  the  request  of  Major  Anthony.  The  Sioux,  and  a  party  of  Cheyennes 
called  the  Dog  soldiers,  were  at  war  with  the  whites.  And  these  Indians  on 
the  Big  Sandy  would  come  in  occasionally  and  report  what  the  other  Indians 
were  doing. 

Question.  Do  you  know  what  induced  Colonel  Chivington  to  attack  these 
Indians? 

Answer.  I  do  not  know ;  I  have  my  opinion. 

Question.  Can  you  think  of  any  reason  which  induced  him  to  make  the  at¬ 
tack  ? 

Answer.  I  have  thought  for  more  than  a  year  that  he  was  determined  to  have 
a  war  with  these  Indians.  That  has  been  the  general  belief  of  men  in  our  part 
of  the  count  y.  I  was  acquainted  with  all  the  chiefs  who  were  there,  and  I 
know  they  had  all  tried  hard  to  keep  peace  between  the  Indians  and  whites. 
I  was  with  a  portion  of  this  same  village  a  year  ago  last  winter,  when  the  first 
talk  of  an  outbreak  commenced.  All  the  chiefs  who  were  killed  by  Colonel 
Chivington  have  labored  as  hard  as  men  could  to  keep  peace  between  the  whites 
and  indiai  s.  They  could  not  control  the  band  called  Dog  soldiers,  who  had 
undoubtedly  committed  depredations. 


16 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Question.  Do  you  know  anything  else  in  connexion  with  this  matter  that  is 
important,  which  you  have  not  stated  ? 

Answer.  I  do  not  know  that  I  do. 

By  Mr.  Loan : 

Question.  What  is  the  distinguishing  name  of  this  band  of  Indians  upon 
which  the  attack  was  made  ? 

Answer.  They  were  known  as  Black  Kettle’s  band.  Black  Kettle  was  the 
chief  of  the  whole  Cheyenne  nation  ;  but  this  was  the  band  that  was  always 
with  him.  The  other  chiefs  that  were  there  were  also  with  him. 

Question.  There  must  have  been  a  chief  to  have  led  the  hostile  Indians  ? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir.  But  this  band  was  the  one  always  with  Black  Kettle. 

Question.  About  what  number  do  you  suppose  were  killed  on  Sand  creek  ? 

Answer.  I  should  judge  there  were  between  100  and  150.  What  I  judge 
from  is  this  :  the  inspector  of  the  district  went  with  me  to  Fort  Lyon,  and  he 
went  out  to  the  battle- field.  The  bodies  were  lying  there  then.  They  spent 
half  a  day  on  the  battle-field,  and  found  69  bodies. 

Question.  Were  there  any  women  and  children  killed? 

Answer.  The  inspector  told  me  that  about  three-fourths  of  them  were  women 
and  children. 


Testimony  of  Major  Scott  J.  Anthony. 

Washington,  March  14,  1865. 

Major  Scott  J.  Anthony  sworn  and  examined. 

By  Mr.  Loan: 

Question.  What  is  your  place  of  residence  ? 

Answer.  Fort  Lyon,  Colorado  Territory. 

Question.  Do  you  hold  any  position  in  the  military  or  civil  service  of  the 
government  ? 

Answer.  None  at  present. 

Question.  Have  you  held  any  at  any  time  ? 

Answer.  I  was  major  of  the  1st  Colorado  cavalry  from  the  1st  of  November, 
1862,  until  the  21st  of  January,  1865. 

Question.  Were  you  present  at  the  killing  of  the  Cheyenne  Indians,  on  their 
reserve,  not  far  from  Fort  Lyon,  on  Sand  creek? 

Answer.  It  was  not  an  Indian  reserve.  I  was  present  at  the  time. 

Question.  State  what  force  was  organized,  under  what  orders  it  acted,  under 
whose  command  it  was,  and  what  was  done. 

Answer.  The  command  reached  Fort  Lvon  on  the  mornincr  of  the  28th  of  No- 

%/  O 

vernber  last,  under  command  of  Colonel  Chivington.  It  consisted  of  a  portion  of 
the  1st  regiment  of  Colorado  cavalry,  and  about  600  men  of  the  3d  regiment  of 
Colorado  cavalry;  numbering  in  all  in  the  neighborhood  of  700  men,  with  two 
pieces  of  artillery.  I  joined  them  there  with  125  men  and  two  pieces  of  artillery. 
We  left  on  the  night  of  the  28th,  for  Sand  creek,  and  reached  there  on  the  morn¬ 
ing  of  the  29th  at  daybreak.  We  found  an  Indian  camp  of  about  130  lodges,  con¬ 
sisting  mostly  of  Cheyennes;  there  were  a  small  band  of  Arapahoe  Indians  with 
them.  The  Indians  were  attacked  by  us,  under  command  of  Colonel  Chivington, 
about  sunrise  in  the  morning.  Detachments  from  the  command  took  position  on 
two  sides  of  their  camp.  There  had  been  a  little  firing  before  that.  When  I 
first  came  up  with  my  command,  the  Indians,  men,  women,  and  children,  were 
in  a  group  together,  and  there  was  firing  from  our  command  upon  them.  The 
Indians  attempted  to  escape,  the  women  and  children,  and  our  artillery  opened 
on  them  while  they  were  running.  Quite  a  party  of  Indians  took  position  under 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


17 


the  bank,  in  the  bed  of  the  creek,  and  returned  fire  upon  us.  We  fought  them 
about  seven  hours,  I  should  think,  there  being  firing  on  both  sides.  The  loss  on 
our  side  was  49  men  killed  and  wounded;  on  theirs  I  suppose  it  was  about  125. 

Question.  Under  what  chief  was  that  band  of  Indians  ? 

Answer.  Black  Kettle,  I  think,  was  the  principal  chief.  There  were  several 
chiefs  in  the  camp,  but  Black  Kettle,  I  think,  was  the  head  chief. 

Question.  Were  there  any  warriors  in  that  camp  ] 

Answer.  There  were. 

Question.  What  number,  do  you  suppose  ? 

Answer.  I  would  not  be  able  to  tell  very  accurately.  There  were  a  great 
many  men  who  fought  us ;  I  should  think  there  were  in  the  neighborhood  of  a 
hundred  men  who  were  fighting  us  while  we  were  there.  Perhaps  there  were 
not  quite  so  many  as  that,  but  as  near  as  I  could  judge  there  were  from  75  to 
100  Indians  returning  our  fire.  I  was  in  command  at  Port  Lyon,  and  had  held 
a  council  with  these  Indians  before;  had  talked  with  them,  and  had  recognized 
Black  Kettle  as  their  head  chief. 

Question.  What  was  the  result  of  the  conference  you  had  with  them  ? 

Answer.  The  circumstances  were  about  these  :  I  was  in  command  at  Fort 
Larned,  240  miles  east  of  Fort  Lyon,  which  place  the  Indians  had  attacked  in 
the  spring,  stealing  all  the  stock  at  the  post,  burning  the  bridges,  and  damaging 
the  post  considerably.  Major  Wynkoop,  who  had  been  in  command  at  Fort 
Lyon,  had  had  some  difficulty  with  the  Indians  at  that  point.  He  had  proposed 
terms  of  peace  with  the  Indians,  which  action  was  not  approved  at  the  head¬ 
quarters  of  the  department  or  district. 

Question.  Were  there  any  military  orders  issued  disapproving  his  arrange¬ 
ments  ] 

Answer.  There  were.  — " 

Question.  Can  you  give  the  numbers  of  these  orders,  and  by  whom  issued  ? 

Answer.  I  have  copies  of  them,  I  think.  One  was  Special  Order  No.  4,  para¬ 
graph  No.  7,  from  headquarters  of  the  district  of  Upper  Kansas.  There  were 
several  orders  in  regard  to  the  same  matter. 

Question.  What  I  want  is  the  order  of  department  headquarters  disapproving 
of  what  Major  Wynkoop  had  done,  and  also  the  order  of  district  headquarters. 

Answer.  I  do  not  think  I  have  those  orders  in  the  city. 

Question.  Do  you  know  who  has  them  ? 

Answer.  I  do  not.  General  Curtis  was  the  commander  of  the  department 
at  the  time  this  difficulty  took  place  between  Major  Wynkoop  and  the  Indians 
at  Smoky  Hill,  and  Major  General  Blunt  was  in  command  of  the  district.  I 
was  out  with  Major  General  Blunt  in  a  campaign  against  the  Indians. 

Question.  Did  you  ever  see  those  orders  from  the  department  headquarters 
disapproving  of  Major  Wynkoop’s  action  in  regard  to  that  matter] 

Answer.  Only  so  far  as  it  related  to  his  unmilitary  conduct. 

Question.  I  mean  his  attempt  to  pacify  the  Indians  ? 

Answer.  I  have  never  seen  those  orders ;  I  have  heard  of  them. 

Question.  Now,  to  return  to  the  point  when  you  were  in  command  at  Fort 
Lyon.  , 

Answer.  I  took  command  there  on  the  second  day  of  November. 

Question.  You  say  you  held  a  conference  with  the  Indians  ?  State  what 
occurred. 

Answer.  At  the  time  I  took  command  at  the  post  there  was  a  band  of 
Arapahoe  Indians  encamped  about  a  mile  from  the  post,  numbering,  in  men, 
women,  and  children,  652.  They  were  visiting  the  post  almost  every  day.  I 
met  them  and  had  a  talk  with  them.  Among  them  was  Left  Hand,  who  was  a 
chief  among  the  Arapahoes.  He  with  his  band  was  with  the  party  at  that 
time.  I  talked  with  them,  and  they  proposed  to  do  whatever  I  said;  whatever 
Part  VI - 2 


18 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


I  said  for  them  to  do  they  would  do.  I  told  them  that  I  could  not  feed  them; 
that  I  could  not  give  them  anything  to  eat ;  that  there  were  positive  orders  for¬ 
bidding  that;  and  that  I  could  not  permit  them  to  come  within  the  limits  of 
the  post.  At  the  same  time  they  might  remain  where  they  were,  and  I  would 
treat  them  as  prisoners  of  war  if  they  remained;  that  they  would  have  to  sur¬ 
render  to  me  all  their  arms  and  turn  over  to  me  all  stolen  property  they  had 
taken  from  the  government  or  citizens.  These  terms  they  accepted.  They 
turned  over  to  me  some  twenty  head  of  stock,  mules,  and  horses,  and  a  few 
arms,  but  not  a  quarter  of  the  arms  that  report  stated  they  had  in  their  pos¬ 
session.  The  arms  they  turned  over  to  me  were  almost  useless.  I  fed  them 
for  some  ten  days.  At  the  end  of  that  time  I  told  them  I  could  not  feed  them 
any  more ;  that  they  better  go  out  to  the  buffalo  country  where  they  could  kill 
game  to  subsist  upon.  I  returned  their  arms  to  them,  and  they  left  the  post. 
But  before  leaving  they  sent  word  out  to  the  Cheyennes  that  I  was  not  very 
friendly  towards  them. 

Question.  How  do  you  know  that  ? 

Answer.  Through  several  of  their  chiefs;  Neva,  an  Arapahoe  chief;  Left 
Hand,  of  the  Arapahoes;  then  Black  Kettle  and  War  Bonnet,  of  the  Cheyennes. 
A  delegation  of  the  Cheyennes,  numbering,  I  suppose,  fifty  or  sixty  men,  came 
in  just  before  the  Arapahoes  left  the  post.  I  met  them  outside  of  the  post  and 
talked  with  them.  They  said  they  wanted  to  make  peace ;  that  they  had  no 
desire  to  fight  against  us  any  longer;  that  there  had  been  difficulty  between  the 
whites  and  Indians  there,  and  they  had  no  desire  to  fight  any.  longer.  I  told 
them  I  had  no  authority  from  department  headquarters  to  make  peace  with 
them;  that  I  could  not  permit  them  to  visit  the  post  and  come  within  the 
lines;  that  when  they  had  been  permitted  to  do  so  at  Fort  Larned,  while  the 
squaws  and  children  of  the  different  tribes  that  visited  that  post  were  dancing  ^ 
in  front  of  the  officers’  quarters  and  on  the  parade  ground,  the  Indians  had  made 
an  attack  on  the  post,  fired  on  the  guard,  and  run  off  the  stock,  and  I  was 
afraid  the  same  thing  might  occur  at  Fort  Lyon.  I  would  not  permit  them  to 
visit  the  post  at  all.  I  told  them  I  could  make  no  offers  of  peace  to  them  until 
I  heard  from  district  headquarters.  I  told  them,  however,  that  they  might  go 
out  and  camp  on  Sand  creek,  and  remain  there  if  they  chose  to  do  so;  but  they 
should  not  camp  in  the  vicinity  of  the  post;  and  if  I  had  authority  to  make 
*  peace  with  them  I  would  go  out  and  let  them  know  of  it. 

In  the  mean  time  I  was  writing  to  district  headquarters  constantly,  stating  to 
them  that  there  was  a  band  of  Indians  within  forty  miles  of  the  post — a  small 
band — while  a  very  large  band  was  about  100  miles  from  the  post.  That  I  Avas 
strong  enough  Avith  the  force  I  had  with  me  to  fight  the  Indians  on  Sand  creek, 
but  not  strong  enough  to  fight  the  main  band.  That  I  should  try  to  keep  the 
Indians  quiet  until  such  time  as  I  received  re-enforcements ;  and  that  as  soon  as 
re-enforcements  did  arrive  we  should  go  further  and  find  the  main  party. 

But  before  the  re-enforcements  came  from  district  headquarters,  Colonel  Chiv- 
ington  came  to  Fort  Lyon  Avith  his  command,  and  I  joined  him  and  Avent  out  on 
that  expedition  to  Sand  creek.  I  never  made  any  offer  to  the  Indians.  It  was 
the  understanding  that  I  was  not  in  favor  of  peace  with  them.  They  so  under¬ 
stood  me,  I  suppose;  at  least  I  intended*they  should.  In  fact,  I  often  heard  of 
it  through  their  interpreters  that  they  did  not  suppose  we  Avere  friendly  towards 
them. 

Question.  What  number  of  men  did  you  have  at  Fort  Lyon  ] 

Answer.  I  had  about  280  men. 

Question.  What  was  the  number  of  Indians  around  Fort  Lyon  at  any  one 
time  Avhen  you  were  talking  to  them  ? 

AnsAver.  I  do  not  think  there  were  over  725  Indians — men,  women  and 
children — within  the  vicinity  of  the  post. 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


19 


Question.  At  the  time  you  held  the  conference  with  the  Arapahoes,  Left 
Hand,  and  others,  how  many  men  were  present  above  the  age  of  eighteen  ? 

Answer.  I  should  suppose  from  80  to  100. 

Question.  Why  did  you  not  capture  those  Indians  at  that  time  ? 

Answer.  I  might  say  I  did.  I  did  not  take  them  because  I  had  instructions 
from  district  headquarters,  as  I  construed  them,  to  go  and  fight  them  wherever 
I  met  them.  While  they  were  there  at  the  post  I  did  intend  to  open  fire  upon 
them,  in  accordance  with  my  instructions. 

Question.  Why  did  you  not  do  it  ? 

Answer.  They  were  willing  to  accede  to  any  request  I  might  make.  They 
turned  over  to  me  their  arms  and  the  property  they  had  stolen  from  the  govern¬ 
ment  and  citizens. 

Question.  What  property  did  they  turn  over  ? 

Answer.  Fourteen  head  of  mules  and  six  head  of  horses. 

Question.  Was  it  property  purporting  to  have  been  stolen  by  them  ? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir. 

Question.  From  whom  ? 

Answer.  They  did  not  say.  Yet  some  of  it  was  recognized;  some  of  it  was 
branded  “  U.  S.”  Some  was  recognized  as  being  stock  that  belonged  to  citizens. 
It  was  generally  understood  afterwards — I  did  not  know  it  at  that  time — that  the 
son  of  the  head  chief  of  the  Arapahoes,  Little  Raven, and  I  think  another,  had 
attacked  a  small  government  train  and  killed  one  man. 

Question.  What  had  Little  Raven  to  do  with  Black  Kettle’s  band  ? 

Answer.  He  was  not  with  them  at  the  time;  Left  Hand  was. 

Question.  These  Indians  surrendered  to  you,  and  you  took  their  arms  from 
them  ? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir. 

Question.  Did  you  issue  rations  to  them  ? 

Answer.  I  did. 

Question.  What  authority  had  you  for  returning  their  arms  to  them  and  order¬ 
ing  them  off? 

Answer.  I  had  no  orders  in  the  matter.  My  instructions  were  to  act  upon 
my  own  judgment.  At  the  same  time  there  were  orders  issued  that  they  should 
not  be  fed  or  clothed  at  the  post. 

Question.  Who  issued  those  orders  ? 

Answer.  General  Curtis. 

Question.  Were  those  orders  issued  after  you  had  received  the  arms  of  the 
Indians  ? 

Answer.  Before  that. 

Question.  Then  why  did  you  receive  those  arms,  and  feed  those  Indians  in 
violation  of  General  Curtis’s  orders  ? 

Answer.  I  received  the  arms  and  told  the  Indians  I  could  only  issue  them 
rations  as  prisoners.  I  fed  them  while  there  as  prisoners,  but  afterwards  re¬ 
leased  them. 

Question.  That  is  what  I  want  to  get  at.  Where  did  you  get  authority  for 
releasing  the  prisoners  that  were  captured  ? 

Answer.  I  had  no  written  authority  for  it. 

Question.  You  did  it  upon  your  own  judgment. 

Answer.  Yes,  sir.  That  was  my  instructions,  to  act  upon  my  own  judgment 
in  the  matter.  I  thought  we  could  not  afford  to  feed  them  at  the  post ;  and 
they  were  in  the  buffalo  country  where  they  could  subsist  themselves. 

Question.  If  they  were  dangerous  to  the  government,  why  did  you  release 
them  ? 

Answer.  I  did  not  so  consider  them  then.  They  were  most  all  women  and 
children,  this  Arapahoe  band. 

Question.  Who  was  the  chief  of  that  band? 


20 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Answer.  Little  Raven  was  the  chief  of  those  I  held  as  prisoners. 

Question.  Was  Black  Kettle  with  his  band  at  the  fort  at  any  time  you  were 
in  command  ? 

Answer.  No,  sir,  not  at  the  fort;  they  passed  by  it. 

Question.  Did  you  ever  hold  any  conference  with  them  ? 

Answer.  I  did. 

Question.  At  what  place  ? 

Answer.  At  the  commissary  building,  about  a  half  a  mile  from  the  fort. 

Question.  What  number  of  men  were  with  Black  Kettle  at  that  time  ? 

Answer.  I  should  think  not  far  from  sixty. 

Question.  State  what  passed  at  that  conference,  so  far  as  you  can  remember. 

Answer.  They  came  in  and  inquire’d  of  me  whether  I  had  any  authority  to 
make  peace  with  them.  They  said  that  they  had  heard  through  the  Arapahoes 
that  “things  looked  dark” — that  was  the  term  they  used — that  we  were  at  war 
with  them  ;  that  they  had  come  in  to  ascertain  whether  these  bad  reports’* they 
had  received  were  correct  or  not.  I  stated  to  them  that  I  had  no  authority  to 
make  peace  with  them.  That  their  young  men  were  then  out  in  the  field  fight¬ 
ing  against  us,  and  that  I  had  no  authority  and  no  instructions  to  make  any 
peace  with  them.  I  told  them  they  might  go  back  on  Sand  creek,  or  between 
there  and  the  headquarters  of  the  Smoky  Hills,  and  remain  there  until  I  received 
instructions  from  the  department  headquarters,  from  General  Curtis ;  and  that 
in  case  I  did  receive  any  authority  to  make  peace  with  them  I  would  go  right 
over  and  let  them  know  it.  I  did  not  state  to  them  that  I  would  give  them 
notice  in  case  we  intended  to  attack  them.  They  went  away  with  that  under¬ 
standing,  thatin  case  I  received  instructions  from  department  headquarters  I 
was  to  let  them  know  it.  But  before  I  did  receive  any  such  instructions 
Colonel  Chivington  arrived  there,  and  this  affair  on  Sand  creek  took  place. 

Question.  Why  did  you  not  arrest  Black  Kettle  and  his  band  there,  or  attack 
them  when  you  had  them  at  your  mercy  ? 

Answer.  I  did  not  do  it,  because  I  did  not  consider  it  a  matter  of  policy  to 
do  it. 

Question.  Why  not  ? 

Answer.  Because  within  100  miles  of  us  was  a  party  of  2,500  or  3,000  In¬ 
dians.  Black  Kettle’s  band  belonged  to  the  same  tribe  of  Indians,  and  I  be¬ 
lieved  that  so  soon  as  I  made  any  attack  upon  Black  Kettle’s  party,  this  whole 
tribe  of  Indians  would  rise  and  cut  off  our  communication  on  both  routes. 

Question.  How  did  you  know  that  that  party  of  3,000  Indians  were  within 
'  100  miles'? 

Answer.  Black  Kettle  told  me  so  himself.  Jack  Smith,  the  son  of  the  Indian 
interpreter  there,  a  half-breed,  told  me  the  same.  One  Eye,  a  Cheyenne  chief, 
told  me  the  same.  On  two  different  occasions  One  Eye  told  me  when  small 
raiding  parties  were  going  to  start  out  from  the  main  Sioux  and  Cheyenne  camp 
to  commit  depredations  on  the  road,  and  depredations  were  committed  just  about 
the  time  they  said  they  would  be,  yet  too  soon  for  us  to  prevent  it.  I  was  sat¬ 
isfied  in  my  own  mind  that  if  I  had  attacked  Black  Kettle  there,  although  I 
might  have  taken  his  entire  camp  at  any  time,  it  would  be  the  cause  of  opening 
up  a  general  Indian  war,  and  I  was  not  strong  enough  to  defend  the  settlements 
in  case  they  commenced  again. 

Question.  I  understood  you  to  say  that  the  Indians  were  already  at  war  with 
the  whites. 

Answer.  Yes,  sir.  That  is,  they  were  sending  out  their  raiding  parties. 
Their  men  came  there  on  Smoke  Hill,  and  every  little  while  a  raiding  party 
would  make  an  attack  on  some  train  or  some  ranch,  yet  there  was  no  large 
party  at  that  particular  time. 

Question.  Were  there  any  other  Indians  at  Sand  creek,  except  Black  Kettle’s 
band  and  the  Arapahoes  of  whom  you  have  spoken? 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


21 


Answer.  There  were  none  but  Black  Kettle’s  band,  and,  as  I  have  since  ascer¬ 
tained,  a  few  lodges  of  Arapahoes,  under  Left  Hand. 

Question.  Little  Raven’s  band  was  not  there? 

Answer.  No,  sir.  There  was  but  a  small  portion  of  Black  Kettle’s  band 
there.  He  was  the  chief  of  all  the  Cheyennes. 

Question.  There  was  a  particular  band  that  went  with  him,  of  which  he  was 
the  immediate  chief4  notwithstanding  he  was  also  the  chief  of  the  whole  nation  ? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir. 

Question.  And  it  was  the  subordinate  chiefs  who  were  at  war  with  the 
whites. 

Answer.  Yes,  sir. 

Question.  Black  Kettle  had  a  band  which  were  always  with  him  ? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir. 

Question.  Now,  what  I  want  to  know  is,  what  other  Indians  were  at  Sand 
creek  when  you  advised  Black  Kettle  and  his  band  to  go  over  there  ? 

Answer.  I  think  there  were  only  a  very  few  Arapahoes  under  Left  Hand. 

Question.  Did  they  have  their  women  and  children  with  them  ? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir. 

Question.  How  long  were  they  at  Sand  creek  before  Colonel  Chivington  came 
along  with  his  force  ? 

Answer.  I  should  think  about  twelve  days. 

Question.  Did  you  receive  any  communication  from  those  Indians  on  Sand 
creek  during  those  twelve  days  ?  Did  they  furnish  you  with  information  of 
any  kind  ? 

Answer.  I  received  some  information ;  I  do  not  know  that  it  came  from  that 
band.  I  had  employed  at  that  time,  on  a  salary  of  $ 125  a  month  and  a  ration, 
One  Eye,  who  was  a  chief  of  the  Cheyennes.  He  was  to  remain  in  this  Chey¬ 
enne  camp  as  a  spy,  and  give  me  information  from  time  to  time  of  the  move¬ 
ments  of  this  particular  band,  and  also  to  go  over  to  the  head  of  the  Smoke 
Hill  to  the  Sioux  and  Cheyenne  camp  there,  and  notify  me  whenever  any 
movement  was  made  by  those  Indians  ;  but  he  had  gone  only  as  far  as  Sand 
creek  when  Colonel  Chivington  made  this  attack  on  the  Indians  at  Sand  creek, 
and  he  was  killed  there. 

Question.  Then  you  cannot  tell  whether  you  had  any  communications  during 
those  twelve  days  from  the  Indians  on  Sand  creek? 

Answer.  They  would  send  in  to  the  post  frequently.  General  Curtis  had 
issued  an  order  that  no  Indian  should  be  permitted  to  visit  the  post.  I  had 
ordered  them  away,  and  the  guard  had  fired  upon  them  when  they  refused  to 
obey  that  order — fired  upon  them  several  times.  I  told  them  they  could  not 
come  in,  and  that  if  they  had  any  communication  to  make  with  me  I  would 
meet  them  outside  of  the  post  and  talk  with  them.  They  sent  to  me  several 
times,  but  they  were  always  begging  parties. 

Question.  Did  they  give  you  any  information  whatever  of  the  movements  of 
any  of  the  hostile  Indians? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir;  One  Eye  did,  and  I  think  Jack  Smith  did.  He  came  in 
at  one  time  and  stated  that  a  party  of  Indians  were  going  to  make  an  attack  on 
the  settlements  down  in  the  vicinity  of  the  mouth  of  Walnut  creek.  I  reported 
the  matter  to  the  district  headquarters,  stating  that  there  would  be  an  attack 
made  about  such  a  day.  The  attack  was  made  at  about  that  time,  so  that  the 
information  he  gave  was  correct. 

Question.  Were  the  women  and  children  of  this  band  of  Black  Kettle  in 
camp  with  him? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir. 

Question.  About  what  number  of  souls  were  in  that  camp  when  you  at¬ 
tacked  it? 

Answer.  I  thought  at  the  time  there  were  a  thousand  or  more ;  but,  from  in- 


22 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


formation  I  have  received  since,  I  am  satisfied  that  there  were  not  so  many  as 
that ;  probably  in  the  neighborhood  of  700  men,  women,  and  children. 

Question.  Did  you  send  any  word  to  Black  Kettle  that  you  intended  to 
attack  him  or  his  band  at  any  time? 

Answer.  None,  whatever.  It  was  a  surprise,  made  without  any  notice  what¬ 
ever  to  them. 

Question.  What  number  of  women  and  children  were  killed  there? 

Answer.  I  do  not  know.  I  made  a  report  to  Colonel  Cliivington  the  next 
day.  I  made  it  partly  upon  information  I  had  received  through  the  men  who 
were  with  me,  and  partly  from  observation.  I  stated  to  him  that  there  were 
300  Indians  killed,  including  women  and  children.  I  have  ascertained  since 
that  there  were  not  so  many  killed ;  at  least  I  am  satisfied  that  there  were  not 
over  125  killed.  At  one  time  I  sent  out  a  scouting  party  and  told  them  to  look 
over  the  ground.  They  came  back  and  reported  to  me  that  they  had  counted 
69  dead  bodies  there.  About  two-thirds  of  those  were  women  and  children. 

Question.  Was  your  command  a  mounted  command? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir. 

Question.  How  did  the  remainder  of  the  Indians  escape? 

Answer.  On  foot. 

Question.  What  kind  of  country  was  it  ? 

Answer.  Prairie  country,  slightly  rolling ;  grass  very  short. 

Question.  Do  you  say  that  Colonel  Chivington’s  command  of  700  mounted 
men  allowed  500  of  these  Indians  to  escape? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir;  and  we  ourselves  lost  49  in  killed  and  wounded. 

Question.  Why  did  you  not  pursue  the  flying  Indians  and  kill  them  ? 

Answer.  I  do  not  know ;  that  was  the  fault  1  found  with  Colonel  Chivington 
at  the  time. 

Question.  Did  he  call  off  the  troops  ? 

Answer.  No,  sir.  The  Indians  took  a  position  in  the  bed  of  the  creek,  which 
was  from  200  to  500  yards  wide.  The  banks  upon  the  side  of  the  creek  were 
two  or  three  feet  high,  in  some  places  as  high  as  ten  feet ;  the  bed  of  the  creek 
was  of  sand,  and  perfectly  level.  The  Indian  warriors  took  their  position  right 
along  the  bank,  dug  holes  in  the  sand  in  which  to  secrete  themselves,  and  fired 
upon  our  men  in  that  way.  We  fought  them  there.  While  the  women  and 
children  were  escaping,  the  men  stood  under  the  bank  and  fought  us  all  day. 

Question.  How  many  pieces  of  artillery  did  you  have  ? 

Answer.  We  had  four  pieces. 

Question.  And  the  Indians  held  you  in  check  there  for  seven  hours  ? 

Answer.  I  think  fully  seven  hours.  I  was  ordered  back  eighteen  miles  on 
the  road  before  the  firing  ceased. 

Question.  Did  you  capture  any  prisoners? 

Answer.  Before  I  left  I  saw  two  prisoners  in  the  Indian  lodges,  in  their 
camp,  where  our  men  were  quartered. 

Question.  Did  you  ever  see  those  prisoners  after  Colonel  Chivington  re¬ 
turned  ? 

Answer.  Only  one  of  them,  Charles  Bent. 

Question.  What  became  of  the  other  ? 

Answer.  I  only  ascertained  from  common  report.  I  went  to  Colonel  Chiv¬ 
ington  and  told  him  that  Jack  Smith  was  a  man  he  might  make  very  useful  to 
him ;  that  he  could  be  made  a  good  guide  or  scout  for  us  ;  “  but,”  said  I  to  him, 
“  unless  you  give  your  men  to  understand  that  you  want  the  man  saved,  he  is 
going  to  be  killed.  He  will  be  killed  before  to-morrow  morning,  unless  you 
give  your  men  to  understand  that  you  don’t  want  him  killed.”  Colonel  Chiv¬ 
ington  replied,  “  I  have  given  my  instructions ;  have  told  my  men  not  to  take 
any  prisoners.  I  have  no  further  instructions  to  give.”  I  replied  to  him 
that  he  could  make  that  man  very  useful,  and  I  thought  that  perhaps 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


23 


lie  had  better  give  the  men  to  understand  that  he  did  not  want  him  killed. 
The  colonel  replied  again,  “I  said  at  the  start  that  I  did  not  want  any  prisoners 
taken,  and  I  have  no  further  instructions  to  give.”  I  then  left  him.  I  learned 
afterwards  that  Jack  Smith  was  killed  in  the  camp,  in  an  Indian  lodge. 

Question.  Jack  Smith  was  a  half-breed1? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir. 

Question.  And  an  interpreter? 

Answer.  I  had  never  met  him  but  once.  He  spoke  English  and  Indian. 

Question.  Where  was  Jack  Smith’s  father  at  that  time? 

Answer.  He  was  in  the  Indian  camp,  trading  with  the  Indians  by  my  per¬ 
mission  ;  and  at  the  same  time  I  had  sent  him  there  partly  as  a  spy  upon  the* 
camp.  I  wanted  to  know  what  movements  they  were  going  to  make.  When  I 
was  about  to  send  him  out  there  he  said  he  wanted  to  take  some  goods  out  there 
to  tra.de  with  the  Indians,  and  1  gave  my  permission. 

Question.  What  property  was  captured  there  ? 

Answer.  About  700  horses,  I  should  think ;  quite  a  large  number  of  buffalo 
robes.  I  do  not  know  how  many,  though  I  think  1  saw  150  buffalo  robes.  There 
were  a  great  many  lodges,  which  were  all  burned.  There  were  a  great  many 
blankets  ;  some  few  bows  and  arrows,  and  I  saw  some  few  guns.  However, 
outside  of  horses,  the  value  to  the  white  man  of  the  whole  would  be  very  little. 

By  Mr.  Buckalew  : 

Question.  Were  there  any  mules? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir,  there  were  some  mules  ;  I  saw  a  few  mules  branded  “  U. 
S.,”  that  were  being  driven  away. 

By  Mr.  Loan  : 

Question.  What  was  done  with  that  property  ? 

Answer.  I  have  never  learned  since. 

Question.  Hid  you  have  possession  or  control  of  any  of  that  property  ? 

Answer.  Colonel  Chivington  instructed  me  to  order  my  quartermaster  to  re¬ 
ceive  the  stock,  and  feed  them  full  rations  of  corn  and  hay  while  they  remained 
at  Fort  Lyon.  But  there  were  only  407  head  received  at  Fort  Lyon,  as  I  after¬ 
wards  ascertained.  As  to  the  balance,  I  received  information  that  led  me  to  believe 
that  225  head  of  the  stock  was  run  off  into  New  Mexico  by  a  portion  of  Col¬ 
onel  Chivington’s  command  ;  60  more  driven  up  the  river  nearly  100  miles, 
were  there  met  by  an  officer  who  was  coming  down,  and  he  brought  them  back 
to  Fort  Lyon.  When  Colonel  Chivington’s  command  left  Fort  Lyon  he  took 
away  all  of  this  stock  that  was  there,  and  I  have  never  heard  of  it  since. 

Question.  Who  issued  the  order  to  your  quartermaster  directing  him  to  de¬ 
liver  this  property  over  to  Colonel  Chivington  ? 

Answer.  There  was  no  written  order.  A  verbal  order  was  given  me  by 
Colonel  Chivington,  which  I  turned  over  to  the  quartermaster. 

Question.  To  whom  was  that  stock  delivered  ? 

Answer.  To  Colonel  Shoup. 

Question.  What  position  did  he  hold  as  an  accounting  officer  ? 

Answer.  There  was  no  quartermaster,  I  think,  that  ever  had  it  in  charge, 
with  the  exception  of  the  acting  assistant  quartermaster  at  Fort  Lyon,  who  took 
it  in  charge  for  a  few  days,  by  verbal  order  from  Colonel  Chivington,  and 
turned  it  over  again  in  the  same  manner. 

Question.  Ho  you  know  of  any  acts  of  hostility  committed  by  Black  Kettle 
or  any  of  his  band  that  were  encamped  on  Sand  creek  ? 

Answer.  I  do  not,  except  this  :  1  was  out  with  Major  General  Blunt  in  an 
engagement  with  the  Indians  on  Pawnee  fork.  There  was  one  man  there  at 
that  time  whom  I  afterwards  recognized  as  being  of  Black  Kettle’s  party,  and 
who  fought  us  at  Pawnee  fork ;  that  was  War  Bonnet.  He  was  at  Pawnee 
fork,  and  was  very  active  there.  He  apparently  had  charge  of  a  small  band 
of  Indians.  It  was  on  the  26t.h  of  August  that  we  fought  them  there. 


24 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Question.  How  long  had  you  been  acquainted  with  War  Bonnet  ? 

Answer.  I  had  met  him  but  twice,  with  the  exception  of  that  fight  I  had 
with  him  on  Pawnee  fork. 

Question.  You  had  met  him  twice  previous  to  that? 

Answer.  Since  that. 

Question.  Where  did  you  first  meet  him  after  that? 

Answer.  At  Fort  Lyon. 

Question.  Why  did  you  not  then  arrest  him  and  punish  him  for  fighting  at 

Pawnee  fork .? 

Answer.  I  thought  if  I  did  so  it  would  enrage  the  balance  of  the  Indians, 
who  were  then  encamped  at  Smoke  Hill,  and  I  was  trying  to  keep  them  quiet, 
until  such  time  as  a  sufficient  number  of  troops  had  arrived  to  enable  us  to  go 
out  and  tight  the  whole  party. 

Question.  If  you  had  reason  to  think  that  Black  Kettle,  or  any  of  his  party, 
intended  to  fight  against  the  United  States,  or  the  whites,  state  what  that 
reason  was. 

Answer.  I  had  no  reason  to  suppose  it  further  than  my  general  knowledge  of 
the  Indian  character.  I  have  been  there  for  upwards  of  two  years,  and  during 
that  time  it  has  been  the  constant  complaint  of  travellers  upon  the  road  that 
the  Indians  were  annoying  their  trains,  even  when  they  did  not  profess  to  be 
at  war  at  all.  It  had  always  been  a  source  of  constant  annoyance  to  us  there. 
Trains  came  into  the  post  and  complained  that  the  Indians  were  taking  their 
property  from  them. 

Question.  How  far  from  Fort  Lyon  were  Black  Kettle  and  his  people  en¬ 
camped  when  you  made  the  attack  ? 

Answer.  Between  HO  and  40  miles. 

Question.  Why  was  not  Mr.  Smith,  the  trader,  also  killed  ? 

Answer.  As  I  came  up  with  my  command,  my  men  formed  in  line  very  close 
to  the  Indian  camp  ;  -among  the  first  persons  I  saw  was  John  Smith.  I  had  not 
given  any  instructions  to  my  men  to  fire.  Firing  was  going  on  on  both  sides 
of  me,  a  portion  of  Colonel  Chivington’s  command  on  the  right  and  another 
portion  on  the  left  were  firing.  I  did  not  give  any  instructions  to  my  men  to 
fire.  I  saw  John  Smith,  who  appeared  to  be  frightened,  and  I  rode  out  in  front 
of  my  men  and  called  out  to  him  to  come  to  me.  I  held  up  my  hands,  called  him 
by  name,  and  swung  my  hat  at  him.  He  started  towards  me,  and  as  he  started, 
I  supposed  he  imagined  some  one  was  firing  at  him.  Whether  they  were  or  not  I 
do  not  know ;  I  did  not  see  any  shots  fired  at  him.  I  am  sure  no  man  of  mine 
fired.  At  that  time  all  the  command,  with  the  exception  of  my  men,  were  firing. 
As  I  was  calling  out  to  him  to  come  to  me,  he  turned  and  started  to  run  the 
other  way.  Just  at  that  time  one  of  my  men  rode  out  and  said,  “  Major,  let 
me  bring  him  out.”  The  man  rode  past  me,  and  as  he  rode  around  Smith,  to 
take  hold  of  him  and  lead  him  out  of  the  Indian  camp,  he  was  shot;  at  least 
I  thought  so  from  his  motions  in  the  saddle.  He  passed  on  by  again,  and  his 
horse  was  shot  down.  After  his  horse  was  shot  down  he  attempted  to  get  up, 
and  some  Indian  ran  up  to  him,  snatched  his  gun  from  him,  and  beat  him  over 
the  head  and  killed  him.  That  was  the  first  man  of  our  command  I  saw  killed. 
The  Indians  at  that  time  commenced  firing  upon  me,  and  then  my  men  com¬ 
menced  firing.  t 

By  Mr.  Buckalew  : 

Question.  What  became  of  Smith  ? 

Answer,  vl  did  not  know  what  became  of  him ;  I  did  not  see  him  for  three  or 
four  hours  afterwards.  The  next  I  saw  of  him  he  was  coming  down  the  bank 
of  the  river,  with  some  of  our  soldiers. 

By  Mr.  Loan : 

Question.  What  became  of  the  buffalo  robes  that  were  taken  there  ? 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


25 


Answer.  I  do  not  know.  I  had  some  buffalo  robes,  my  own  bedding,  which 
went  at  the  same  time,  and  we  have  never  been  able  to  ascertain  what  became  of 
them.  I  went  to  Colonel  Chivington  and  reported  to  him  that  John  Smith  had 
lost  all  his  buffalo  robes;  I  wanted  them  recovered.  He  said  to  me,  “You  go  to 
John  Smith  and  tell  him  that  he  need  have  no  fear  at  all  about  the  matter;  I 
will  give  an  order  confiscating  that  property  for  the  use  of  the  hospital.  ”  I 
afterwards  ascertained  that  I  had  lost  all  my  own  bedding  and  buffalo  robes, 
and  also  provision  for  ten  men  for  thirty  days,  that  I  had  taken  out  there.  The 
colonel  said,  “  Well,  we  will  give  you  an  order  confiscating  that  for  the  use  of  the 
hospital,  and  you  can  be  reimbursed ;  you  shall  not  lose  a  cent.  ”  However, 
the  order  never  was  issued,  confiscating  the  property. 

Question.  Do  you  know  by  what  authority  the  225  head  of  stock  were  taken 
off  to  New  Mexico  ? 

Answer.  I  do  not.  Captain  Cook  told  me  he  knew  how  many  men  there 
were,  and  he  knew  who  had  them  in  charge;  but  he  never  gave  me  the  names. 

This  is  the  way  in  which  we  have  been  situated  out  there.  I  have  been  in  com¬ 
mand  of  a  body  of  troops  at  Fort  Larned  or  Fort  Lyon  for  upwards  of  two  years. 
About  two  years  ago  in  September  the  Indians  were  professing  to  be  perfectly 
friendly.  These  were  the  Cheyennes,  the  Camanches,  the  Apaches,  the  Arapa- 
hoes,  the  Kiowas,  encamped  at  different  points  on  the  Arkansas  river  between 
Fort  Larned  and  Fort  Lyon.  Trains  were  going  up  to  Fort  Lyon  frequently, 
and  scarcely  a  train  came  in  but  had  some  complaint  to  make  about  the  Indians. 
I  recollect  that  one  particular  day  three  trains  came  in  to  the  post  and  reported 
to  me  that  the  Indians  had  robbed  them  of  their  provisions.  We  at  the  post 
had  to  issue  provisions  to  them  constantly.  Trains  that  were  carrying  govern¬ 
ment  freight  to  New  Mexico  would  stop  there  and  get  their  supplies  replenished 
on  account  of  the  Indians  having  taken  theirs  on  the  road. 

At  one  time  I  took  two  pieces  of  artillery  and  125  men,  and  went  down  to  meet 
the  Indians.  As  soon  as  I  got  there  they  were  apparently  friendly.  A  Kio¬ 
wa  chief  perhaps  would  say  to  me  that  his  men  were  perfectly  friendly,  and 
felt  all  right  towards  the  whites,  but  the  Arapahoes  were  very  bad  Indians. 
Go  to  the  Arapahoe  camp,  they  would  perhaps  charge  everything  upon  the  Ca¬ 
manches,  while  the  Camanches  would  charge  it  upon  the  Cheyennes ;  yet  each 
band  there  was  professing  friendship  towards  us. 

These  troubles  have  been  going  on  for  some  time,  until  the  settlers  in  that 
part  of  the  country,  and  all  through  western  Kansas  and  Colorado  do  not  think 
they  can  bear  it.  When  these  troubles  commenced  upwards  of  a  year  ago  I 
received  information  that  led  me  to  believe  that  the  Indians  were  going  to  make  a 
general  war  this  last  spring.  I  supposed  so  at  the  time.  They  were  endeavoring 
by  every  means  to  purchase  arms  and  ammunition.  They  would  offer  the  best  horse 
they  had  for  a  revolver,  or  a  musket,  or  a  little  ammunition. 

This  last  spring  it  seemed  to  have  commenced ;  I  do  not  know  how.  I  know, 
however,  that  at  the  different  posts  they  were  professing  friendship.  They  were 
encamped  in  pretty  large  numbers  in  the  vicinity  of  the  posts,  and  while  their 
women  and  children  were  dancing  right  alongside  the  officers’  quarters,  the 
Indians  secreted  themselves  in  a  ravine  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  post,  and  at 
a  signal  jumped  out  and  run  off  the  stock,  firing  at  the  guards;  at  the  same  time 
the  women  and  children  jumped  on  their  ponies,  and  away  they  went.  They 
burned  down  the  bridges,  and  almost  held  the  post  under  their  control  for  three 
or  four  days.  About  the  same  time  they  commenced  depredations  on  the  road. 
The  mails  could  not  pass  without  a  pretty  large  escort.  At  least,  whenever  we 
sent  them  without  an  escort  the  Indians  attacked  them,  and  the  people  consid¬ 
ered  it  very  unsafe  to  travel  the  roads. 

When  the  Indians  took  their  prisoners  (in  fact,  however,  they  generally  took 
no  prisoners)  near  Simmering  spring,  they  killed  ten  men.  I  was  told  by 
Captain  Davis,  of  the  California  volunteers,  that  the  Indians  cut  off’  the  heads 


26 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS 


of  the  men  after  they  had  scalped  them,  and  piled  them  in  a  pile  on  the  ground, 
and  danced  around  them,  and  kicked  their  bodies  around  over  the  ground,  &c. 
It  is  the  general  impression  among  the  people  of  that  country  that  the  only  way 
to  fight  Indians  is  to  fight  them  as  they  fight  us  ;  if  they  scalp  and  mutilate  the 
bodies  we  must  do  the  same. 

I  recollect  one  occasion,  when  I  had  a  fight  on  Pawnee  fork  with  the  In¬ 
dians  there,  I  had  fifty-nine  men  with  me,  and  the  Indians  numbered  several 
hundred.  I  was  retreating,  and  they  had  followed  me  then  about  five  miles. 
I  had  eleven  men  of  my  party  shot  at  that  time.  I  had  with  my  party  then  a 
few  Delaware  Indians,  and  one  Captain  Fall-Leaf,  of  the  Delaware  tribe,  had 
his  horse  shot;  we  had  to  stop  every  few  minutes,  dismount  and  fire  upon  the 
Indians  to  keep  them  off.  They  formed  a  circle  right  around  us.  Finally  we 
shot  down  one  Indian  very  close  to  us.  I  saw  Fall-Leaf  make  a  movement  as 
though  he  wanted  to  scalp  the  Indian.  I  asked  him  if  he  wanted  that  Indian’s 
scalp,  and  he  said  he  did.  We  kept  up  a  fire  to  keep  the  Indians  off,  while  he 
went  down  and  took  off  his  scalp,  and  gave  his  Delaware  war-whoop.  That 
seemed  to  strike  more  terror  into  those  Indians  than  anything  else  we  had  done 
that  day.  And  I  do  think,  that  if  it  had  not  been  for  that  one  thing,  we  should 
have  lost  a  great  many  more  of  my  men.  I  think  it  struck  a  terror  to  them,  so 
that  they  kept  away  from  us. 

It  is  the  general  impression  of  the  people  of  that  country  that  the  only  way 
to  fight  them  is  to  fight  as  they  fight;  kill  their  women  and  children  and  kill 
them.  At  the  same  time,  of  course,  we  consider  it  a  barbarous  practice. 

Question.  Did  the  troops  mutilate  the  Indians  killed  at  Sand  creek  ? 

Answer.  They  did  in  some  instances  that  I  know  of ;  but  I  saw  nothing 
to  the  extent  I  have  since  heard  stated. 

Question.  State  what  you  saw. 

Answer.  I  saw  one  man  dismount  from  his  horse;  he  was  standing  by  the 
side  of  Colonel  Chivington.  There  was  a  dead  squaw  there  who  had  apparently 
been  killed  some  little  time  before.  The  man  got  down  off’  his  horse,  took  hold 
of  the  squaw,  took*  out  his  knife  and  tried  to  cut  off  her  scalp.  I  thought  the 
squaw  had  been  scalped  before ;  a  spot  on  the  side  of  the  head  had  evidently 
been  cut  off  before  with  a  knife ;  it  might  possibly  have  been  done  by  a  grape-shot, 
or  something  of  that  kind.  I  saw  a  great  many  Indians  and  squaws  that  had 
been  scalped ;  I  do  not  know  how  many,  but  several.  There  have  been  different 
reports  about  these  matters.  I  heard  a  report  some  twenty  days  after  the 
fight — I  saw  a  notice  in  Colonel  Chivington’s  report — that  a  scalp  three  days 
old,  a  white  woman’s  scalp,  was  found  in  the  Cheyenne  camp.  I  did  not  hear 
anything  about  that  until  after  Colonel  Chivington  had  reached  Denver.  I  was 
with  him  for  ten  days  after  the  fight,  and  never  heard  a  word  about  a  white 
woman’s  scalp  being  found  in  the  camp  until  afterwards. 

On  the  other  hand,  on  the  day  I  left  Fort  Lyon  to  come  east,  on  the  30th  of 
January,  I  saw  an  official  report  from  Major  Wynkoop,  together  with  affidavits 
from  different  men ;  among  them  was  one  man  who  was  my  adjutant  at  that 
time ;  he  speaks  in  his  affidavit  about  the  bodies  of  the  Indians  having  been  so 
badly  mutilated,  their  privates  cut  off,  and  all  that  kind  of  thing.  I  never  saw 
anything  of  that;  and  I  never  heard  it  until  I  saw  it  in  those  affidavits  at  Fort 
Lyon,  two  months  after  the  fight.  Yet  it  was  a  matter  of  daily  conversation 
between  us  at  the  posts.  I,  however,  did  myself  see  some  bodies  on  the  ground 
that  were  mutilated. 

Question.  Anything  further  than  you  have  stated? 

Answer.  No,  sir.  I  saw  what  convinced  me  that,  in  attempting  to  escape 
with  two  children,  one  squaw  had  been  mortally  wounded,  and  had  drawn  her 
e,  gathered  her  two  children  near  her,  and  cut  both  of  their  throats.  That 
not  done  by  our  men.  I  did  not  see  any  one  mutilating  any  Indian,  with 

/ 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


27 


the  exception  of  the  one  man  I  have  spoken  of,  while  Colonel  Chivington  was 
standing  by  the  side  of  him. 

I  saw  one  instance,  however.  There  was  one  little  child,  probably  threer 
years  old,  just  big  enough  to  walk  through  the  sand.  The  Indians  had  gone 
ahead,  and  this  little  child  was  behind  following  after  them.  The  little  fellow 
was  perfectly  naked,  travelling  on  the  sand.  I  saw  one  man  get  off  his  horse, 
at  a  distance  of  about  seventy-five  yards,  and  draw  up  his  rifle  and  fire — he 
missed  the  child.  Another  man  came  up  and  said,  “Let  me  try  the  son  of  a 
bitch ;  I  can  hit  him.”  He  got  down  off’  his  horse,  kneeled  down  and  fired  at 
the  little  child,  but  he  missed  him.  A  third  man  came  up  and  made  a  similar 
remark,  and  fired,  and  the  little  fellow  dropped. 

By  Mr.  Buckalew: 

Question.  Those  were  men  of  your  command  ] 

Answer.  Of  Colonel  Chivington’s  command. 

By  Mr.  Loan : 

Question.  Had  the  officers  control  of  their  men  at  that  time1? 

Answer.  There  did  not  seem  to  be  any  control. 

Question.  Could  the  officers  have  controlled  their  men,  or  were  the  men  act¬ 
ing  in  defiance  of  the  orders  of  their  officers  ? 

Answer.  I  did  not  hear  any  orders  given  but  what  w^ere  obeyed.  As  a  gen¬ 
eral  thing  the  officers  and  men  were  doing  just  what  they  saw  fit  to  do. 

By  Mr.  Gooch : 

Question.  Did  you  communicate  to  Colonel  Chivington,  when  he  came  to 
Fort  Lyon,  the  relations  you  had  had  with  those  Indians  1 

Answer.  Yes,  sir. 

Question.  Did  you,  under  the  circumstances,  approve  of  this  attack  upon 
those  Indians'? 

Answer.  I  did  not. 

Question.  Did  you  not  feel  that  you  were  bound  in  good  faith  not  to  attack 
those  Indians  after  they  had  surrendered  to  you,  and  after  they  had  taken  up  a 
position  which  you  yourself  had  indicated  1 

Answer.  I  did  not  consider  that  they  had  surrendered  to  me  ;  I  never  would 
consent  that  they  should  surrender  to  me.  My  instructions  were  such  that  I 
felt  in  duty  bound  to  fight  them  wherever  I  found  them;  provided  I  considered 
it  good  policy  to  do  so.  I  did  not  consider  it  good  policy  to  attack  this  party 
of  Indians  on  Sand  creek  unless  I  was  strong  enough  to  go  on  and  fight  the 
main  band  at  the  Smoke  Hills,  some  seventy  miles  further.  If  I  had  had  that 
force  I  should  have  gone  out  and  fought  this  band  on  Sand  creek. 

Question.  The  Arapahoes  had  surrendered  to  you  ] 

Answer.  I  considered  them  differently  from  the  Cheyennes. 

Question.  They  were  with  the  Cheyennes,  or  a  part  of  them  were  1 

Answer.  I  understood  afterwards  that  some  six  or  eight  or  ten  lodges  of  the 
Arapahoes  were  there. 

Question.  Did  you  not  know  at  the  time  you  made  this  attack  that  those 
Arapahoes  were  there  with  the  Cheyennes  % 

Answer.  I  did  not.  A  part  of  the  Cheyennes  had  left ;  a  part  of  them  said 
they  did  not  believe  we  at  the  post  felt  friendly  towards  them;  and  I  have  since  / 
learned  that  a  part  of  them  had  left. 

Question.  These  very  Indians  had  come  in  and  held  communication  with 
you,  and  had  taken  up  the  position  you  had  directed  them  to  take  ? 

Answer.  No,  sir;  1  told  them  they  should  not  remain  on  the  road,  but  they 
might  go  back  on  Sand  creek,  or  some  place  where  they  could  kill  game. 


28 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Question.  You  advised  them  to  go  there  ] 

Answer.  Yes,  sir. 

*  Question.  Did  you  not  suppose  that  they  understood  from  you  that  if  they 
went  there  and  behaved  themselves  they  would  not  be  attacked  by  you  ? 

Answer.  I  do  not  thiuk  they  thought  so.  I  think  they  were  afraid  I  was 
going  to  attack  them.  I  judge  so  from  words  that  came  to  me  like  this  :  “  That 
they  did  not  like  that  red-eyed  chief ;  that  they  believed  he  wanted  to  fight 
them.” 

Question.  You  say  you  did  not  approve  of  the  attack  upon  them  by  Colonel 
Chivington.  Did  you  remonstrate  with  Colonel  Chivington  against  making  that 
attack  1 

Answer.  I  did. 

Question.  You  felt  that  you  ought  not  to  make  the  attack  under  the  circum¬ 
stances  % 

Answer.  I  did.  I  made  a  great  many  harsh  remarks  in  regard  to  it.  At  the 
same  time  I  did  not  so  much  object  to  the  killing  of  the  Indians,  as  a  matter 
of  principle — merely  as  a  matter  of  policy.  I  considered  it  a  very  bad  policy, 
as  it  would  open  up  the  war  in  that  whole  country  again,  which  was  quiet  for 
the  time.  I  am  very  well  satisfied  the  Indians  intended  a  general  outbreak  as 
soon  as  the  weather  would  permit.  * 

Question.  You  think  the  attack  made  upon  those  Indians  there,  in  addition  to 
the  other  characteristics  which  it  possesses,  was  impolitic  ? 

Answer.  I  do,  very  much  so.  I  think  it  was  the  occasion  of  what  has  occurred 
on  the  Platte  since  that  time.  I  have  so  stated  in  my  report  to  the  headquarters 
of  the  district  and  of  the  department.  I  stated  before  Colonel  Chivington  arrived 
there  that  the  Indians  were  encamped  at  this  point ;  that  I  had  a  force  with  me 
sufficiently  strong  to  go  out  and  fight  them  ;  but  I  did  not  think  it  policy  to  do 
so,  for  I  was  not  strong  enough  to  fight  the  main  band.  If  I  fought  this  band, 
the  main  band  would  immediately  strike  the  settlements.  But  so  soon  as  the 
party  should  be  strong  enough  to  fight  the  main  band,  I  should  be  in  favor  of 
making  the  war  general  against  the  Indians.  I  stated  to  them  also  that  I  did 
not  believe  we  could  fight  one  band  without  fighting  them  all ;  that  in  case  we 
fought  one  party  of  Indians  and  whipped  them,  those  that  escaped  would  go 
into  another  band  that  was  apparently  friendly,  and  that  band  would  secrete 
those  who  had  been  committing  depredations  before.  As  it  was  with  Little 
Haven’s  band  ;  his  own  sons  attacked  a  train  a  short  distance  above  Fort  Lyon, 
killed  one  soldier,  took  a  government  wagon  and  mules,  some  horses,  and  took 
some  women  prisoners.  One  woman  they  afterwards  outraged,  and  she  hung 
herself;  the  other  one,  I  think,  they  still  hold..  Some  of  the  Indians  have 
married  her,  as  they  call  it,  and  she  is  still  held  in  their  camp,  as  I  have  under¬ 
stood  ;  not  now  in  the  camp  of  those  who  took  her  prisoner,  but  she  has  been 
sold  to  the  Sioux  and  Cheyennes.  The  instructions  we  constantly  received 
from  the  headquarters,  both  of  the  district  and  the  department,  were  that  we 
should  show  as  little  mercy  to  the  Indians  as  possible. 

By  Mr.  Loan : 

Question.  Could  you  furnish  us  copies  of  those  instructions  1 

Answer.  I  have  in  the  city  some  private  letters,  and  I  think  I  have  also 
some  confidential  communications,  that  go  to  show  something  of  that  nature. 

Question.  I  should  be  glad  to  have  copies  of  some  of  them. 

Answer.  I  think  I  have  some  of  them.  I  have  copies  of  some  letters  I  wrote 
to  department  and  district  headquarters.  My  reports  were  always  approved  ; 
they  sent  back  word  every  time  that  my  reports  were  approved.  I  stated  that 
I  would  hold  on  to  those  Indians ;  let  them  remain  dormant  until  such  time  as 
troops  enough  arrived  to  fight  the  main  band.  They  always  approved  my 
action  in  the  matter.  When  Colonel  Chivington  arrived  there  with  his  com¬ 
mand,  I  immediately  reported  to  headquarters' that  he  had  arrived. 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


29 


Question.  Wlio  was  the  district  commander  ? 

Answer.  Major  Henning. 

Question.  How  did  a  major  command  a  colonel  ? 

Answer.  Colonel  Chivington  was  in  entirely  another  district.  The  district  I 
was  in  was  in  upper  Arkansas,  and  was  commanded  by  Major  Heiftiing.  Colonel 
Chivington  commanded  the  district  of  Colorado. 

Question.  Then  Fort  Lyon  was  not  in  Colonel  Cliivington’s  district? 

Answer.  No,  sir. 

Question.  By  what  authority  did  you  act  in  concert  with  Colonel  Chivington  ? 

Answer.  By  the  authority  of  the  instructions  I  had  received  from  my  own 
district  commander,  that  I  should  fight  the  Indians  wherever  I  met  them.  When 
Colonel  Chivington  came  down  I  talked  with  him  ;  he  told  me  where  he  was 
going,  and  asked  me  if  I  wanted  to  go  with  him.  I  told  him  if  he  was  going 
to  make  a  general  war  with  the  Indians  I  did.  He  gave  me  to  understand  that 
he  was  going  to  make  it  general. 

Question.  Can  you  furnish  us  a  copy  of  those  instructions  that  authorized  you 
to  go  under  Colonel  Chivington  when  he  was  out  of  his  district  ? 

Answer.  I  had  no  instructions  to  go  under  him  at  all.  I  have,  however,  some 
papers  to  show  the  feeling  in  regard  to  the  district.  I  told  Colonel  Chivington, 
several  times  on  that  march  to  Sand  creek,  that  One  Eye  was  there,  employed 
by  me;  that  Black  Kettle  was  there,  and  that  I  considered  Black  Kettle  friendly 
towards  us;  that  Left  Hand  was  there;  that,  probably,  John  Smith  was  there 
by  my  permission ;  that  there  was  a  soldier  there  with  Smith  whom  I  had  sent 
off  as  a  sort  of  spy,  too ;  and  that  I  wanted,  if  he  did  fight  those  Indians,  by  all 
means  to  save  those  parties ;  that  if  he  did  fight  them  he  should  give  notice 
beforehand  in  order  to  get  them  out.  I  advised  him  to  surround  the  camp,  and 
not  let  one  escape,  and  then  push  right  forward  and  fight  the  main  band;  that 
he  was  strong  enough  for  them.  I  believed  at  the  time  that  if  we  should  attack 
the  main  band,  it  would  put  an  end  to  all  our  Indian  troubles  there.  And  I 
supposed  he  was  going  to  do  it ;  that  was  the  understanding  at  the  time  we  left 
Fort  Lyon.  I  took  twenty-three  days’  rations  for  my  men,  with  the  under¬ 
standing  that  we  were  to  be  gone  at  least  that  length  of  time. 


Testimony  of  Major  S.  G.  Colley. 

Washington,  March  14,  1865. 
Major  S.  G.  Colley  sworn  and  examined. 

By  Mr.  Loan : 

Question.  Where  do  you  reside? 

Answer.  At  Fort  Lyon. 

Question.  Do  you  hold  any  official  position,  civil  or  military  ? 

Answer.  I  am  an  Indian  agent. 

Question.  Will  you  state  what  you  know  of  the  Indians  out  there,  their  dis¬ 
position  towards  the  whites,  &c.,  and  what  you  know  about  the  massacre  at 
Sand  creek  ? 

Answer.  I  was  not  present  at  that  fight. 

Question.  How  long  have  you  been  agent  for  those  Indians  ? 

Answer.  My  appointment  was  in  July,  1861. 

Question.  Were  you  intimately  acquainted  with  the  character  and  conduct  of 
Black  Kettle  and  his  band  of  Indians? 

Answer.  I  think  I  was.  » 

Question.  What  do  you  know  about  Left  Hand’s  band  of  the  Arapahoes? 


» 


30 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Answer.  I  know  nothing  bad  about  them.  I  have  been  with  them  hundreds 
of  times. 

Question.  What  has  been  their  general  character  for  peace  and  good  conduct 
towards  the  whites  ?  Have  they  been  guilty  of  any  acts  of  hostility,  theft,  or 
anything  of  the  kind  ? 

Answer.  Nearly  a  year  ago  I  heard  of  some  troubles  on  the  Platte  with  some 
Cheyenne  Indians.  When  the  treaty  was  made  with  those  Indians  in  1860, 
before  I  went  out  there,  there  was  claimed  to  be  two  bands  of  Cheyennes  and 
^  Arapahoes ;  the  one  of  the  North  Platte,  and  the  one  of  the  South  Platte. 
This  North  Platte  band  was  not  a  party  to  that  treaty,  and  were  dissatisfied 
with  it.  There  was  an  effort  made  to  get  those  Indians  to  join  the  southern 
band,  as  it  was  called,  but  the  effort  was  never  successful.  The  governor,  my¬ 
self,  and  another  man  met  the  northern  Indians  to  see  if  we  could  not  get  them 
to  unite  with  the  southern  Indians,  and  all  go  on  a  reservation.  But  we  failed 
in  that.  Early  in  the  spring  of  last  year  I  understood  from  Denver,  perhaps 
from  Governor  Evans  himself,  that  there  had  been  a  collision  between  the  sol¬ 
diers  and  Indians.  I  did  not  know  what  effect  it  would  have  upon  our  Indians 
below.  I  immediately  went  out  and  found  all  the  Indians  I  could,  and  commu¬ 
nicated  with  them,  and  told  them  there  had  been  trouble  on  the  Platte,  and 
asked  them  if  they  knew  anything  about  it.  They  said  they  had  heard  of  it, 
but  supposed  it  was  some  of  the  Dog  Soldiers  over  there,  as  this  northern  band 
is  called.  They  said  they  themselves  did  not  want  to  have  any  trouble,  but  if 
the  soldiers  followed  them  up  they  supposed  they  would  have  to  fight.  I  told 
them  I  wished  they  would  come  in  on  the  Arkansas  as  close  as  they  could  and 
stay  there,  and  be  out  of  trouble.  Previous  to  this,  for  two  years,  we  have  been 
satisfied  that  there  was  an  effort  being  made  by  the  Sioux  Indians  to  induce 
these  Indians  to  join  them  and  make  war  upon  the  whites.  We  have  labored 
for  two  years  to  keep  it  down.  The  Sioux  Indians,  many  of  them  from  Min¬ 
nesota,  are  there  in  that  country,  and  have  been  endeavoring  to  unite  these 
Indians  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  general  war  upon  the  whites.  These 
Indians  said  the  Sioux  had  been  there  with  the  war-pipe,  but  they  did  not 
mean  to  go  to  war  with  the  whites. 

There  were  a  great  many  depredations  committed  below  our  place,  at  Earned, 
by  some  Indians.  It  was  sometimes  reported  that  all  the  bands  were  engaged 
in  them;  then  it  was  reported  that  they  were  committed  by  the  Sioux.  It  was 
impossible  to  ascertain  what  Indians  were  engaged.  But  so  far  as  I  met 
the  Cheyennes  and  the  Arapahoes  on  the  Arkansas,  they  disclaimed  it,  and 
pretended  to  be  friendly. 

In  June  last  I  received  a  circular  from  Governor  Evans,  requesting  me  to 
invite  any  of  the  Indians  that  had  not  been  at  war  with  the  whites  to  Fort 
Lyon;  the  Cheyennes  and  Arapahoes  of  the  North  Platte  to  Fort  Collins;  the 
Cheyennes  and  Arapahoes  of  the  Arkansas  at  Fort  Lyon;  the  Kiowas  and 
Camanches  at  Earned,  and  tell  them  if  they  would  come  in  and  behave  them¬ 
selves,  they  should  be  fed  and  cared  for.  I  immediately  sent  Mr.  Smith,  Jack 
Smith,  who  was  killed,  and  Colonel  Bent,  to  all  these  Indians  to  carry  them  this 
information.  During  this  time  occurred  this  trouble  at  Fort  Earned,  by  the 
Kiowas  running  off  the  stock.  Orders  were  then  issued  that  no  Indians  should 
come  to  that  post,  as  I  understood  it.  After  One  Eye  had  come  back  and  said 
he  had  seen  Black  Kettle,  who  said  he  would  bring  in  his  Indians,  I  sent  him 
out  again  to  see  what  was  going  on. 

During  this  time  orders  were  issued,  I  understood  from  General  Curtis,  that 
no  Indians  should  visit  a  military  post;  but  it  was  a  long  while  before  One  Eye 
got  in ;  he  did  not  get  in  until  the  4tli  day  of  September,  and  he  got  in  then  by 
accident.  1^'  he  had  been  met  by  a  soldier  he  would  have  been  shot;  but  he 
happened  to  meet  some  other  soldiers,  who  took  him  prisoner  and  brought  him 
in  then.  Major  Wynkoop  took  him  and  kept  him  in  the  guard-house  that  day. 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


31 


He  told  us  that  there  were  some  white  prisoners  with  the  Cheyennes  whom 
they  had  brought,  and  whom  they  were  willing  to  deliver  up,  if  we  would  go 
out  for  them.  Major  Wynkoop  went  out  with  one  hundred  men,  had  a  conver¬ 
sation  with  the  Indians,  and  brought  in  four  prisoners,  one  girl  and  three 
children. 

Black  Kettle  and  his  principal  men,  some  twenty  or  thirty  of  them,  came  in 
with  Major  Wynkoop,  ail'd  went  to  Denver  and  had  a  conference  with  Governor 
Evans.  The  governor  declined  to  make  any  peace  with  them,  but  turned  them 
over  to  the  military.  Black  Kettle  went  out  and  brought  in  quite  a  number  of 
lodges,  and  the  young  men  came  in  to  the  post. 

Before  this  time,  General  Curtis,  through  representations  from  some  quarter, 
was  apparently  led  to  believe  that  the  Indians  were  behaving  very  badly  at 
Fort  Lyon;  and  Major  Wynkoop  was  relieved  of  his  command  by  Major 
Anthony.  At  that  time  the  Arapahoes  were  there,  being  fed  by  Major  Wynkoop. 
When  Major  Anthony  came,  he  said  he  was  ordered  to  fight  those  Indians;  but 
he  found  things  different  from  what  he  expected,  and  he  did  not  think  it  policy 
then  to  fight  them;  that  there  was  no  danger  from  those  Indians;  they  could 
be  kept  there,  and  killed  at  any  time  it  was  necessary.  lie  told  them  that  he 
did  not  feel  authorized  to  give  them  any  rations,  and  that  they  better  go  out 
a  piece  where  they  could  kill  buffalo. 

After  Major  Wynkoop  had  brought  those  Indians  in,  and  until  after  this 
fight,  I  do  not  know  of  any  depredations  having  been  committed  in  our  country. 
There  may  have  been  some  committed  below  in  the  vicinity  of  Fort  Larned ; 
but  during  that  time,  two  months  or  over,  the  Indians  in  our  country  did  not 
N  commit  any  depredations. 

Question.  Have  you  any  means  of  knowing  the  number  of  Indians  in  that 
camp  on  Sand  creek  ? 

Answer.  I  have  no  personal  knowledge  of  the  number  of  lodges  there.  But 
there  were  about  one  hundred  lodges  of  the  Arapahoes  at  the  post  at  the  time 
Major  Anthony  took  the  command  there.  Left  Hand’s  band  had  gone  out 
to  Sand  creek,  and  Black  Kettle’s  band  of  the  Cheyennes. 

Question.  How  many"  were  in  Left  Hand’s  band  ? 

Answer.  About  eight  lodges. 

Question.  How  many  to  a  lodge  1 

Answer.  About  five. 

Question.  About  how  strong  was  Black  Kettle’s  band  ] 

Answer.  I  do  not  know  of  my  own  knowledge.  I  only  know  from  what 
men  told  me  who  had  counted  them.  At  one  time  when  One  Eye  was  out,  we 
did  suppose,  from  what  we  had  heard,  that  the  Indians  were  all  going  to  unite 
against  us. 

Question.  Judging  from  all  your  information  as  Indian  agent,  have  you  any 
reason  to  believe  that  Black  Kettle  or  Left  Hand  had  been  guilty  of  or  intended 
any  hostility  towards  us  ? 

Answer.  I  have  no  reason  to  believe  that  of  either  of  them. 

Question.  Have  you  any  reason  to  know  that  they  desired  to  remain  at  peace, 
and  were  opposed  to  fighting  the  people  of  the  United  States  ? 

Answer.  Left  Hand,  who  speaks  English,  told  me  that  he  never  would  fight 
the  whites.  He  said  that  some  of  his  boys  got  mad  after  he  was  fired  at  at  Fort 
Larned.  Left  Hand  had  come  in  there  and  offered  to  assist  in  the  recovery  ot 
some  stock  that  had  been  stampeded  there.  He  was  fired  on  by  the  soldiers  at  Fort 
Larned.  He  said,  “I  was  not  much  mad;  but  my  boys  were  mad,  and  I  could 
not  control  them.  But  as  for  me,  I  will  not  fight  the  whites,  and  you  cannot 
make  me  do  it.  You  may  imprison  me  or  kill  me ;  but  I  will  not  fight  the 
whites.” 

Question.  What  was  the  feeling  of  Black  Kettle  ? 

Answer.  He  himself  always  appeared  to  be  friendly. 


32 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Question.  Did  you  ever  know  of  liis  committing  any  act  of  hostility  towards 
the  whites,  or  sanctioning  it  in  others  ] 

Answer.  I  never  did. 

Question.  What  relation  did  he  bear  to  the  Cheyenne  tribe  of  Indians  ? 

Answer.  He  was  acknowledged  as  the  head  chief  of  the  southern  bands  of 
Cheyennes.  There  were  subordinate  chiefs  who  weje  heads  of  bands. 

By  Mr.  Buckalew  : 

Question.  What  has  become  of  Black  Kettle  ] 

Answer.  I  have  seen  a  half-breed  who  was  there  with  Mr.  Smith,  and  could 
not  ge\t  back  to  the  soldiers,  and  ran  off  with  the  Indians,  and  was  with  them  for 
fourteen  days  after  they  got  over  to  the  Sioux  Indians.  From  what  he  told  me — 
and  I  could  rely  upon  it — Black  Kettle  was  not  killed,  but  Left  Hand  was  wounded, 
and  died  after  he  got  over  there. 

Question.  Of  the  fight  itself  you  know  nothing  ] 

Answer.  No,  sir;  I  was  not  there ;  I  was  at  Fort  Lyon  a*t  the  time. 

Question.  The  Jack  Smith  who  was  killed  there  was  the  son  of  a  white  man] 

Answer.  Yes,  sir;  of  John  Smith. 

Question.  He  was  an  interpreter] 

Answer.  He  interpreted  for  me  ;  he  spoke  both  English  and  Indian. 

Question.  Had  you  any  reason  to  think  that  Mr.  Smith  or  his  son  entertained 
any  hostility  to  the  whites  ] 

Answer.  The  old  gentleman  was  always  our  main  man  there,  communicating 
with  the  Indians,  for  he  had  lived  with  them  so  long.  Nobody  doubted  his 
fidelity  to  the  government. 

Question.  Was  there  any  reason  to  doubt  that  of  the  son  ? 

Answer.  Captain  Hardee  informed  me,  when  he  went  out  there  on  the  stage, 
that  he  thought  Jack  Smith  was  one  of  the  party  that  attacked  the  stage.  When 
Jack  came  I  told  him  what  I  had  heard.  He  said  he  had  rode  up  to  the  stage 
and  wanted  to  know  if  his  father  was  in  the  coach  ;  and  he  wanted  to  know  what 
the  trouble  was  that  he  had  heard  of  in  the  east ;  that  they  then  fired  upon 
them,  and  then  the  Indians  returned  the  fire. 

Question.  Was  there  any  other  act  of  Jack  denoting  hostility  ] 

Answer.  I  never  heard  of  any.  He  was  at  Fort  Lyon  at  work  haying  there 
for  some  men.  In  July  last,  I  think,  Colonel  Chivington  was  at  Fort  Lyon. 
This  One  Eye  was  near  about  the  fort,  and  wanted  to  go  out  and  see  the  Indians, 
but  was  afraid  of  the  soldiers.  Colonel  Chivington  wrote  out  a  certificate  of  his 
good  character,  stating  that  he  was  a  friendly  Indian,  and  then  told  him  if  he  came 
across  any  soldiers  to  show  that  to  them ;  if  they  shot  before  he  got  to  them  to 
show  a  white  flag,  and  that  would  protect  him.  He  was  an  Indian  we  relied 
upon  a  great  deal  for  information.  He  was  killed  at  Sand  creek.  I  asked 
Colonel  Chivington  if  there  was  any  way  these  Indians,  Black  Kettle,  Left  Hand, 
and  some  others,  could  be  treated  with.  He  said  his  orders  from  General  Curtis 
were  that  it  could  be  done  on  these  conditions :  that  they  must  give  up  their  stolen 
property,  make  restitution  for  any  damage  they  had  done,  &c.,  and  I  supposed 
he  was  going  to  do  that. 


Testimony  of  Governor  John  Evans. 

Washington,  March  15,  1865. 
Governor  John  Evans  sworn  and  examined. 

By  Mr.  Loan: 

Question.  What  is  your  present  official  position] 

Answer.  Governor  of  Colorado  Territory,  and  superintendent  of  Indian  affairs. 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS.  33 

Question.  Do  you  know  anything  of  a  band  of  Indians  under  the  lead  of  a 
chief  of  the  name  of  Black  Kettle? 

Answer.  There  is  a  band  of  Cheyenne  Indians  under  a  chief  of  that  name, 
roaming  over  the  plains. 

Question.  In  what  part  of  the  country  were  they  located,  relative  to  the  other 
bands  of  Indians  ? 

Answer.  The  Indians  that  were  with  Black  Kettle — I  do  not  know  that  he 
was  the  leader  of  them  entirely,  but  the  Indians  he  went  with,  and  was  the  chief 
among,  were  mainly  roaming  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  Smoke  Hill  and  Repub¬ 
lican  fork,  and  down  on  the  south  Arkansas.  Sometimes  they  went  up  as  far  as 
the  Platte. 

Question.  How  many  other  bands  were  there  ? 

Answer.  There  is  a  band  up  in  the  neighborhood  of  Fort  Laramie,  some  of 
whose  chiefs,  the  Shield  and  Spotted  Horse,  were  with  them. 

Question.  Was  there  any  other  band  of  the  tribe  of  Cheyenne  Indians  than 
those  on  the  Platte  and  those  on  the  Arkansas  ? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir;  I  think  so.  How  far  they  were  divided  into  bands  it  is 
rather  difficult  to  say;  and  where  each  band  is  located  is  very  difficult  to  say, 
because  they  range  from  away  below  the  Arkansas  to  above  Fort  Laramie,  or  to 
Powder  river.  For  years  they  have  been  in  the  habit  of  roaming  back  and  forth 
over  the  plains. 

Question.  Will  you  give  us  the  names  of  the  head  chiefs  of  the  Cheyennes 
that  you,  as  superintendent  of  Indian  affairs,  recognized  ? 

Answer.  There  was  Black  Kettle,  White  Antelope,  and  Bull  Bear  among  them. 

Question.  Having  the  supreme  control  of  the  Cheyenne  nation? 

Answer.  No,  sir;  I  do  not  think  there  was  any  such  chief  recognized.  They 
had  a  party  of  about  forty  young  men,  called  the  Dog  soldiers,  who  several  years 
ago  took  the  control  of  the  tribe  mainly  out  of  the  hands  of  the  chiefs.  They 
were  clubbed  together  as  a  band  of  braves,  and  the  chiefs  could  not  control  them. 

Question.  What  part  of  the  country  did  Black  Kettle  and  the  Indians  with 
him  occupy  during  last  summer? 

Answer.  From  information  which  I  have  received  I  think  they  were  mainly 
on  the  head  of  the  Smoke  Hill. 

Question.  How  far  from  Fort  Lyon? 

Answer.  Sometimes  nearer,  sometimes  farther  off.  As  I  stated  before,  they 
are  entirely  nomadic,  and  they  pass  from  one  part  of  the  country  to  another. 
The  most  precise  information  I  have  of  their  precise  locality,  at  any  particular 
time,  is  the  report  of  Major  Wynkoop,  who  went  out  and  saw  their  camp,  in  the 
latter  part  of  August,  or  in  the  early  part  of  September  last. 

Question.  Where  were  they  then  ? 

Answer.  At  what  is  called  Big  Timbers,  on  the  head  of  Smoke  Hill. 

Question.  Have  you  any  knowledge  that  they  were  north  of  Denver  at  any 
time  during  last  summer?  If  so,  state  at  what  places  they  were. 

Answer.  I  have  the  information  from  the  chiefs  that  during  the  summer  they 
were  on  the  Platte,  in  the  neighborhood  of  Plum  creek,  a  little  west  of  Fort 
Kearney ;  and  on  the  Blue,  east  of  Fort  Kearney.  They  ranged  away  down  into 
Kansas  and  Nebraska  there  during  the  summer. 

Question.  From  whom  did  you  derive  this  information  ? 

Answer.  It  was  either  Black  Kettle  or  White  Antelope  who  told  me  so. 

Question.  At  what  time? 

Answer.  At  the  time  of  the  depredations  on  the  trains  that  were  perpetrated 
in  August  last. 

Question.  I  mean  at  what  time  did  they  tell  you  this? 

Answer.  They  told  me  so  on  the  28th  of  September. 

3 


Part  VI 


34 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Question.  You  say  they  were  down  on  Plum  creek  at  the  time  these  depre¬ 
dations  were  committed? 

Answer.  They  said  the  Cheyennes  committed  them. 

Question.  What  I  want  to  know  is  whether  you  have  information  that  Black 
Kettle,  or  any  of  the  band  that  travel  with  him,  had  been  north  of  Denver  last 
summer.  Did  Black  Kettle  tell  you  that  either  he  himself,  or  any  of  the  band 
under  his  immediate  control,  had  been  there? 

Answer.  I  inferred  they  had  from  his  saying  that  the  Cheyennes  had  com¬ 
mitted  those  depredations.  As  a  matter  of  course  I  told  him  they  had  committed 
them,  because  they  had  some  white  prisoners  who  had  been  captured  there,  and 
whom  they  claimed  as  theirs.  He  did  not  answer  to  that  proposition.  He  said 
the  Cheyennes  committed  the  depredations  east  of  Kearney.  He  did  not  say 
directly  that  they  had  been  on  the  Blue.  They  gave  up  to  Major  Wynkoop 
the  prisoners  that  were  captured  on  the  Little  Blue,  and  then  he  said  that  the 
Cheyennes  committed  the  depredations. 

Question.  Did  Black  Kettle  say  that  his  band  had  done  it? 

Answer.  He  did  not  say  which  band  of  Cheyennes.  I  inferred  that  they 
were  his  band  because  they  did  not  speak  of  any  other  bands.  These  Cheyennes 
that  range  on  the  head  of  the  Smoke  Hill  and  Republican  seem  all  to  band  to¬ 
gether. 

Question.  What  is  the  distance  from  their  location  about  Fort  Lyon  to  Fort 
Kearney,  and  from  there  to  Little  Blue? 

Answer.  I  should  have  to  guess  at  the  distance. 

Question.  You  have  travelled  that  country  frequently,  have  you  not? 

Answer.  Not  across  in  that  direction. 

Question.  You  have  a  general  knowledge  of  that  country  and  the  bearing  of 
it,  and  can  estimate  it  from  the  route  you  have  travelled? 

Answer.  From  the  Big  Timbers  on  the  head  of  the  Smoke  Hill. 

Question.  Or  about  Fort  Lyon? 

Answer.  It  is  at  least  from  ninety  to  one  hundred  miles  from  Fort  Lyon,  and 
from  Big  Timbers  to  Fort  Kearney  would  probably  be  150  miles.  I  may  be  mis¬ 
taken  as  to  that. 

Question.  How  far  east  of  Denver  is  Fort  Lyon  ? 

Answer.  It  is  southeast. 

Question.  How  far  east? 

Answer.  Something  like  100  miles. 

Question.  What  distance  is  Fort  Lyon  from  Denver  by  a  right  line? 

Answer.  I  suppose  about  200  miles.  It  is  about  250  miles  the  way  they 
travel.  It  must  be  quite  200  miles  on  an  air  line. 

Question.  Where  was  it  that  Black  Kettle  was  telling  you  about  this? 

Answer.  At  Denver. 

Question.  State  the  circumstances  under  which  that  conversation  arose. 

Answer.  He  with  other  chiefs  and  headmen - 

Question.  Please  name  them. 

Answer.  I  cannot  give  all  their  names. 

Question.  State  as  many  as  you  can  remember. 

Answer.  Black  Kettle,  White  Antelope,  and  Bull  Bear,  of  the  Cheyennes ; 
Nevy  and  two  or  three  others  of  the  Arapahoes.  They  were  brought  to  Denver 
for  the  purpose  of  council  by  Major  Wynkoop,  after  he  had  been  out  to  their 
camp,  brought  there  for  the  purpose  of  making  a  treaty  of  peace. 

Question.  You  were  acting  as  superintendent  of  Indian  affairs  ? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir. 

Question.  What  propositions  did  you  make  to  them,  and  what  was  the  con¬ 
clusion  of  that  conference  ? 

Answer.  Major  Wynkoop’s  report  is  published  in  my  report  to  the  Commis¬ 
sioner  of  Indian  Affairs. 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


35 


Question.  That  may  be;  but  you  can  state  it  ? 

Answer.  In  brief,  he  reported  that  he  had  been  out  to  their  camp,  and  found 
them  drawn  up  in  line  of  battle.  He  sent  in  an  Indian  he  had  with  him  to  get 
them  to  council  instead  of  to  fight;  and  he  held  a  council  in  the  presence  of 
their  warriors  with  their  bows  and  arrows  drawn.  They  agreed  to  allow  these 
men  to  come  to  see  me  in  reference  to  making  peace,  with  the  assurance  that  he 
would  see  them  safe  back  again  to  their  camp,  as  he  states  in  his  report  or  letter 
to  me  in  regard  to  it. 

Question.  When  you  saw  the  Indians,  what  occurred  ? 

Answer.  The  Indians  made  their  statement,  that  they  had  come  in  through 
great  fear  and  tribulation  to  see  me,  and  proposed  that  I  should  make  peace 
with  them;  or  they  said  to  me  that  they  desired  me  to  make  peace.  To  which 
I  replied  that  I  was  not  the  proper  authority,  as  they  were  at  war  and  had  been 
fighting,  and  had  made  an  alliance  with  the  Sioux,  Kiowas,  and  Oomanches  to  go 
to  war;  that  they  should  make  their  terms  of  peace  with  the  military  authorities. 
I  also  told  them  that  they  should  make  such  arrangements,  or  I  advised  them 
to  make  such  arrangements  as  they  could,  and  submit  to  whatever  terms  were 
imposed  by  the  military  authorities  as  their  best  course. 

Question.  What  reply  did  they  make  to  that  ? 

Answer.  They  proposed  that  that  would  be  satisfactory,  and  that  they  would 
make  terms  of  peace.  The  next  day  I  got  a  despatch  from  Major  General 
Curtis,  commanding  the  department,  approving  my  course,  although  he  did  not 
know  what  it  was.  But  the  despatch  contained  an  order  that  no  peace  should 
be  made  with  the  Indians  without  his  assent  and  authority ;  dictating  some 
terms  for  them  to  be  governed  by  in  making  the  peace. 

Question.  Have  you  a  copy  of  that  despatch  with  you  1 

Answer.  It  is  published  in  m}7-  annual  report. 

Question.  Did  you  communicate  that  fact  to  the  Indians  ? 

Answer.  It  was  after  the  Indians  had  left  that  I  received  a  despatch.  The 
despatch  came  to  the  commander  of  the  district ;  and  a  copy  was  sent  to  me 
for  the  purpose  of  giving  me  notice. 

Question.  Was  anything  further  said  in  that  conference  with  the  Indians  ? 

Answer.  I  took  occasion  to  gather  as  much  information  as  I  could  in  regard 
to  the  extent  of  hostile  feelings  among  the  Indians,  and  especially  in  regard 
to  what  bands  had  been  committing  the  depredations  along  the  line  and  through 
the  settlements,  which  had  been  very  extensive. 

Question.  What  did  Black  Kettle  say  in  regard  to  his  band ;  and  what*  did 
the  other  Indians  say  in  regard  to  their  bands  ? 

Answer.  Black  Kettle  said  he  and  White  Antelope  had  been  opposed  all  the 
time  to  going  to  war,  but  they  could  not  control  their  young  men — these  Dog 
soldiers  ;  they  have  been  very  bad. 

Question.  These  Dog  soldiers  were  on  the  Blue  ? 

Answer.  They  were  in  his  camp ;  they  were  his  young  men ;  Black  Kettle 
wras  an  old  man. 

Question.  Where  was  his  camp  ] 

Answer.  At  the  Big  Timbers. 

Question.  Where  Major  Wynkoop  found  them  ? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir. 

Question.  How  do  you  know  that  fact  ? 

Answer.  By  the  statement  that  their  warriors  were  there. 

Question.  Did  Major  Wynkoop  make  that  statement  to  you  ? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir ;  in  his  letter  to  me  giving  the  circumstances  under  which 
he  brought  these  Indians  to  me. 

Question.  Did  Major  Wynkoop  report  to  you  that  the  Dog  soldiers,  of  the 
Cheyennes,  were  in  Black  Kettle’s  camp  1 


36 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Answer.  He  did  not  mention  the  Hog  soldiers ;  but  the  Dog  soldiers  are 
warriors  of  the  Cheyenne  tribe. 

Question.  I  understand  that ;  but  you  say  there  is  no  head  chief  that  you 
recognized  as  such.  I  wanted  to  know  if  these  Dog  soldiers  belonged  to  the 
band  under  the  lead  of  Black  Kettle  ] 

Answer.  The  Dog  soldiers  belonged  to  the  bands  commanded  by  Black 
Kettle,  White  Antelope,  and  Bull  Bear,  which  all  run  together.  There  is  no 
known  separation  among  them. 

Question.  Do  I  understand  you,  then,  to  say  that  the  Indians  indiscriminately 
occupy  that  country  from  below  the  Arkansas  to  the  North  Platte  ? 

Answer.  The  Cheyenne  Indians,  the  Sioux  Indians,  the  Arapahoe  Indians, 
roam  indiscriminately  through  there. 

Question.  Then  there  was  no  particular  band  that  made  their  homes  about 
the  head  of  the  Smoky  fork  ? 

Answer.  There  were  a  number  of  bands  and  tribes  that  hunted  through  there 
indiscriminately. 

Question.  What  I  want  to  know  is  the  usual  locality  of  Black  Kettle’s  band  1 

Answer.  It  was  like  all  the  rest.  He  goes  where  he  thinks  there  is  the  best 
hunting ;  he  ranges  from  one  part  of  the  country  to  the  other. 

Question.  Do  you  know  that  the  Indians  known  as  Dog  soldiers  ever  were 
in  Black  Kettle’s  camp ;  and  if  so,  at  what  time,  and  how  do  you  know  the 
fact  ? 

Answer.  I  will  not  name  them  as  Dog  soldiers. 

Question.  I  mean  the  warriors  known  as  the  Dog  soldiers  of  the  Cheyennes 
Indians.  Have  they  ever  been  in  his  camp  at  any  time  that  you  know  of? 

Answer.  Bull  Bear,  who  was  to  see  me,  was  the  head  of  the  Dog  soldiers 
himself,  the  head  one  of  that  band,  a  sub-chief.  They  said  they  left  nearly 
all  their  warriors  at  this  bunch  of  timbers. 

Question.  Where  Black  Kettle’s  camp  was  ? 

Answer.  Black  Kettle  was  in  the  camp.  You  have  the  idea  that  Black 
Kettle  had  some  particular  camp.  The  distinction  between  White  Antelope 
and  Black  Kettle,  as  an  authority  among  the  tribes,  has  varied  at  different 
times.  The  government  has  never  recognized  either  of  them  as  head  chief  that 
I  know  of. 

Question.  You  have  omitted  to  answer  the  question  whether  you  knowr  of 
these  Dog  soldiers,  at  any  time  or  at  any  place,  being  in  Black  Kettle’s  camp 
or  under  his  control  1 

Answer.  I  know  the  answer  that  Bull  Bear  gave  when  he  came  to  Denver. 
He  was  recognized  as  the  leader  of  the  Dog  soldiers.  He,  with  Black  Kettle 
and  White  Antelope,  said  that  they  left  their  warriors  down  at  the  bunch  of 
timbers;  and  Major  Wynkoop  reports  the  same  thing. 

Question.  You  inferred  that  the  warriors  referred  to  were  the  Dog  soldiers  ? 

Answer.  I  did. 

Question.  At  this  conference,  when  Bull  Bear  told  you  this,  what  did  he  say 
in  regard  to  war  and  peace  ? 

Answer.  He  said  he  was  ready  to  make  peace.  They  spoke  of  some  of  their 
warriors  being  out.  Their  war  is  a  guerilla  warfare.  They  go  off  in  little 
bands  of  twenty  or  thirty  together  and  commit  these  depredations,  so  that  there 
is  scarcely  ever  more  than  that  many  seen  in  any  of  these  attacks.  They  re¬ 
ported  that  some  of  their  young  men  were  out  upon  the  war-path,  or  had  been 
out,  and  they  did  not  know  whether  they  were  in  at  the  time.  That,  I  think, 
was  stated  at  that  time,  or  in  a  communication  that  came  from  them  a  short 
time  before  this.  I  got  a  letter  from  Black  Kettle  through  Bent;  it  was  sent 
up  to  me.  Upon  which  Major  Wynkoop  went  out  to  their  camp,  and  either 
that  or  their  statement  at  the  conference  gave  me  the  information  that  a  portion 
of  their  warriors  were  still  out. 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


37 


Question.  How  did  Major  Wynkoop  know  in  regard  to  this  letter  or  its  con¬ 
tents  ? 

Answer.  It  was  brought  in  to  Major  Colley,  at  Fort  Lyon,  where  Major  Wyn- ' 
koop  was  in  command,  by  two  or  three  Indians;  and  immediately  upon  their 
coming  in  Major  Wynkoop  took  these  Indians,  and  went  with  them,  as  guides. 

Question.  That  was  before  you  saw  the  letter? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir ;  and  they  immediately  sent  me  a  copy  of  the  letter.  . 

Question.  Did  these  Indians  propose  to  do  anything  that  you,  as  their  super¬ 
intendent,  directed  them  to  do  in  this  matter,  for  the  purpose  of  keeping  peace  ? 

Answer.  They  did  not  suggest  about  keeping  peace;  they  proposed  to  make 
peace.  They  acknowledged  that  they  were  at  war,  and  had  been  at  war  during 
the  spring.  They  expressed  themselves  as  satisfied  with  the  references  I  gave 
them  to  the  military  authorities ;  and  they  went  back,  as  I  understood,  with  the 
expectation  of  making  peace  with  “  the  soldiers,”  as  they  termed  them — with 
the  military  authorities. 

Question.  Why  did  you  permit  those  Indians  to  go  back,  under  the  circum¬ 
stances,  when  you  knew  they  were  at  war  with  the  whites  ? 

Answer.  Because  they  were  under  the  control  and  authority  of  the  military, 
over  which  I,  as  superintendent  of  Indian  affairs,  had  no  control. 

Question.  Did  you  make  application  to  the  district  commander  there  to  detain 
those  Indians  ? 

Answer.  Ho,  sir. 

Question.  Why  did  you  not  do  it? 

Answer.  Because  the  military  commander  was  at  the  council. 

Question.  What  was  his  name  ? 

Answer.  Colonel  Chivington.  I  told  the  Indians  he  was  present  and  could 
speak  in  reference  to  those  matters  we  had  been  speaking  about. 

Question.  Were  any  orders  given  to  Major  Wynkoop,  either  by  yourself  or 
by  Colonel  Chivington,  in  regard  to  his  action  towards  those  Indians  ? 

Answer.  I  gave  no  orders,  because  I  had  no  authority  to  give  any. 

Question.  Did  Colonel  Chivington  give  any  ? 

Answer.  He  made  these  remarks  in  the  presence  of  the  couucil :  that  he  was 
commander  of  the  district ;  that  his  rule  of  fighting  white  men  and  Indians  was 
to  fight  them  until  they  laid  down  their  arms  ;  if  they  were  ready  to  do  that, 
then  Major  Wynkoop  was  nearer  to  them  than  he  was,  and  they  could  go  to 
him. 

Question.  Do  you  know  whether  he  issued  any  orders  to  Major  Wynkoop  to 
govern  his  conduct  in  the  matter  ? 

Answer.  I  do  not.  Major  Wynkoop  was  not  under  his  command,  however. 

I  understood  that  Fort  Lyon  was  not  in  the  command  that  Colonel  Chivington 
was  exercising  at  the  time.  It  was  a  separate  command,  under  General  Blunt, 
of  the  military  district  of  the  Arkansas,  as  I  understood  it. 

Question.  Were  the  Indian  chiefs  sent  back  to  their  homes  in  pursuance  of 
any  orders  given  to  Major  Wynkoop,  that  you  know  of? 

Answer.  No,  sir.  I  will  say  further,  in  regard  to  my  course,  that  it  was  re¬ 
ported  to  the  Indian  bureau,  and  approved  by  the  Indian  bureau  as  proper,  not 
to  interfere  with  the  military,  which  will  appear  in  my  annual  report.  I  have 
no  official  knowledge  of  what  transpired  after  this  couucil,  so  far  as  these 
Indians  are  concerned,  except  that  I  notified  the  agent  that  they  were  under 
the  military  authority,  and  I  supposed  they  would  be  treated  as  prisoners. 

Question.  How  long  have  you  been  superintendent  of  Indian  affairs  there  ? 

Answer.  Since  the  spring  of  1862. 

Question.  Have  you  any  knowledge  of  any  acts  committed  by  either  of  those 
chiefs,  or  by  the  bands  immediately  under  their  control — any  personal  knowl¬ 
edge? 

Answer.  In  1862,  a  party  of  these  Dog  soldiers 


38 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Question.  I  am  not  asking  about  the  Deg  soldiers,  but  about  Black  Kettle’s 
band. 

Answer.  They  are  the  same  Indians.  The  Dog  soldiers  were  a  sort  of  vigi¬ 
lance  committee  under  those  old  chiefs. 

Question.  I  understood  you  to  say,  a  few  minutes  ago,  that  the  Dog  soldiers 
threw  off  the  authority  of  the  old  chiefs,  and  were  independent  of  them  ? 

Answer.  That  they  managed  the  tribe  instead  of  the  chiefs. 

Question.  What  act  of  hostility  was  oommitted  by  the  Dog  soldiers,  in  pur¬ 
suance  of  the  authority  of  any  of  the  chiefs  of  the  nation  ? 

Answer.  That  I  could  not  say,  for  I  have  no  way  of  ascertaining  what  au¬ 
thority  they  have — only  what  I  gather  from  the  agent,  who  was  intimate  with 
them. 

Question.  What  is  the  name  of  that  agent  ? 

Answer.  Colley.  He  is  familiar  with  those  Indians,  and  said  that  the  Dog 
soldiers  were  to  blame  for  their  ugly  conduct. 

Question.  That  is  what  I  understand ;  and  I  wanted  you,  as  superintendent 
of  Indian  affairs,  to  tell  us  if  these  Dog  soldiers  were  under  the  command  of  any 
chief  that  had  control  of  them,  and  the  name  of  that  chief,  if  you  know  it. 

Answer.  The  identification  of  the  chief  that  commands  them  is  what  I  am 
not  able  to  do,  because  they  have  in  that  band,  or  tribe,  the  chiefs  that  I  have 
mentioned.  Which  of  them  is  superior  in  authority  I  am  not  advised. 

Question.  What  was  the  general  reputation  of  Black  Kettle,  as  a  hostile  or  a 
friendly  Indian,  during  your  control  there  as  superintendent  of  Indian  affairs  ? 

Answer.  Black  Kettle  has  had  the  reputation  of  being  himself  a  good  Indian. 

Question.  Peaceably  inclined,  and  well  disposed  towards  the  whites  ? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir  ;  and  White  Antelope  more  particularly.  But  I  was  going 
on  to  state  in  regard  to  their  conduct.  In  the  summer  of  1862  a  party  of  war¬ 
riors  of  the  Cheyennes  came  to  Denver  and  called  on  me,  and  wanted  some¬ 
thing  to  eat. 

Question.  Can  you  designate  what  particular  band  they  belonged  to? 

Answer.  They  were  of  the  same  band  we  are  fighting  about  the  Blue — Black 
Kettle,  White  Antelope,  and  Bull  Bear’s  Indians,  that  range  mainly  down  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Smoke  Hill.  They  came  to  Denver  on  a  war  expedition 
against  the  Utes.  I  advised  them  to  cease  their  hostilities.  When  I  went 
there  I  had  an  idea  of  trying  to  get  everybody  to  live  without  fighting,  the  In¬ 
dians  among  the  rest.  The  Indians  on  the  mountains  and  on  the  plains  spent 
their  time  in  chasing  one  another.  I  was  in  this  delicate  position:  the  Utes, 
who  are  a  very  warlike  and  dangerous  tribe,  had  got  a  jealousy  of  the  Indians 
on  the  plains,  and  the  whites  who  live  on  the  plains  also.  The  whites  were  con¬ 
stantly  giving  presents  to  the  begging  portion  of  the  plains  Indians.  The  su¬ 
perintendency  and  the  agency  were  constantly  giving  goods  to  them;  and  the 
Utes  complained  that  the  whites  were  fitting  out  the  plains  Indians  in  their 
war  parties  against  the  Utes,  which  was  true  to  some  extent.  The  Utes  said 
that  when  they  chased  the  Cheyennes  and  Arapalioes,  which  run  together 
almost  constantly,  and  the  Sioux — there  are  parties  of  Sioux  with  the  Arapa- 
lioes  and  Cheyennes  in  nearly  all  their  war  parties — when  the  Utes  would 
chase  them  down  into  the  plains,  they  had  to  stop  because  the  whites  interfered, 
and  they  did  not  dare  to  go  down  into  the  plains.  They  were  of  the  opinion 
that  the  whites  were  taking  the  side  of  the  Indians  of  the  plains ;  and  they 
were  on  the  point  of  going  to  war  with  us. 

I  suggested  to  these  Indians  that  it  was  better  for  them  to  make  peace.  I 
went  with  Colonel  Leavenworth  down  to  the  camp  of  the  Sioux,  Arapahoes, 
and  Cheyennes,  at  a  subsequent  period,  and  tried  to  arrange  with  them.  I  had 
a  Ute  agent  with  me  to  make  the  arrangement  to  quit  fighting.  When  this 
party  came,  in  1S62,  I  mentioned  these  things,  showing  the  advantages,  and 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


39 


they  promised  me  they  would  go  back;  I  gave  them  some  bacon  and  flour,  and 
other  things,  for  subsistence.  They  started  under  a  promise  that  they  would 
go  back,  and  not  go  up  to  the  Utes,  and  jeopard  our  safety  with  them.  In¬ 
stead  of  that,  they  started  for  the  South  Park,  the  Ute  battle-ground,  where 
they  usually  fight,  and  the  next  day  or  two  afterwards  messengers  came  in 
from  the  settlers  on  the  road,  saying  that  the  Indians  were  committing  depre¬ 
dations;  that  they  had  cleaned  out  and  outraged  one  landlord;  had  insulted  a 
woman ;  had  gone  in  and  taken  possession  of  several  of  these  sparsely  settled 
places ;  had  made  one  woman  cook  for  the  whole  party,  and  I  think  they  had  sent 
in  for  protection.  Some  six  soldiers  went  up  to  protect  the  neighborhood  ;  but 
when  they  got  there,  these  Indians  had  gone  back  on  the  plains  by  another 
route. 

Question.  What  was  the  name  of  the  chief  in  command  of  that  party  ? 

Answer.  I  do  not  know ;  that  was  their  first  visit. 

Question.  Was  it  Black  Kettle,  or  White  Antelope,  or  Bull  Bear] 

Answer.  I  could  not  say  it  was  not  them,  nor  that  it  was.  It  was  a  party 
of  warriors  from  the  same  party  that  Black  Kettle,  White  Antelope  and  Bull 
Bear  ranged  with. 

Question.  Although  you  had  a  conversation  with  them,  and  furnished  them 
with  supplies,  and  induced  them  to  return,  you  do  not  know  the  name  of  the 
chief  ? 

Answer.  There  were  several  chiefs. 

Questioh.  Can  you  name  any  one  of  them] 

Answer.  I  cannot  give  the  name ;  I  might  get  it  if  I  were  in  my  office. 

Question.  As  governor  of  Colorado  Territory,  did  you  have  any  troops  or¬ 
ganized  there  last  summer  ] 

Answer.  Yes,  sir;  I  organized  a  regiment. 

Question.  For  what  term  of  service  ? 

Answer.  For  one  hundred  days. 

Question.  Who  was  the  colonel  of  that  regiment] 

Answer.  George  L.  Shoup. 

Question.  Did  you  ever  issue  any  orders  to  that  regiment,  or  to  any  part  of 

it? 

Answer.  No,  sir. 

Question.  Were  they  organized  as  United  States  troops] 

Answer.  Yes,  sir. 

Question.  Were  they  placed  under  the  control  of  the  district  commander  as 
soon  as  organized  ? 

Answer.  Before  they  were  organized,  for  this  reason :  while  the  regiment  was 
being  raised,  there  was  information  come  in  of  a  camp  of  about  800  of  these  In¬ 
dians  ;  a  report  of  which  will  be  found  in  my  annual  report  to  the  Commissioner 
of  Indian  Affairs.  It  came  in  in  this  way :  Little  Geary,  a  grandson  of  the 
signer  of  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  lives  on  the  Platte,  sixty  miles  south 
of  Denver.  In  the  night  two  Cheyenne  chiefs  came  to  him. 

Question.  What  were  their  names] 

Answer.  It  seems  to  me  one  of  them  was  Crooked  Neck.  The  statement  I 
was  going  to  make  was  this :  these  Indians  came  in  and  notified  Geary  to  get 
out  of  the  way.  He  was  living  on  ranch  with  a  large  amount  of  stock,  and 
with  a  Cheyenne  wife.  He  had  Spotted  Horse  there  with  him  under  protec¬ 
tion.  Spotted  Horse,  a  Cheyenne  Indian  of  Fort  Laramie,  had  been  friendly 
all  the  time,  and  was  there  under  protection.  These  Indians  made  these  state¬ 
ments  to  him,  as  you  will  see  in  the  printed  copy  of  my  report  to  the  Commis¬ 
sioner  of  Indian  Affairs. 

I  think  about  800  Indians  were  camped  at  the  head  of  Beaver,  at  the  Point 
of  Rocks  on  the  Beaver,  which  is  about  120  miles  east  of  Denver,  composed  of 
Arapalioes,  Cheyennes,  Sioux,  Kiowas,  Camanclies  and  Apaches.  They  said 


40 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


that  their  plan  was,  in  two  or  three  nights,  to  divide  into  small  parties  of  abont 

200,  going  in  the  neighborhood  of - ,  which  was  about  40  miles  below 

Geary’s;  100  going  just  above  Geary’s  to  Fort  Lumpton  ;  about  250  to  the  head 
of  Cherry  creek,  which  is  25  or  30  miles  south  of  Denver;  and  the  remainder 
of  them  to  go  to  the  Arkansas,  at  Fountaine  que  Bonille.  That  these  parties 
were  to  be  divided  into  little  bands,  and  each  take  a  farm-house,  clean  it  out 
and  steal  the  stock,  and  in  this  way  commit  the  most  wholesale  and  extensive 
massacre  that  has  ever  been  known.  I  have  no  doubt  it  would  have  been  so, 
but  for  the  vigilance  that  was  taken  to  prevent  it. 

Geary,  who  is  an  educated  and  sensible  man,  immediately  took  Spotted 
Horse,  who  heard  these  Indians  give  their  account ;  it  was  done  confidentially 
by  them.  Geary,  who  has  been  in  my  employ  as  a  spy  over  the  Indians,  who 
has  been  out  among  them  as  a  messenger,  started  the  next  morning — they 
got  to  his  house  about  midnight,  or  2  o’clock.  Geary  started  immediately  in 
the  morning  with  Spotted  Horse,  and  got  to  my  house  at  11  o’clock;  riding 
between  60  and  70  miles  during  the  day,  for  the  purpose  of  giving  me  this  in¬ 
formation.  I  immediately  notified  the  district  commander,  and  put  the  recruits 
which  were  supposed  to  be  subject  to  my  command  under  his  command,  by 
an  order;  and  any  militia  that  might  be  organized  was  subject  to  his  command 
for  the  purposes  of  defence.  He  sent  express  in  every  direction  to  notify  the 
settlers.  I  telegraphed,  and  also  sent  messengers.  It  so  happened  that  a  mili¬ 
tia  company  had  gone  down  there,  and  were  near  that,  and  that  a  militia  com¬ 
pany  had  gone  to  Fort  Lumpton,  or  near  there. 

The  Indians  came  in  at  these  different  points  on  the  second  night,  skulking 
along  under  the  bluffs,  where  their  trails  were  seen.  They  found  the  settle¬ 
ments  all  alarmed,  and  went  back  again,  except  at  the  head  of  Cherry  creek, 
where  they  killed  two  or  three  and  took  quite  a  large  number  of  cattle  ;  and  at 
Fort  Lumpton  they  killed  one  man.  And  before  Geary  got  back  they  stole  some 
of  his  horses  and  the  horses  of  one  or  two  of  his  neighbors,  and  ran  them  off. 

Question.  At  what  time  was  this  ? 

Answer.  It  must  have  been  early  in  August. 

Question.  At  what  time  was  this  hundred-days  regiment  organized  ? 

Answer.  Early  in  September. 

Question.  At  what  time  was  it  mounted  ? 

Answer.  Some  companies  were  mounted  before  the  regiment  was  full ;  others 
were  mounted  subsequently,  as  they  could  get  horses. 

Question.  How  were  horses  obtained,  and  from  whom  ] 

Answer.  The  quartermaster  of  the  department. 

Question.  Do  you  know  anything  further  than  you  have  stated  in  connexion 
with  this  attack  upon  Black  Kettle  and  his  band  on  Sand  creek  ?  Did  you 
issue  any  orders,  or  take  any  part  in  any  transaction  having  in  view  any  such 
attack  1 

Answer.  I  did  not  know  anything  about  it.  After  I  got  here,  I  got  a  letter 
from  the  secretary  of  the  territory,  saying  it  was  rumored  they  were  going 
there. 

Question.  Whom  did  “  they  ”  refer  to  ] 

Answer.  Colonel  Chivington  and  his  force.  I  think  he  said  it  was  surmised 
that  they  were  going  to  Fort  Lyon.  It  is  proper  for  me  to  say  that  I  under¬ 
stood  they  were  going  to  make  an  expedition  against  the  Indians.  But  I  had 
no  knowledge  of  where  they  were  going. 

Question.  After  Major  Wynkoop  left  you  in  September,  do  you  know  what 
was  done  with  these  Indians  ] 

Answer.  I  do  not. 

Question.  Do  you  know  what  action  the  Indians  took  afterwards  1 

Answer.  I  do  not. 

Question.  Do  you  know  where  they  were  encamped  ? 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


41 


Answer.  I  accidentally  heard — I  had  no  official  knowledge  of  the  fact — that 
there  were  several  hundred  of  them  at  Fort  Lyon.  The  next  day  after  this 
council  I  started  for  a  place  about  300  miles  off,  to  hold  a  treaty  with  the 
Utes  down  on  the  Rio  Grande,  and  was  gone  nearly  a  month. 

Question.  At  what  time  did  you  start  to  come  east  ? 

Answer.  I  think  I  started  on  the  15th  of  November. 

Question.  Is  Colonel  Shoup  yet  in  service1? 

Answer.  No,  sir;  when  I  came  away  he  was  encamped  at  Bijou  Basin,  about 
75  miles  east  of  Denver,  where  they  had  been  for  a  considerable  length  of  time. 

Question.  How  did  he  get  out  of  the  service  ? 

Answer.  His  time  expired,  and  he  was  regularly  mustered  out,  so  I  under¬ 
stand. 

Question.  You  have  not  been  back  since  ? 

Answer.  No,  sir. 

Question.  Was  there  any  property  accounted  for  to  you,  or  to  any  officer  of 
the  government,  so  far  as  you  know,  that  was  taken  at  Black  Kettle’s  camp  ? 

Answer.  Not  any.  I  would  say,  however,  that  any  property  the  army  cap¬ 
tured  they  would  not  be  likely  to  turn  over  to  me. 

I  was  asked  if  I  knew  of  any  depredations  committed  by  these  Indians,  and 
I  stated  what  was  done  in  18G2.  Before  going  further,  I  will  say,  that  Black 
Kettle  told  me  in  that  council  that  he  and  White  Antelope  had  been  opposed 
to  depredations  all  the  time,  but  could  not  control  their  tribes.  They  admit¬ 
ted  that  their  tribes,  that  the  Arapahoes  and  Sioux,  had  made  a  large  number 
of  attacks,  and  told  me  where  each  depredation  I  inquired  about  had  been 
committed  by  the  different  tribes. 

I  gave  to  the  committee  of  investigation  on  Indian  affairs,  the  other  day,  a 
sketch  of  the  minutes  kept  of  that  council.  There  was  quite  a  large  number 
of  these  depredations  referred  to  and  inquired  of  in  that  council,  but  not  by 
any  means  all  the  depredations  that  were  committed  last  summer. 

The  Cheyennes  commenced  their  depredations  early  in  the  spring  with  the 
Arapahoes,  Kiowas,  Oomanches,  and  Sioux.  Agreeably  to  a  previous  treaty 
or  council  held  by  them  in  the  winter  of  1863  and  1864 — which  treaty  was  the 
consummation  of  an  arrangement  that  the  Sioux  tried  to  make  with  our  Indians 
in  1863,  which  I  reported  to  the  Indian  bureau,  and  they  sent  me  out  authority 
to  treat  with  them — I  went  to  the  head  of  the  Republican,  and  spent  about  a 
month  there  trying  to  get  them  together,  having  my  messengers  out.  Little 
Geary  went  to  the  camp  of  Bull  Bear,  Black  Kettle,  White  Antelope,  and  a 
large  number  of  others.  The  report  of  this  attempt  is  published  in  my  annual 
report  for  1863. 

The  result  of  that  failure  was,  that  they  told  Mr.  Geary,  after  agreeing  first 
to  come  and  see  me,  that  they  had  made  up  their  minds  to  have  nothing  more 
•  to  do  with  us  ;  that  they  did  not  Avant  any  more  of  our  goods ;  that  they  might 
as  Avell  be  killed  as  starved  to  death  ;  that  they  Avere  being  driven  out  of  their 
country  by  the  whites  ;  that  they  repudiated  the  treaty  of  Fort  Wise,  under 
which  Ave  Avere  making  preparations  to  settle  them,  as  you  will  see  by  looking 
into  my  report,  in  which  I  give  Geary’s  SAvorn  statement. 

After  coming  back  a  portion  of  these  Indians  ran  together.  You  will  ob¬ 
serve  that  they  made  the  treaty  of  1861  together.  A  portion  of  them  com¬ 
menced  committing  depredations  that  fall.  They  stole  a  lot  of  horses,  a  por¬ 
tion  of  which  we  recovered  in  the  autumn.  A  man  Avho  was  present  at  their 
“  big  medicine  ”  on  the  Arkansas,  by  the  name  of  North,  came  to  me  privately 
and  secretly  from  this  band  of  Indians  that  committed  depredations  in  No¬ 
vember,  1863,  within  about  twenty  miles  of  Denver  ;  he  came  to  me  from 
their  camp,  and  made  a  statement  which  I  forwarded  to  the  War  Department 
and  to  the  Indian  bureau,  which  is  also  in  my  annual  report  for  this  year. 


42 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Nortli  tolcl  me  that  the  Kiowas,  Comanches,  Apaches,  Cheyennes,  a  portion 
of  the  Arapahoes,  and  the  Sioux,  had  held  a  council,  at  which  he  was  present, 
and  shook  hands  over  it.  That  they  would  pretend  to  be  friendly  with  the 
whites  until  they  could  get  sufficient  ammunition  ;  then  in  the  spring  they 
would  divide  into  little  parties  and  commence  a  war  on  the  whites.  Early  last 
spring  the  first  depredation  they  committed  was  to  steal  one  hundred  and  seventy- 
five  head  of  cattle,  which  was  done  by  the  Cheyennes,  from  Irwin  &  Jackman, 
government  contractors,  for  transportation  across  the  plains.  Irwin  Jack¬ 
man’s  men  followed  them  about  twenty  miles  down  Sand  creek,  until  they  struck 
off  to  the  head  of  the  Republican.  They  then  came  to  Denver  and  reported  to 
the  military  commander,  Colonel  Chivington,  and  requested  a  force  to  go  with 
them  to  recover  their  cattle.  That  force  was  sent  out,  and  after  being  gone  a 
week  or  two  they  returned,  having  recovered  about  a  dozen  of  the  cattle,  one 
soldier  having  been  wounded.  He  returned  for  the  want  of  subsistence,  and  was 
sent  again,  and  went  through  to  Fort  Earned  on  the  route.  That  was  Lieuten¬ 
ant  Ayres,  and  during  the  time  he  was  gone  he  had  a  battle  with  the  Indians, 
in  which  they  drove  him.  They  attacked  him  as  he  was  passing  through  with 
his  battery  to  Fort  Earned,  which  is  in  Kansas.  At  that  battle  one  of  the  In¬ 
dians,  who  was  said  to  be  a  very  friendly  Indian  to  the  whites,  was  killed.  He 
was  said  to  be  in  favor  of  making  peace,  and  preventing  the  battle,  and  was  in 
the  act  of  trying  to  pacify  the  Indians  when  he  was  shot.  But  Lieutenant 
Ayres’s  report  has  never  been  furnished  to  me,  and  consequently  I  cannot  give 
the  details  of  it ;  but  this  was  the  statement  the  lieutenant  made  when  he  got 
back.  He  got  away  from  the  Indians  without  being  captured.  They  were  in 
very  large  force.  He  got  away  and  got  to  Fort  Larned.  That  is  the  end  of  the 
effort  to  get  back  these  cattle.  Lie  and  the  rest  of  his  battery — he  had  a  sec¬ 
tion  of  a  battery,  I  think,  two  guns — was  at  Fort  Larned  for  some  time. 
But  the  commander  there,  who  was  said  to  be  an  intemperate  man,  was  not  on 
the  alert;  and  the  Kiowas  and  some  other  Indians,  mainly  Kiowas,  captured 
the  whole  of  the  battery’s  horses,  one  hundred  and  forty,  and  ran  them  off  right 
from  the  fort.  While  Satant,  the  commander  of  the  Indians,  was  talking  with 
the  officer  in  command,  making  great  professions  of  friendship  at  the  time, 
they  made  this  raid  upon  the  battery’s  horses  and  got  away  with  them. 

I  would  say  still  further,  that  to  give  a  description  of  all  the  depredations 
that  were  committed  during  the  summer,  and  fall,  and  this  winter,  would  re¬ 
quire  a  statement  which  would  be  very  extensive.  I  would  like  this,  as  there 
is  an  impression  in  the  minds  of  people  here  that  the  Indian  war  out  there  has 
not  amounted  to  much — I  would  like  this,  that  this  committee,  for  the  purpose 
of  ascertaining,  would  deputize  somebody  to  gather  the  reports  of  the  attacks, 
the  number  of  people  killed,  and  the  amount  of  property  destroyed  during  the 
past  year. 

By  Mr.  Gooch: 

Question.  With  all  the  knowledge  you  have  in  relation  to  these  attacks  and 
depredations  by  the  Indians,  do  you  think  they  afford  any  justification  for  the 
attack  made  by  Colonel  Chivington  on  these  friendly  Indians,  under  the  circum¬ 
stances  under  which  it  was  made  ] 

Answer.  As  a  matter  of  course,  no  one  could  justify  an  attack  on  Indians 
while  under  the  protection  of  the  flag.  If  those  Indians  were  there  under  the 
protection  of  the  flag,  it  would  be  a  question  that  would  be  scarcely  worth  ask¬ 
ing,  because  nobody  could  say  anything  in  favor  of  the  attack.  I  have  heard, 
however — that  is  only  a  report — that  there  was  a  statement  on  the  part  of 
Colonel  Chivington  and  his  friends  that  these  Indians  had  assumed  a  hostile  at¬ 
titude  before  he  attacked  them.  I  do  not  know  whether  that  is  so  or  not  I 
have  said  all  I  have  had  to  do  with  them.  I  supposed  they  were  being  treated 
as  prisoners  of  war  in  some  way  or  other. 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


43 


I  had  a  letter  from  General  Curtis,  after  I  got  here,  saying  he  was  troubled 
to  know  what  to  do  with  so  many  nominal  prisoners  of  war,  as  they  were  so 
expensive  to  feed  there.  The  subsistence  of  the  fort  was  short,  and  it  was  a 
long  way  to  get  subsistence,  and  through  a  hostile  country,  and  he  was  troubled 
to  know  what  to  do  with  them. 

Question.  But  from  all  the  circumstances  which  you  know,  all  the  facts  in 
relation  to  that  matter,  do  you  deem  that  Colonel  Chivington  had  any  justifica¬ 
tion  for  that  attack  ? 

Answer.  So  far  as  giving  an  opinion  is  concerned,  I  would  say  this :  That 
the  reports  that  have  been  made  here,  a  great  many  of  them,  have  come  through 
persons  whom  I  know  to  be  personal  enemies  of  Colonel  Chivington  for  a  long 
time.  And  I  would  rather  not  give  an  opinion  on  the  subject  until  I  have  heard 
the  other  side  of  the  question,  which  I  have  not  heard  yet. 

Question.  I  do  not  ask  for  an  opinion.  Do  you  know  of  any  circumstance 
which  would  justify  that  attack? 

Answer.  I  do  not  know  of  any  circumstance  connected  with  it  subsequent  to 
the  time  those  Indians  left  me  and  I  started  for  another  part  of  the  country.  It 
is  proper  for  me  to  say,  that  these  attacks  during  the  summer,  and  up  to  the  time 
I  came  away,  were  of  very  frequent  occurrence.  The  destruction  of  property 
was  very  great.  Our  people  suffered  wonderfully,  especially  in  their  property, 
and  in  their  loss  of  life.  They  murdered  a  family  some  twenty-odd  miles  east 
of  Denver.  The  attacks  by  hostile  Indians,  about  the  time  I  came  away,  were 
very  numerous  along  the  Platte.  There  was  an  attack  as  I  came  in,  about  the 
month  of  November.  It  was  in  the  evening,  about  sundown,  and  I  passed  over 
the  ground  in  the  night  in  the  stage  with  my  family,  and  a  few  days  afterwards 
a  party  of  emigrants,  returning  from  Colorado,  were  murdered  near  the  same 
ground,  which  was  near  Plum  creek ;  and  for  a  considerable  length  of  time, 
immediately  after  I  came  in,  the  attacks  were  very  numerous  and  very  violent, 
until  the  stage  was  interrupted  so  that  it  has  not  been  running  since,  until  within 
a  few  days. 

Kr 

I  started  home  and  could  not  get  there  because  there  was  no  transportation. 
I  came  back  here  and  shall  return  in  a  few  days  again.  I  mention  this  in  order 
to  do  away  with  the  impression  that  might  exist  that  hostilities  had  ceased,  and 
that  this  attack  of  Colonel  Chivington  had  excited  the  recent  hostilities. 

These  Indians  told  me,  when  they  were  there,  that  the  Sioux  were  in  large 
force  on  the  head  of  the  Republican,  and  would  make  an  attack  about  the  time 
I  expected  to  come  in.  I  delayed  my  coming  in  a  short  time  on  account  of 
what  they  told  me,  and  when  I  did  come  in  I  found  some  Indians  commencing 
their  depredations,  which  they  continued  about  the  month  following,  both  be¬ 
fore  and  after  the  attack  made  by  Colonel  Chivington.  General  Curtis  wrote 
to  me  that  he  did  not  think  Cbivington’s  attack  was  the  instigation  of  the 
hostilities  perpetrated  along  the  Platte. 


Testimony  of  Mr.  A.  C.  Hunt. 

Washington,  March  15,  1S65. 

Mr.  A.  C.  Hunt  sworn  and  examined. 

By  Mr.  Loan : 

Question.  Where  do  you  reside  ? 

Answer.  I  reside  at  Denver,  Colorado. 

Question.  What  is  your  official  position  ? 

Answer.  I  am  United  States  marshal  for  the  district  of  Colorado.  I  have 
been  in  Denver  since  1859. 

Question.  Do  you  know  anything  in  connexion  with  the  killing  of  the  In¬ 
dians  at  Sand  creek,  about  the  last  of  November,  1864? 


44 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Answer.  I  do  not  suppose  I  know  anything  that  would  be  admissible  as 
evidence.  All  I  know  is  from  general  rumor,  not  being  on  the  ground  at  all. 
I  was  in  Denver  when  the  regiment  returned. 

Question.  Did  you  hear  anything  about  it  from  Colonel  Chivington,  or  any 
one  of  his  command  'l 

Answer.  I  heard  an  immense  sight  from  soldiers  in  his  command. 

Question.  State  what  they  told  you. 

Answer.  I  also  talked  a  long  time  with  the  guide,  James  Beckwith,  after  they 
returned. 

Question.  State  anything  that  was  said  by  any  one  connected  with  that 
transaction  in  regard  to  what  was  done. 

Answer.  I  talked  longer  with  Melrose,  a  private  in  Captain  Baxtor’s  com- 
pany,  under  Colonel  Shoup.  He  gave  me  quite  a  history  of  the  fight,  and 
everything  pertaining  to  it.  He  enlisted  from  the  Arkansas.  There  is  a  gen¬ 
eral  disposition,  on  the  part  of  those  who  enlisted  from  that  neighborhood,  to 
cry  down  the  whole  transaction  as  being  very  badly  managed,  and  very  mur¬ 
derous.  J  hey  made  no  secret  of  telling  what  had  been  done,  but  made  no 
boast  of  it  at  all.  They  said  they  were  heartily  ashamed  of  it. 

Question.  State  what  they  said  was  done. 

Answer.  According  to  their  understanding,  when  they  started  out,  they  were 
enlisted  for  the  purpose  of  fighting  hostile  Indians,  there  being  any  quantity 
of  them  on  the  plains.  They  knew  nothing  of  their  whereabouts.  They  went 
under  the  orders  of  Colonel  Chivington,  who  led  the  command.  They  came 
within  80  miles  of  Fort  Lyon,  where  they  were  halted  for  some  days,  and  all 
communication  stopped.  No  person,  not  even  the  United  States  mail,  was 
permitted  to  go  down  the  road  for  quite  a  length  of  time,  until  the  forces  which 
had  been  straggling  back  had  all  been  collected  together.  When  they  did 
march  to  Fort  Lyon  they  went  very  rapidly,  taking  every  person  about  the 
fort  by  surprise,  no  person  anticipating  their  coming  at  all.  Their  first  move¬ 
ment  was  to  throw  a  guard  around  the  fort.  That  surprised  the  soldiers  very 
much ;  they  said  they  did  not  know  the  object  of  it.  That  night  they  were 
ordered  to  march  again  in  a  northeast  direction.  I  think  that  and  perhaps  the 
next  night  they  marched  some  35  miles  to  fall  upon  this  camp  of  Indians  on 
Sand  creek.  None  of  the  soldiers  were  posted  as  to  what  Indians  they  were 
fighting,  or  anything  about  it,  until  they  got  an  explanation,  after  the  attack 
was  made,  from  various  white  men  in  the  camp.  Those  white  men  told  the 
soldiers  that  they  were  Black  Kettle’s  band,  who  had  been  there  for  sometime; 
a  part  of  the  time  had  been  drawing  rations  from  the  fort — were,  to  all  intents 
and  purposes,  friendly  Indians.  Beyond  that  I  know  that  the  colonel,  as  soon 
as  the  fight  was  over,  came  back  to  Denver.  I  met  him  the  day  he  came  in. 
I  he  command  afterwards  returned  in  marching  time.  They  had  evidences,  of 
what  they  had  been  doing — among  the  rest,  White  Antelope’s  medal ;  I  think 
they  had  about  20  of  Black  Kettle’s  scalps — quite  that  many,  I  think,  were 
exhibited ;  they  had  White  Antelope’s  commission,  or  something  like  that, 
from  Commissioner  Dole — something  like  a  recommend  ;  they  had  a  thousand 
and  one  trophies  in  the  way  of  finely  worked  buffalo  robes,  spurs,  and  bits, 
and  things  of  that  kind ;  all  of  which,  I  suppose,  was  contraband  of  war — 
they  were  taken  on  the  field  of  battle. 

Question.  Did  they  say  anything  about  how  the  attack  was  made,  at  what 
time,  and  under  what  circumstances  ? 

Answer.  1  understood  them  to  say  it  was  made  just  at  daylight.  The  In¬ 
dians  that  were  not  armed  almost  all  fled  and  escaped.  The  impression  of  the 
men  I  talked  with  was  that  they  had  killed  over  100  of  them;  the  impression 
of  some  others  was  that  they  had  killed  400  or  500. 

Question.  Was  anything  said  about  killing  women  and  children  ? 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


45 


Answer.  Yes,  sir;  they  killed  everything  alive  in  the  camp  that  they  could 
get  at.  I  believe  that  was  part  of  the  understanding,  that  none  should  be 
spared.  I  believe  it  is  generally  the  understanding  that  you  fight  Indians  in 
that  way< 

Question.  What  were  those  ornamented  buffalo  robes  worth  in  the  market  ? 

Answer.  They  are  very  valuable — worth  from  $20  to  $50  each. 

Question.  In  whose  possession  did  you  see  them  ] 

Answer.  They  were  most  y  in  private  hands — in  the  hands  of  the  men  who 
were  in  the  fight;  by  permission,  I  suppose.  I  do  not  suppose  there  was  any 
demand  made  for  them  by  any  person.  I  suppose  each  man  who  had  one  of 
them  thought  he  was  entitled  to  it. 

Question.  Is  that  the  rule  out  there,  that  the  soldiers  of  the  United  States 
are  entitled  to  all  they  capture  1 

Answer.  That  is  the  only  battle  they  have  ever  had ;  so  that  I  do  not  know 
as  there  is  any  particular  rule  about  that  matter. 

Question.  How  long  did  they  say  the  fight  continued  ? 

Answer.  I  am  under  the  impression  now  that  they  said  it  continued  some 
two  or  three  hours.  That  is  my  impression  from  the  representations  made  by 
the  parties  engaged  in  the  fight. 

Question.  How  many  Indians  did  they  say  were  engaged  in  the  fight  ? 

Answer.  It  has  been  estimated  that  there  were  from  500  to  3,000  there.  I 
suppose  the  agent  knows  almost  exactly  how  many  there  were  of  them.  They 
judge  from  the  lodges,  and  there  are  from  five  to  six  in  a  lodge,  so  far  as  my 
experience  goes.  From  the  best  information  I  could  get  there  were  from  100 
to  120  lodges  there. 

Question.  Was  there  anything  said  about  the  number  that  escaped  ? 

Answer.  A  large  proportion  of  them  escaped ;  that  was  the  supposition  of 
the  soldiers  I  talked  with. 

Question.  In  what  way,  on  horseback  or  on  foot  ? 

Answer.  Those  of  the  warriors  who  had  horses  that  they  could  g6t  hold  of 
escaped  on  horseback.  The  women  and  young  ones,  who  had  no  horses,  went 
on  foot. 

Question.  Did  they  take  any  prisoners  in  that  fight  1 

Answer.  I  never  heard  of  any  prisoners  being  taken  that  were  brought  in. 

Question.  Do  you  know  whether  they  captured  any  property  from  the  In¬ 
dians  ] 

Answer.  I  think  they  were  possessed  of  no  property  except  what  I  have 
mentioned. 

Question.  Did  they  have  no  horses,  ponies,  and  mules  ? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir ;  I  saw  a  great  many  ponies.  A  New  Mexican  company 
was  mostly  mounted  on  ponies  that  they  had  captured.  I  saw  them  come  in 
on  Indian  horses  ;  they  were  poor,  thin  horses. 

Question.  Did  you  hear  Colonel  Cliivington  himself  say  anything  about  that 
transaction  ? 

Answer.  No,  sir,  except  in  a  public  speech  he  made  afterwards,  and  in  that 
he  did  not  say  much  about  it. 

Question.  Did  he  assign  any  reason  why,  under  the  circumstances,  he  at¬ 
tacked  that  band  of  Indians  ? 

Answer.  He  said  all  the  time  that  they  were  hostile  Indians,  and  was  very 
wroth  with  any  of  the  community  who  knew  anything  about  the  Indians,  who 
had  been  in  the  country  a  long  while,  who  knew  something  about  Black  Kettle 
and  White  Antelope,  and  who  denominated  them  friendly  Indians,  and  who 
differed  with  him  as  to  the  policy  of  bringing  those  Indians  down  upon  us  at 
that  time.  He  was  very  wroth  with  me  particularly,  and  one  or  two  others  ; 
and  I  suppose  that  was  what  brought  forth  the  remarks  that  he  made. 

Question.  What  was  his  policy  ? 


46  MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 

Answer.  To  exterminate  the  Indians. 

Question.  To  kill  them  all  ? 

Answer.  Yes,  sir,  I  should  judge  so  ;  and  that  seemed  to  be  quite  a  popular 
notion  too. 

Question.  Did  you  have  any  means  of  knowing  the  reputation  of  Black 
Kettle  and  White  Antelope  ] 

Answer.  We  have  always  regarded  Black  Kettle  and  White  Antelope  as 
the  special  friends  of  the  white  man  ever  since  I  have  been  in  the  country. 

Question.  Do  you  know  of  any  acts  of  hostility  committed  by  them,  or  with 
their  consent  ? 

Answer.  No,  sir;  I  do  not. 

Question.  Did  you  ever  hear  any  acts  of  hostility  attributed  to  them  by  any 
one  i 

Answer.  No,  sir. 

By  Mr.  Gooch : 

Question.  Is  there  a  general  feeling  among  the  whites  there  in  favor  of  the 
extermination  of  the  Indians  ? 

Answer.  That  feeling  prevails  in  all  new  countries  where  the  Indians  have 
committed  any  depredations.  And  most  especially  will  people  fly  off  the  handle 
in  that  way  when  you  exhibit  the  corpse  of  some  one  who  has  been  murdered 
by  the  Indians.  When  they  come  to  their  sober  senses  they  reflect  that  the 
Indians  have  feelings  as  well  as  we  have,  and  are  entitled  to  certain  rights; 
which,  by  the  by,  they  never  get. 

Question.  Had  there  been  any  such  acts  committed  by  the  Indians  at  that 
time  ? 

Answer.  No,  sir;  not  for  months.  But  last  summer  there  were  exhibitions 
that  were  horrid  to  tell,  and  there  were  terrible  imprudences  in  consequence. 
Persons  killed  thirty  or  forty  miles  off  were  brought  into  Denver  and  exhibited 
there. 

Question.  There  had  been  nothing  of  that  kind  for  some  time  previous  to 
this  attack  by  Colonel  Chivington  ? 

Answer.  No,  sir. 

Question.  Do  you  know  of  any  motive  which  actuated  Colonel  Chivington  in 
making  this  attack  ? 

Answer.  It  may  be  invidious  in  me  to  give  my  idea  of  his  motive.  I  was 
entirely  satisfied  that  his  motive  was  not  a  good  and  virtuous  one — so  much  so, 
that  when  I  was  where  he  stopped  his  command  I  wrote  a  letter  to  Judge  Ben¬ 
nett,  giving  him  my  views  about  the  matter,  and  telling  him  what  I  thought  was 
his  object.  We  regarded  those  Indians  on  the  reservation  as  safe,  and  ought 
not  to  be  attacked.  That  opinion,  perhaps,  was  not  shared  by  the  community, 
though  I  presume  the  great  majority  of  the  command  were  aware  of  the  Indians 
they  were  going  to  kill. 

Question.  If  you  have  no  objection,  I  would  like  you  to  state  what  you 
think  was  his  motive. 

Answer.  I  think  it  was  hope  of  promotion.  He  had  read  of  Kit  Carson, 
General  Harney,  and  others,  who  had  become  noted  for  their  Indian  fighting.  I 
have  no  objection  to  state  that. 

Mr.  Gooch.  The  reason  why  I  ask  these  questions  is,  that  this  attack  seems 
to  us  to  be  of  such  a  character  that  we  are  anxious  to  ascertain,  if  possible, 
what  could  have  been  the  motive  which  actuated  an  officer  to  make  such  an 
attack  under  the  circumstances. 

The  witness.  I  have  no  doubt  that  what  I  have  stated  was  one  motive. 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS, 


47 


Papers  submitted  by  Hon.  H.  P.  Bonnet,  delegate  in  Congress  from  Colorado 

Territory. 

Washington  City,  March  20,  1865. 

Sir  :  I  am  compelled  to  leave  to-night  for  New  York,  to  be  gone  several  days, 
and  it  will  likely  be  impossible  for  me  to  appear  before  the  committee  at  all. 
But,  as  you  requested,  I  will  furnish  the  committee  with  such  official  and  un¬ 
official  documents  as  I  have  touching  upon  the  “  Sand  creek  affair.  ” 

Herewith  enclosed  please  find  the  official  reports  of  all  the  principal  officers 
engaged  in  the  transaction ;  also,  a  copy  of  Governor  Evans’s  proclamation,  after 
which  the  one-hundred-day  regiment  was  raised;  also,  some  slips  cut  from  the 
“.Rocky  Mountain  News, ”tlie  organ  of  Governor  Evans,  and  edited  by  the 
postmaster  at  Denver;  also,  find  an  extract  from  Secretary  Elbert’s  message 
made  to  the  legislature  and  published  in  the  “Rocky  Mountain  News.”  All 
the  foregoing  papers  I  believe  to  be  genuine  copies  of  what  they  purport  to  be. 

Very  respectfully, 

H.  P.  BENNET. 

Hon.  Mr.  Gooch. 


Proclamation  by  Governor  Evans,  of  Colorado  Territory. 

PROCLAMATION. 

Having  sent  special  messengers  to  the  Indians  of  the  plains,  directing  the 
friendly  to  rendezvous  at  Fort  Lyon,  Fort  Larned,  Fort  Laramie,  and  Camp 
Collins  for  safety  and  protection,  warning  them  that  all  hostile  Indians  would 
be  pursued  and  destroyed,  and  the  last  of  said  messengers  having  now  returned, 
and  the  evidence  being  conclusive  that  most  of  the  Indian  tribes  of  the  plains 
are  at  war  and  hostile  to  the  whites,  and  having  to  the  utmost  of  my  ability 
endeavored  to  induce  all  of  the  Indians  of  the  plains  to  come  to  said  places 
of  rendezvous,  promising  them  subsistence  and  protection,  which,  with  a  few  - 
exceptions,  they  have  refusedto  do  : 

Now,  therefore,  I,  John  Evans,  governor  of  Colorado  Territory,  do  issue  this 
my  proclamation,  authorizing  all  citizens  of  Colorado,  either  individually  or  in 
such  parties  as  they  may  organize,  to  go  in  pursuit  of  all  hostile  Indians  on  the 
plains,  scrupulously  avoiding  those  who  have  responded  to  my  said  call  to 
rendezvous  at  the  points  indicated ;  also,  to  kill  and  destroy,  as  enemies  of  the 
country,  wherever  they  may  be  found,  all  such  hostile  Indians.  And  further,  as 
the  only  reward  I  am  authorized  to  offer  for  such  services,  I  hereby  empower 
such  citizens,  or  parties  of  citizens,  to  take  captive,  and  hold  to  their  own  private 
use  and  benefit,  all  the  property  of  said  hostile  Indians  that  they  may  capture, 
and  to  receive  for  all  stolen  property  recovered  from  said  Indians  such  reward 
as  may  be  deemed  proper  and  just  therefor. 

I  further  offer  to  all  such  parties  as  will  organize  under  the  militia  law  of  the 
Territory  for  the  purpose  to  furnish  them  arms  and  ammunition,  and  to  present 
their  accounts  for  pay  as  regular  soldiers  for  themselves,  their  horses,  their  sub¬ 
sistence,  and  transportation,  to  Congress,  under  the  assurance  of  the  department 
commander  that  they  will  be  paid. 

The  conflict  is  upon  us,  and  all  good  citizens  are  called  upon  to  do  their  duty 
for  the  defence  of  their  homes  and  families. 

In  testimony  whereof,  I  have  hereunto  set  my  hand  and  caused  the  great  seal 
of  the  Territory  of  Colorado  to  be  affixed  this  11th  day  of  August,  A.  D.  1864. 
[seal.]  JOHN  EVANS. 

By  the  governor : 

S.  H.  Elbert,  Secretary  of  Colorado  Territory. 


48 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


OFFICIAL  REPORTS  OF  OFFICERS  ENGAGED  IN  THE  AFFAIR  OF  SANDY 
CREEK,  PUBLISHED  IN  THE  ROCKY  MOUNTAIN  NEWS. 

First  report  of  Colonel  C/iivington. 

Headquarters  District  of  Colorado, 

In  the  field ,  on  Big  Bend  of  Sandy  Creek ,  Col.  Ter.,  Nov.  29,  1864. 

Sir  :  I  liave  not  the  time  to  give  you  a  detailed  history  of  our  engagement  of 
to-day,  or  to  mention  those  officers  and  men  who  distinguished  themselves  in 
one  of  the  most  bloody  Indian  battles  ever  fought  on  these  plains.  You  will 
find  enclosed  the  report  of  my  surgeon  in  charge,  which  will  bring  to  many 
anxious  friends  the  sad  fate  of  loved  ones  who  are  and  have  been  risking 
everything  to  avenge  the  horrid  deeds  of  those  savages  we  have  so  severely 
handled.  We  made  a  forced  march  of  forty  miles,  and  surprised,  at  break  of 
day,  one  of  the  most  powerful  villages  of  the  Cheyenne  nation,  and  captured 
over  five  hundred  animals ;  killing  the  celebrated  chiefs  One  Eye,  White  An¬ 
telope,  Knock  Kno,  Black  Kettle,  and  Little  Robe,  with  about  five  hundred  of 
their  people,  destroying  all  their  lodges  and  equipage,  making  almost  an  anni¬ 
hilation  of  the  entire  tribe. 

I  shall  leave  here,  as  soon  as  I  can  see  our  wounded  safely  on  the  way  to  the 
hospital  at  Fort  Lyon,  for  the  villages  of  the  Sioux,  which  are  reported  about 
eighty  miles  from  here,  on  the  Smoky  Hill,  and  three  thousand  strong ;  so  look 
out  for  more  fighting.  I  will  state,  for  the  consideration  of  gentlemen  who  are 
opposed  to  fighting  these  red  scoundrels,  that  I  was  shown,  by  my  chief  surgeon, 
the  scalp  of  a  white  man  taken  from  the  lodge  of  one  of  the  chiefs,  which  could 
not  have  been  more  than  two  or  three  days  taken;  and  I  could  mention  many 
more  things  to  show  how  these  Indians,  who  have  been  drawing  government 
rations  at  Fort  Lyon,  are  and  have  been  acting. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

J.  M.  CHIVINGTON, 

Col.  Comd’g  Colorado  Expedition  against  Indians  on  Plains. 
Chas.  Wheeler,  A.  A.  A.  G., 

Headquarters  District  of  Colorado,  Denver. 


Second  report  of  Colonel  Chivington. 

Headquarters  District  of  Colorado, 

Denver,  C.  T.,  December  16,  1864. 

General:  I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  the  following  report  of  operations  of 
the  Indian  expedition  under  my  command,  of  which  brief  notice  was  given  you 
by  my  telegram  of  November  29,  1864 : 

Having  ascertained  that  the  hostile  Indians  had  proceeded  south  from  the 
Platte,  and  were  almost  within  striking  distance  of  Fort  Lyon,  I  ordered  Colonel 
Geo.  L.  Shoup,  3d  regiment  Colorado  volunteer  cavalry,  (100-day  service,) 
to  proceed  with  the  mounted  men  of  his  regiment  in  that  direction. 

On  the  20th  of  November  I  left  Denver  and  Booneville,  C.  T.  ;  on  the  24th  of 
November  joined  and  took  command  in  person  of  the  expedition  which  had 
been  increased  by  a  battalion  of  the  1st  cavalry  of  Colorado,  consisting  of  de¬ 
tachments  of  companies  C,  E  and  H.  I  proceeded  with  the  utmost  caution 
down  the  Arkansas  river,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  28th  instant  arrived  at  Fort 
Lyon,  to  the  surprise  of  the  garrison  of  that  post.  On  the  same  morning  I  re¬ 
sumed  my  march,  being  joined  by  Major  Scott  J.  Anthony,  1st  cavalry  of  Col¬ 
orado,  with  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  men  of  said  regiment,  consisting  of 
detachments  of  companies  D,  G  and  II,  with  two  howitzers.  The  command 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


49 


then  proceeded  in  a  northeasterly  direction,  travelling  all  night,  and  at  daylight 
of  the  29th  November  striking  Sand  creek  about  forty  (40)  miles  from  Fort 

Lyon. 

Here  was  discovered  an  Indian  villageof  one  hundred  and  thirty  (130)lodges,- 
composed  of  Black  Kettle’s  band  of  Cheyennes  and  eight  (8)  lodges  of  Arapahoes, 
with  Left  Hand.  My  line  of  battle  was  formed  with  Lieutenant  Wilson’s  bat¬ 
talion  of  the  1st  regiment,  numbering  about  125  men,  on  the  right,  Colonel 
Shoup’s  3d  regiment,  numbering  about  450  men,  in  the  centre,  and  Major  An¬ 
thony’s  battalion,  numbering  125  men,  1st  regiment,  on  the  left. 

The  attack  was  immediately  made  upon  the  Indian’s  camp  by  Lieutenant 
Wilson,  who  dashed  forward,  cutting  the  enemy  off  from  their  herd,  and  driv¬ 
ing  them  out  of  their  camp,  which  was  subsequently  destroyed. 

The  Indians,  numbering  from  900  to  1,000,  though  taken  by  surprise,  speed¬ 
ily  rallied  and  formed  a  line  of  battle  across  the  creek,  about  three-fourths  of  a 
mile  above  the  village,  stubbornly  contesting  every  inch  of  ground. 

The  commands  of  Colonel  Shoup  and  Major  Anthony  pressed  rapidly  forward 
and  attacked  the  enemy  sharply,  and  the  engagement  became  general,  we  con¬ 
stantly  driving  the  Indians,  who  fell  back  from  one  position  to  another  for  five 
miles,  and  finally  abandoned  resistance  and  dispersed  in  all  directions  and  were 
pursued  by  my  troops  until  nightfall. 

It  may,  perhaps,  be  unnecessary  for  me  to  state  that  I  captured  no  prisoners. 
Between  five  and  six  hundred  Indians  were  left  dead  upon  the  field.  About 
five  hundred  and  fifty  ponies,  mules  and  horses  were  captured,  and  all  their 
pdges  were  destroyed,  the  contents  of  which  has  served  to  supply  the  command 
with  an  abundance  of  trophies,  comprising  the  paraphernalia  of  Indian  warfare 
and  life.  My  loss  was  eight  (8)  killed  on  the  field  and  forty  (40)  wounded,  of 
which  two  have  since  died.  Of  the  conduct  of  the  3d  regiment  (100-day  ser¬ 
vice)  I  have  to  say  that  they  well  sustained  the  reputation  of  our  Colorado 
troops  for  bravery  and  effectiveness ;  were  well  commanded  by  their  gallant 
young  Colonel,  Geo.  L.  Shoup,  ably  assisted  by  Lieutenant  Colonel  L.  L.  Bow¬ 
en,  Major  Hal  Sayr  and  Captain  Theodore  G.  Cree,  commanding  1st,  2d  and  3d 
battalions  of  that  regiment 

Of  the  conduct  of  the  two  battalions  of  the  1st  regiment  I  have  but  to  remark 
that  they  sustained  their  reputation  as  second  to  none,  and  were  ably  handled 
by  their  commanders,  Major  Anthony,  Lieutenant  Wilson  and  Lieutenant  Clark 
Dunn,  upon  whom  the  command  devolved  after  the  disability  of  Lieutenant 
Wilson  from  wounds  received. 

Night  coming  on,  the  pursuit  of  the  flying  Indians  was  of  necessity  abandoned, 
and  my  command  encamped  within  sight  of  the  field. 

On  the  1st  instant,  having  sent  the  wounded  and  dead  to  Fort  Lyon,  the  first 
to  be  cared  for,  and  the  latter  to  be  buried  upon  our  own  soil.  I  resumed  the 
pursuit  in  the  direction  of  Camp  Wynkoop  on  the  Arkansas  river,  marching  all 
night  of  the  3d  and  4tli  instant,  in  hopes  of  overtaking  a  large  encampment  of 
Arapahoes  and  Cheyennes,  under  Little  Raven,  but  the  enemy  had  been  apprized 
of  my  advance,  and  on  the  morning  of  the  5th  instant,  at  3  o’clock,  precipitately 
broke  camp  and  fled.  My  stock  was  exhausted.  For  one  hundred  miles  the 
snow  had  been  two  feet  deep,  and  for  the  previous  fifteen  days — excepting  on 
November  29  and  30 — the  marches  had  been  forced  and  incessant. 

Under  these  circumstances,  and  the  fact  of  the  time  of  the  3d  regiment  being 
nearly  out,  I  determined  for  the  present  to  relinquish  the  pursuit. 

Of  the  effect  of  the  punishment  sustained  by  the  Indians  you  will  be  the  judge. 
Their  chiefs  Black  Kettle,  White  Antelope,  One  Eye,  Knock  Knee,  and  Little 
Robe,  were  numbered  with  the  killed  and  their  bands  almost  annihilated.  I  was 
shown  the  scalp  of  a  white  man,  found  in  one  of  the  lodges,  which  could  not 
have  been  taken  more  than  two  or  three  days  previous.  For  full  particulars  and 
reports  of  the  several  commanders  I  respectfully  refer  you  to  the  following  copies 
Part  VI - 4  - 


50 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


herewith  enclosed,  of  Colonel  George  L.  Slioup,  3d  regiment,  December  6,  1864; 
Colonel  Slioup,  3d  regiment,  December  7,  1864;  Colonel  L.  L.  Bowen,  3d  regi¬ 
ment,  November  30,  1864;  Major  Hal  Sayr,  3d  regiment,  December  6,  1864; 
Captain  Theodore  G.  Cree,  3d  regiment,  December  6,  1864;  Major  Scott  J. 
Anthony,  1st  regiment,  December  1,  1864;  Lieutenant  Clark  Dunn,  1st  regi¬ 
ment,  November  30,  1864;  Lieutenant  J.  J.  Kennedy,  November  30,  1864. 

If  all  the  companies  of  the  1st  cavalry  of  Colorado  and  the  11th  Ohio  vol¬ 
unteer  cavalry,  stationed  at  camps  and  posts  near  here,  were  ordered  to  report 
to  me,  I  could  organize  a  campaign,  which,  in  my  judgment,  would  effectually 
rid  the  country  between  the  Platte  and  Arkansas  rivers  of  these  red  rebels. 

I  would  respectfully  request  to  be  informed,  if  another  campaign  should  be 
authorized  from  here,  whether  I  could  employ  one  or  two  hundred  friendly  Utes, 
(Indians,)  furnishing  them  subsistence,  arms  and  ammunition  for  the  campaign. 

I  am,  general,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

J.  M.  C  III  YIN  GTON, 

Col.  1st  Cavalry  of  Colorado,  Commanding  District  of  Colorado. 


First  report  of  Colonel  Shoup. 

Headquarters  Third  Colorado  Cavalry, 

In  field,  100  miles  below  Fort  Lyon,  December  6,  1864. 

Captain  :  In  answer  to  your  communication  of  this  date,  asking  me  to  con¬ 
sult  with  the  officers  of  my  regiment,  and  report-  their  opinion  as  to  the  propriety 
and  willingness  of  themselves  and  the  enlisted  men  under  my  command  to  con¬ 
tinue  this  expedition  against  the  Indians  to  the  Smoky  Hill  and  Republican,  I 
have  to  say — 

My  “officers  and  men”  will  obey  orders  and  go  to  the  Smoky  Hill  and  Re¬ 
publican,  if  the  colonel  commanding,  after  due  deliberation,  will  so  order.  How¬ 
ever,  they  are  nearly  all  of  the  opinion,  (the  officers,)  that  an  expedition  to  the 
above  named  streams  at  present  must  fail.  This  opinion  is  based  upon  the 
fact  that  their  horses  are  worn  out,  and  in  an  unserviceable  condition;  most  of 
the  animals  would  fail  on  the  first  forced  march. 

They  are  of  the  further  opinion  that  many  of  these  men  will  re-enlist  to  pros¬ 
ecute  this  campaign  if  we  meet  with  no  reverse  and  the  men  are  not  worn  out 
and  disheartened  in  a  fruitless  march  just  before  the  expiration  of  their  term  of 
enlistment. 

All  the  above  is  fully  indorsed  by  me ;  and  while  I  am  more  than  eager  to 
duplicate  the  great  victory  of  November  29, 1  think  an  expedition  to  the  Smoky 
Hill  and  Republican,  considering  the  worn-out  condition  of  my  horses,  would 
prove  more  of  a  disaster  than  a  success,  at  present ;  the  failure  of  which  would 
so  dishearten  my  men,  that  no  inducement  could  be  held  out  that  would 
cause  them  to  re-enlist.  All  of  which  is  most  respectfully  submitted. 

GEORGE  L.  SHOUP, 

Colonel  3d  Colorado  Cavalry. 

Captain  J.  S.  Maynard, 

A.  A.  A.  General ,  District  of  Colorado,  in  the  field. 


Second  report  of  Colonel  Shoup. 

Headquarters  District  of  Colorado, 

In  the  field,  December  7,  1864. 

Dear  Sir:  I  have  the  honor  to  report  the  part  taken  by  my  regiment,  3d 
Colorado  cavalry,  in  the  engagement  with  the  Indians  on  Sand  creek,  forty  (40) 
miles  north  of  Fort  Lyon,  Colorado  Territory,  November  29,  1864. 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


51 


I  brought  my  regiment  into  action  at  sunrise.  The  first  order  given  was  to 
Captain  John  McCannon,  company  I,  to  cutoff  the  Indians  from  their  ponies 
on  the  south  side  of  the  village;  this  order  was  obeyed  with  great  celerity  and 
success.  Captain  McCannon  captured  about  two  hundred  (200)  ponies  at  the 
first  dash,  but  being  closely  pressed  by  hundreds  of  Indians,  sent  the  ponies  to 
the  rear,  and  opened  a  terrible  and  withering  fire  on  the  Indians,  completely 
checking  them,  killing  many,  and  causing  them  to  retreat  up  Sand  creek. 

Captain  0.  H.  P.  Baxter,  with  his  company  G,  was  sent  to  re-enforce 
Captain  McCannon.  The  two  companies  then  fought  the  Indians  up  the  south 
side  of  the  creek  for  about  two  (2)  miles,  and  at  this  point  many  of  the  Indians 
took  refuge  in  the  banks  of  the  creek,  where  they  had  prepared  rifle-pits. 
Captain  McCannon,  with  his  company,  remained  at  that  place  until  late  in  the 
afternoon,  and  was  the  last  to  leave  the  field  of  battle.  His  brave  company 
killed  twenty-six  (26)  Indians  in  one  pit,  and  must  have  killed  fifty  (50)  or 
more  during  the  engagement.  Company  G,  led  by  Captain  Baxter  and  Lieu¬ 
tenant  Templeton,  pursued  the  demoralized  and  flying  savages  to  the  south  and 
west,  killing  upwards  of  twenty  Indians.  Lieutenant  W.  E.  Grinnell,  with  a 
detachment  of  21  men  of  company  K,  fought  during  part  of  the  engagement 
on  the  southwest  side  of  the  battle-field.  This  brave  little  detachment  deserve 
honorable  mention  for  their  gallant  conduct  on  the  field.  They  lost  one-fifth  of 
their  number,  killed  and  wounded.  At  the  opening  of  the  engagement  I  led 
about  four  hundred  (400)  of  my  men  up  the  north  side  of  the  creek  and  engaged 
the  main  body  of  the  Indians,  who  were  retreating  to  the  west.  I  dismounted 
my  men  and  fought  them  for  some  time  on  foot. 

At  this  point  Captain  Talbott,  of  company  M,  fell  severely  wounded,  while 
bravely  leading  his  men  in  a  charge  on  a  body  of  Indians  who  had  taken  refuge 
on  the  banks  on  the  north  side  of  the  creek.  Here  a  terrible  hand-to-hand  en¬ 
counter  ensued  between  the  Indians  and  Captain  Talbott’s  men  and  others  who 
had  rushed  forward  to  their  aid — the  Indians  trying  to  secure  the  scalp  of  Cap¬ 
tain  Talbott.  I  think  the  hardest  fighting  of  the  day  occurred  at  that  point,""' 
some  of  our  men  fighting  with  club  muskets;  the  1st  and  3d  Coloradoans 
fighting  side  by  side,  each  trying  to  excel  in  bravery,  and  each  ambitious  to  kill 
at  least  one  Indian.  Many  valuable  lives  of  officers  and  men  were  saved  by  the 
bravery  of  others  just  as  the  fatal  knife  was  raised  to  perform  its  work  of  death. 

*  Early  in  the  engagement,  Captain  Nickols,  with  his  company  D,  pursued  a 
band  of  Indians  that  were  trying  to  escape  to  the  northeast ;  he  overtook  and 
punished  them  severely,  killing  twenty- five  or  thirty  and  captured  some  ponies. 

Other  companies  of  my  regiment  fought  with  zeal  and  bravery,  but  after  10* 
o’clock  a.  m.  the  battle  became  so  general  and  covered  so  wide  a  field  that  it 
became  necessary  to  divide  my  command  into  small  detachments,  sending  them 
in  all  directions  to  pursue  the  flying  Indians. 

I  am  told  by  my  officers  and  men  that  some  of  their  comrades  engaged  the 
Indians  in  close  combat.  I  am  satisfied,  from  my  own  ’observation,  that  the 
historian  will  search  in  vain  for  braver  deeds  than  were  committed  on  that  field 
of  battle. 

My  loss  is  nine  (9)  men  killed,  one  missing,  supposed  to  be  killed,  and  forty- 
four  (44)  wounded. 

Captain  Presley  Talbott  and  Lieutenant  C.  H.  Hawley  are  the  only  officers 
wounded  of  my  regiment ;  Captain  Talbott  in  left  side,  and  Lieutenant  Hawley 
in  shoulder. 

Enclosed  herewith  you  will  find  copy  of  the  reports  of  my  battalion  coim 
manders  to  me.  Aell  of  which  is  most  respectfully  submitted. 

I  am,  sir,  with  great  respect,  your  obedient  servant, 

GEORGE  L.  SHOUP, 

Colonel  3 cl  Colorado  Cavalry. 

Colonel  J.  M.  Chivington,  Commanding  District  of  Colorado. 


52 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Report  of  Lieutenant  Colonel  Bowen. 


Sandy  Creek,  November  30,  1864. 

Sir  :  I  have  the  honor  to  enclose  you  the  reports  of  the  company  commanders 
of  the  first  battalion,  commanded  by  myself,  in  the  action  of  yesterday.  I  fully 
indorse  all  contained  in  these  reports ;  all  behaved  well,  each  vieing  with  the  other 
as  to  who  could  do  the  enemy  the  most  injury.  This,  I  think,  can  truly  be  said 
of  the  whole  regiment.  I  was  in  position  during  the  action  to  see  most  of  the 
regiment,  and  did  not  see  one  coward.  Permit  me  to  congratulate  you  upon 
the  signal  punishment  meted  out  to  the  savages  on  yesterday,  “who  so  ruth¬ 
lessly  have  murdered  our  women  and  children,”  in  the  language  of  the  colonel 
commanding,  although  I  regret  the  loss  of  so  many  brave  men.  The  third 
regiment  cannot  any  longer  be  called  the  “  bloodless  third.” 

From  the  most  reliable  information,  from  actual  count  and  positions  occupied, 
I  have  no  doubt  that  at  least  one  hundred  and  fifty  Indians  were  killed  by 
my  battalion. 

I  cannot  speak  in  terms  of  too  high  praise  of  all  the  officers  and  men  under 
my  command. 

The  war  flag  of  this  band  of  Cheyennes  is  in  my  possession,  presented  by 
Stephen  Decatur,  commissary  sergeant  of  company  C,  who  acted  as  my 
battalion  adjutant. 

Very  respectfully, 

LEAVITT  L.  BOWEN, 

Lieut.  Col.  3d  Colorado  Cavalry,  Commanding  1st  Battalion. 

Colonel  George  L.  Shoup, 

Third  Regiment  Colorado  Cavalry. 


Report  of  Major  Sayr. 

Camp - ,  December  6,  1864. 

Sir  :  I  have  the  honor  to  submit  the  following  report  of  the  part  taken  by  * 
my  battalion  in  the  action  of  November  29,  on  Sand  creek.  The  battalion 
consisted  of  company  B,  Captain  H.  M.  Orahood,  First  Lieutenant  Charles  H. 
Hawley,  Second  Lieutenant  Harry  Richmond,  and  sixty-four  men;  company  I, 
Captain.John  McCannon,  First  Lieutenant  Thomas  J.  Davis,  and  fifty-three  men ; 
company  G,  Captain  0.  H.  P.  Baxter,  Second  Lieutenant  A.  J.  Templeton,  and 
forty  men;  company  K,  Lieutenant  W.  E.  Grinnell,  and  twenty-one  men; 
making  a  total  of  178  men.  Company*  I  was  sent  at  the  beginning  of  the 
action  to  the  west  of  the  field,  where  they  remained  during  the  day,  much  of 
the  time  sustaining  a  heavy  fire  from  the  enemy,  who  were  secreted  under  a 
high  bank,  on  the  south  side  of  Sand  creek.  This  company  did  good  service 
in  preventing  the  escape  of  the  Indians  to  the  west.  Companies  B,  G,  and 
K,  moved  across  the  creek  and  went  into  the  action  on  the  north  side  of  the 
creek  and  west  of  the  Indian  town,  where  they  remained  for  several  hours, 
doing  good  service,  while  under  a  heavy  fire  from  the  enemy,  who  were  con¬ 
cealed  in  rifle-pits  in  the  bed  of  the  creek. 

The  action  became  general,  and  lasted  from  6.30  a.  m.  until  1  p.  m.,  when  the 
companies  divided  into  small  squads  and  went  in  pursuit  of  the  Indians,  who 
were  now  flying  in  every  direction  across  the  plains,  and  were  pursued  until 
dark. 

Both  officers  and  men  conducted  themselves  bravely.  The  number  of  Indians 
killed  by  the  battalion,  as  estimated  by  company  commanders,  is  about  175  to 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


53 


200.  Company  B,  Lieutenant  Hawley,  wounded  in  shoulder;  private  Marrion 
wounded  in  thigh  f  company  I,  three  killed  and  three  wounded ;  company  G-, 
none  killed  or  wounded ;  company  K,  two  killed  and  two  wounded  ;  making  a 
total  of  five  killed  and  seven  wounded. 

Hoping  the  above  will  meet  your  approval,  I  am,  colonel,  very  respectfully,  &e., 

HAL.  SAYR, 

Major  Commanding  2d  Battalion ,  3 d  Colorado  Cavalry. 

Colonel  George  L.  Shoup, 

Commanding  Third  Colorado  Cavalry. 


Report  of  Captain  Cree. 


Camp  Skedaddle,  December  6,  1864. 


Sir  :  I  have  the  honor  to  report  to  you  the  part  taken  by  the  third  battalion 
in  the  fight  of  the  29th  of  November.  They  first  formed  on  the  left  of  the  regi¬ 
ment,  in  the  rear  of  the  village,  then  removed  upon  the  right  bank  of  the  creek, 
near  one-half  mile;  there  dismounted  and  fought  the  red-skins  about  an  hour, 
where  the  boys  behaved  like  veterans. 

After  finding  that  we  had  done  all  the  good  that  we  could  do  there,  removed 
companies  D  andE,  (company  F  having  gone  with  Colonel  Bowen’s  battalion,) 
and  moved  to  the  right,  across  the  hill,  for  the  purpose  of  killing  Indians  that 
were  making  their  escape  to  the  right  of  the  command,  in  which  movement  we 
succeeded  in  killing  many.  I  then  made  a  detail  from  company  D,  of  fifteen  (15) 
men,  and  sent  them  to  capture  some  twenty  (20)  ponies,  which  I  could  see  some 
four  (4)  miles  to  the  right  of  the  village;  but  before  they  reached  the  ponies' 
some  twenty  Indians  attacked  them,  when  a  fierce  fight  ensued,  in  which  private 
McFarland  was  killed  in  a  hand-to-hand  engagement;  but,  like  true  soldiers, 
they  stood  their  ground,  killing  five  (5)  Indians,  and  wounding  several  others. 

The  Indians  finding  it  rather  warm  to  be  healthy,  left.  The  boys  pursued 
them  some  eight  or  ten  miles,  and  finding  that  they  could  not  overtake  them, 
returned,  bringing  with  them  the  ponies  they  were  sent  for.  I  then  returned 
with  the  command  to  the  village  to  take  care  of  their  killed  and  wounded  com¬ 


panions. 

Company  E  lost  one  killed  and  one  wounded ;  company  D,  two  killed  and 
one  wounded. 

As  for  the  bravery  displayed  by  any  one  in  particular,  I  have  no  distinctions 
to  make.  All  I  can  say  for  officers  and  men  is,  that  they  all  behaved  well,  and 
won  for  themselves  a  name  that  will  be  remembered  for  ages  to  come. 

The  number  of  Indians  killed  by  my  battalion  is  sixty  (60.) 

I  am,  colonel,  yours  truly, 


T.  G.  CREE, 


Captain  Commanding  3d  Battalion ,  3d  Colorado  Cavalry. 

Colonel  George  L.  Shoup. 


Report  of  Major  Anthony. 

Headquarters,  in  the  Field, 

Battalion  First  Colorado  Cavalry ,  December  1,  1864. 

Sir  :  I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  I  left  Fort  Lyon,  Colorado  Territory, 
with  detachments  from  companies  D,  G,  and  H,  1st  Colorado  cavalry,  number¬ 
ing  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  men,  and  two  howitzers,  and  joined  Colonel 
Chivington’s  brigade  one  mile  below  Fort  Lyon,  at  8  o’clock  p.  m.,  November 
28,  and  proceeded  with  his  command,  on  Indian  expedition,  in  a  northeasterly 
direction,  striking  Sand  creek  at  daylight  of  the  29th  November,  forty  miles  from 


54 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Fort  Lyon,  when  we  came  upon  a  herd  of  Indian  horses,  and  I  was  sent  for- 
•  ward  with  my  battalion  to  capture  stock.  After  proceeding  about  one  mile  we 
came  in  sight  of  an  Indian  camp,  some  two  miles  further.  I  immediately  sent 
word, to  the  colonel  commanding  that  an  Indian  camp  was  in  sight,  and  pro¬ 
ceeded  with  my  command  in  the  direction  of  the  camp,  which  I  reached  just 
before  sunrise.  I  found  Lieutenant  Wilson,  with  a  detachment  of  1st  Colorado 
cavalry,  upon  the  right  and  south  of  the  camp,  and  Lieutenant  Dunn,  with 
a  detachment  of  the  1st  Colorado  cavalry,  posted  upon  the  west  hank  of 
Sand  creek,  and  opposite  the  camp,  both  commands  keeping  up  a  brisk  fire 
upon  the  camp.  LTpon  my  nearing  the  camp  upon  the  west  side  I  was  attacked 
by  a  small  force  of  Indians  posted  behind  the  bank  of  the  creek,  who  commenced 
firing  upon  me  with  arrows,  and  who  had  collected  on  the  opposite  side  of  camp. 
Colonel  Chivington  coming  up  at  this  time  with  Colonel  Shoup’s  regiment,  3d 
Colorado  cavalry,  and  two  howitzers,  charged  through  the  camp,  driving  the 
Indians  completely  out  of  their  camp  and  into  the  creek,  in  holes  or  rifle-pits 
dug  in  the  sand.  The  fighting  now  became  general.  The  Indians  fought 
desperately,  apparently  resolved  to  die  upon  that  ground,  but  to  injure  us  as 
much  as  possible  before  being  killed.  We  fought  them  for  about  six  hours, 
along  the  creek  for  five  miles. 

The  loss  to  my  command  was  one  killed  and  three  wounded.  The  loss  to 
the  entire  command,  ten  killed  and  forty  wounded.  Lieutenant  Baldwin,  com¬ 
manding  the  section  of  howitzers,  attached  to  my  battalion,  had  a  fine  private 
horse  shot  from  under  him.  Seven  horses  were  killed  from  my  command.  The 
loss  to  the  Indians  was  about  three  hundred  killed,  some  six  hundred  ponies, 
and  one  hundred  and  thirty  lodges,  with  a  large  quantity  of  buffalo  robes,  and 
•  their  entire  camp  equipage. 

The  camp  proved  to  be  Cheyenne  and  Arapahoe  Indians,  and  numbered 
about  1,100  persons,  under  the  leadership  of  Black  Kettle,  head  chief  of  the 
Cheyenne  tribe.  Black  Kettle  and  three  other  chiefs  were  killed. 

All  the  command  fought  well,  and  observed  all  orders  given  them.  We 
camped  upon  the  ground  occupied  by  the  Indians  the  day  before,  destroyed 
the  entire  camp  of  the  Indians,  and  then  pushed  rapidly  in  a  southeasterly 
direction,  in  pursuit  of  Little  Raven’s  camp  of  Arapahoes,  reported  to  be  on  the 
Arkansas  river. 

I  am,  sir,  with  much  respect,  your  obedient  servant, 

SCOTT  J.  ANTHONY, 

Major  First  Colorado  Cavalry ,  Commanding  Battalion. 

A.  A.  A.  General  Colonel  Chivington’s 

Brigade,  Indian  Expedition. 


Report  of  Lieutenant  Kennedy. 

Headquarters  Co.  C,  First  Colorado  Cavalry, 

Camp,  South  Bend  of  Big  Sandy,  November  30,  1864. 

Colonel  :  I  have  the  honor  to  make  the  following  report  of  company  C, 
1st  cavalry  of  Colorado,  on  the  expedition  against  the  Cheyenne  Indians,  in 
pursuance  of  special  orders  from  headquarters,  district  of  Colorado,  No.  132,  of 
November  13,  1864. 

I  left  camp  Wheeler,  Colorado  Territory,  on  the  20th  of  November,  1864, 
with  forty-two  men  of  company  C,  1st  cavalry  of  Colorado,  en  route  for  Fort 
Lyon,  Colorado  Territory,  a  distance  of  two  hundred  and  forty  miles,  at  which 
place  I  arrived  on  the  28th  of  November,  1864.  I  left  Fort  Lyon  at  eight  (8) 
o’clock  p.  m  the  same  day,  with  thirty-five  (35)  men  of  C  company,  under 
command  of  First  Lieutenant  Luther  Wilson,  commanding  battalion  1st  cavalry 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


55 


of  Colorado,  made  a  marcli  of  forty  miles  to  South  Bend  of  Big  Sandy,  Colorado 
Territory,  at  which  place  I  arrived  a  little  after  daybreak  on  the  morning  of 
the  29th,  where  we  came  upon  a  large  village  of  hostile  Cheyenne  Indians, 
numbering  from  nine  hundred  to  one  thousand,  which  we  immediately  attacked; 
after  which  a  general  engagement  ensued,  which  lasted  until  3  o’clock  p.  m.,  in 
which  the  Indians  were  defeated  and  nearly  annihilated ;  after  which  we  re¬ 
turned  to  the  Indian  village,  which  we  helped  to  destroy,  and  then  went  into 
camp. 

I  had  one  private,  Oliver  Pierson,  mortally  wounded,  (who  has  since  died  ;) 
two  privates,  August  Mettze  and  John  B.  Calhoun,  severely  wounded  ;  Sergeant 
M.  H.  Linnell,  saddler  Elias  South,  and  privates  C.  J.  Ballou  and  William  Boyls, 
slightly  wounded.  And  I  would  most  respectfully  acknowledge  to  the  colonel 
commanding  the  services  rendered  by  my  platoon  commanders,  sergeant  John 
C.  Turner  and  M.  H.  Linnell,  and  recommend  them  for  their  bravery  during 
the  entire  engagement. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

J.  J.  KENNEDY, 

Second  Lieut.  1st  Colorado  Cavalry ,  Commanding  Co.  C. 

Colonel  J.  M.  Chivington, 

Commanding  Indian  Expedition. 


Report  of  Lieutenant  Dunn. 

Headquarters  Co.  E,  First  Colorado  Cavalry, 

Camp  South  Bend  of  Big  Sandy,  C.  T.,  November  30,  1864. 

Colonel  :  I  have  the  honor  to  make  the  following  report  of  company  E,  1st 
cavalry  of  Colorado,  on  an  expedition  against  Indians. 

On  the  25th  instant  I  left  Camp  Fillmore  with  my  company,  pursuant  to 
Special  Order  No.  3,  headquarters,  District  of  Colorado,  dated  in  the  field  No¬ 
vember  23,  1864.  I  joined  the  column  then  in  the  field  the  same  evening  at 
Spring  Bottom,  thirty  miles  distant.  I  continued  the  march  the  next  day  under 
command  of  Lieutenant  Wilson,  commanding  battalion  of  the  1st  cavalry  of 
Colorado.  We  reached  Fort  Lyon,  seventy  miles  further  down  the  Arkansas, 
on  the  28th  instant,  about  noon.  About  7  o’clock  the  same  evening  I  started 
from  that  place  with  eighteen  men  of  my  company,  taking  three  days’  cooked 
rations  on  our  horses,  and  travelled  in  a  northeasterly  course.  At  daylight  we 
came  in  sight  of  a  large  village  of  hostile  Indians,  Cheyennes  and  Arap'ahoes, 
numbering  nine  hundred  or  one  thousand,  nearly  two  miles  north  of  us.  We 
immediately  proceeded  to  the  attack  by  moving  down  a  small  ravine  and 
making  a  charge  on  the  village  from  the  north  side,  taking  the  Indians  com¬ 
pletely  by  surprise.  They  rallied  immediately  and  the  engagement  became 
general,  and  lasted  till  afternoon,  when  they  were  utterly  routed  and  half  their 
number  left  dead  on  the  field. 

We  continued  the  pursuit  till  3  o’clock  p.  m.,  when  our  horses  being  much 
fatigued,  and  our  ammunition  nearly  exhausted,  we  returned  to  the  village, 
which  we  helped  to  destroy,  and  then  went  into  camp  for  the  night. 

I  lost  no  men  killed,  and  but  two  wounded.  Sergeant  Jackson  had  his  hip 
broken,  and  private  Mull  was  shot  through  the  leg. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

CLARK  DUNN, 

Second  Lieut.  1st  Colorado  Cavalry ,  Commanding  Co.  E. 

Colonel  Chivington, 

First  Colorado  Cavalry. 


56 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Editorial  articles  from  the  Rocky  Mountain  News ,  the  organ  of  Governor 
Evans ,  and  edited  by  Mr.  William  N.  Byers ,  P.  M.  at  Denver. 

THE  BATTLE  OF  SAND  CREEK. 

Among  the  brilliant  feats  of  arms  in  Indian  warfare,  the  recent  campaign  of 
our  Colorado  volunteers  will  stand  in  history  with  few  rivals,  and  none  to 
exceed  it  in  final  results.  We  are  not  prepared  to  write  its  history,  which  can 
only  be  done  by  some  one  who  accompanied  the  expedition,  but  we  have  gath¬ 
ered  from  those  who  participated  in  it,  and  from  others  who  were  in  that  part  ot 
the  country,  some  facts  which  will  doubtless  interest  many  of  our  readers. 

The  people  of  Colorado  are  well  aware  of  the  situation  occupied  by  the  third 
regiment  during  the  great  snow-storm  which  set  in  the  last  of  October.  Their 
rendezvous  was  in  Bijou  Basin,  about  eighty  miles  southeast  of  this  city,  and 
close  up  under  the  foot  of  the  Divide.  That  point  had  been  selected  as  the  base 
for  an  Indian  campaign.  Many  of  the  companies  reached  it  after  the  storm  set 
in ;  marching  for  days  through  the  driving,  blinding  clouds  of  snow  and  deep 
drifts.  Once  there,  they  were  exposed  for  weeks  to  an  Arctic  climate,  surrounded 
by  a  treeless  plain  covered  three  feet  deep  with  snow.  Their  animals  suffered 
for  food  and  with  cold,  and  the  men  fared  but  little  better.  They  were  insuffi¬ 
ciently  supplied  with  tents  and  blankets,  and  their  sufferings  were  intense.  At 
the  end  of  a  month  the  snow  had  settled  to  the  depth  of  two  feet,  and  the  com¬ 
mand  set  out  upon  its  long  contemplated  march.  The  rear  guard  left  the  Basin 
on  the  23d  of  November.  Their  course  was  southeast,  crossing  the  Divide  and 
thence  heading  for  Fort  Lyon.  For  one  hundred  miles  the  snow  was  quite 
two  feet  in  depth,  and  for  the  next  hundred  it  ranged  from  six  to  twelve  inches. 
Beyond  that  the  ground  was  almost  bare  and  the  snow  no  longer  impeded  their 
march. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  28tli  the  entire  command  reached  Fort  Lyon,  a  dis¬ 
tance  of  two  hundred  and  sixty  miles,  in  less  than  six  days,  and  so  quietly  and 
expeditiously  had  the  march  been  made  that  the  command  at  the  fort  was  taken 
entirely  by  surprise.  When  the  vanguard  appeared  in  sight  it  was  reported 
that  a  body  of  Indians  were  approaching,  and  precautions  were  taken  for  their 
reception.  No  one  upon  the  route  was  permitted  to  go  in  advance  of  the  column, 
and  persons  who  it  was  suspected  would  spread  the  news  of  the  advance  were 
kept  under  surveillance  until  all  danger  from  that  source  was  past. 

At  Fort  Lyon  the  force  was  strengthened  by  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  men 
of  the  first  regiment,  and  at  nine  o’clock  in  the  evening  the  command  set  out 
for  the  Indian  village.  The  course  was  due  north,  and  their  guide  was  the 
Polar  star.  As  daylight  dawned  they  came  in  sight  of  the  Indian  camp,  after  a 
forced  midnight  march  of  forty-two  miles,  in  eight  hours,  across  the  rough,  un¬ 
broken  plain.  But  little  time  was  required  for  preparation.  The  forces  had 
been  divided  and  arranged  for  battle  on  the  march,  and  just  as  the  sun  rose 
they  dashed  upon  the  enemy  with  yells  that  would  put  a  Comanche  army  to 
blush.  Although  utterly  surprised,  the  savages  were  not  unprepared,  and  fora 
time  their  defence  told  terribly  against  our  ranks.  Their  main  force  rallied  and 
formed  in  line  of  battle  on  the  bluffs  beyond  the  creek,  where  they  were  pro¬ 
tected  by  rudely  constructed  rifle-pits,  from  which  they  maintained  a  steady 
fire  until  the  shells  from  company  C’s  (third  regiment)  howitzers  began  drop¬ 
ping  among  them,  when  they  scattered  and  fought  each  f°r  himself  in  genuine 
Indian  fashioii.  As  the  battle  progressed  the  field  of  carna£e  widened  until  it 
extended  over  not  less  than  twelve  miles  of  territory.  The  Indians  who  could, 
escaped  or  secreted  themselves,  and  by  three  o’clock  in  tlie  afteiaioon  the  carnage 
had  ceased.  It  was  estimated  that  between  three  and  f°ur  hundred  of  the 
savages  got  away  with  their  lives.  Of  the  balance  there  were  wouned 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


57 


nor  prisoners.  Their  strength  at  the  beginning  of  the  action  was  estimated  at 
nine  hundred. 

Their  village  consisted  of  one  hundred  and  thirty  Cheyenne  and  eight  Ara¬ 
pahoe  lodges.  These,  with  their  contents,  were  totally  destroyed.  Among 
their  effects  were  large  supplies  of  flour,  sugar,  coffee,  tea,  &c.  Women’s  and 
children’s  clothing  were  found;  also  books  and  many  other  articles  which  must 
have  been  taken  from  captured  trains  or  houses.  One  white  man’s  scalp  was 
found  which  had  evidently  been  taken  but  a  few  days  before..  The  chiefs 
fought  with  unparalleled  bravery,  falling  in  front  of  their  men.  One  of  them 
charged  alone  against  a  force  of  two  or  three  hundred,  and  fell  pierced  with 
balls  far  in  advance  of  his  braves. 

Our  attack  was  made  by  five  battalions.  The  first  regiment,  Colonel  Chiv- 
ington,  part  of  companies  C,  D,  E,  C,  H  and  K,  numbering  altogether  about 
two  hundred  and  fifty  men,  was  divided  into  two  battalions;  the  first  under 
command  of  Major  Anthon3r,  and  the  second  under  Lieutenant  Wilson,  until  the 
latter  was  disabled,  when  the  command  devolved  upon  Lieutenant  Dunn.  The 
three  battalions  of  the  third,  Colonel  Slioup,  were  led,  respectively,  by  Lieuten¬ 
ant  Colonel  Bowen,  Major  Sayr,  and  Captain  Cree.  The  action  was  begun  by 
the  battalion  of  Lieutenant  Wilson,  who  occupied  the  right,  and  by  a  quick  and 
bold  movement  cut  off"  the  enemy  from  their  herd  of  stock.  From  this  circum¬ 
stance  we  gained  our  great  advantage.  A  few  Indians  secured  horses,  but  the 
great  majority  of  them  had  to  fight  or  fly  on  foot.  Major  Anthony  was  on  the 
left,  and  the  third  in  the  centre. 

Among  the  killed  were  all  the  Cheyenne  chiefs,  Black  Kettle,  White  Ante¬ 
lope,  Little  Kobe,  Left  Hand,  Knock  Knee,  One  Eye,  and,  another,  name  un¬ 
known.  Not  a  single  prominent  man  of  the  tribe  remains,  and  the  tribe  itself 
is  almost  annihilated.  The  Arapalioes  probably  suffered  but  little.  It  has 
been  reported  that  the  chief  Left  Hand,  of  that  tribe,  was  killed,  but  Colonel 
Chivington  is  of  the  opinion  that  he  was  not.  Among  the  stock  captured  were 
a  number  of  government  horses  and  mulefc,  including  the  twenty  or  thirty 
stolen  from  the  command  of  Lieutenant  Chase  at  Jimmy’s  camp  last  summer. 

The  Indian  camp  was  well  supplied  with  defensive  works.  For  half  a  mile 
along  the  creek  there  was  an  almost  continuous  chain  of  rifle-pits,  and  another 
similar  line  of  works  crowned  the  adjacent  bluff.  Pits  had  been  dug  at  all  the 
salient  points  for  miles.  After  the  battle  twenty-three  dead  Indians  were  taken 
from  one  of  these  pits  and  twenty-seven  from  another. 

Whether  viewed  as  a  march  or  as  a  battle,  the  exploit  has  few,  if  any,  paral¬ 
lels.  A  march  of  260  miles  in  but  a  fraction  more  than  five  days,  with  deep 
snow,  scanty  forage,  and  no  road,  is  a  remarkable  feat,  whilst  the  utter  surprise 
of  a  large  Indian  vilhqge  is  unprecedented.  In  no  single  battle  in  North 
America,  we  believe,  have  so  many  Indians  been  slain. 

It  is  said  that  a  short  time  before  the  command  reached  the  scene  of  battle 
an  old  squaw  partially  alarmed  the  village  by  reporting  that  a  great  heard  of 
buffalo  were  coming.  She  heard  the  rumbling  of  the  artillery  and  tramp  of  the 
moving  squadrons,  but  her  people  doubted.  In  a  little  time  the  doubt  was  dis¬ 
pelled,  but  not  by  buffaloes. 

A  thousand  incidents  of  individual  daring  and  the  passing  events  of  the  day 
might  be  told,  but  space  forbids.  We  leave  the  task  for  eye-witnesses  to 
chronicle.  All  acquitted  themselves  well,  and  Colorado  soldiers  have  again 
covered  themselves  with  glory. 

THE  FORT  LYON  AFFAIR. 

The  issue  of  yesterday’s  News,  containing  the  followingdespatch,  created 
considerable  of  a  sensation  in  this  city,  particularly  among  the  Tliirdsters  and 
others  who  participated  in  the  recent  campaign  and  the  battle  on  Sand  creek  ; 


58 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


“Washington,  December  20,  1864. 

“  Lhe  affair  at  Fort  Lyon,  Colorado,  in  which  Colonel  Chivington  destroyed 
a  large  Indian  village,  and  all  its  inhabitants,  is  to  be  made  the  subject  of  con¬ 
gressional  investigation.  Letters  received  from  high  officials  in  Colorado  say 
that  the  Indians  were  killed  after  surrendering,  and  that  a  large  proportion  of 
them  were  women  and  children.” 

j 

Indignation  was  loudly  and  unequivocally  expressed,  and  some  less  consid¬ 
erate  ot  the  boys  were  very  persistent  in  their  inquiries  as  to  who  those  “  high 
officials  were,  with  a  mild  intimation  that  they  had  half  a  mind  to  “  go  for 
them.  This  talk  about  “friendly  Indians”  and  a  “  surrendered”  village  will 
do  to  “  tell  to  marines,”  but  to  us  out  here  it  is  all  bosh. 

The  confessed,  murderers  of  the  Hungate  family — a  man  and  wife  and  their 
two  little  babes,  whose  scalped  and  mutilated  remains  were  seen  by  all  our 
citizens — were  “friendly  Indians,”  we  suppose,  in  the.  eyes  of  these  “high 
officials.”  They  fell  in  the  Sand  creek  battle. 

The  confessed  participants  in  a  score  of  other  murders  of  peaceful  settlers 
and  inoffensive  travellers  upon  our  borders  and  along  our  roads  in  the  past  six 
months  must  have  been  friendly,  or  else  the  “  high  officials”  wouldn’t  say  so. 

The  band  of  marauders  in  whose  possession  were  found  scores  of  horses  and 
mules  stolen  from  government  and  from  individuals  ;  wagon  loads  of  flour, 
coffee,  sugar  and  tea,  and  rolls  of  broad  cloth,  calico,  books,  &c  ,  robbed  from 
freighters  and  emigrants  on  the  plains  ;  underclothes  of  white  women  and 
childrep,  stripped  from  their  murdered  victims,  were  probably  peaceably  dis¬ 
posed  toward  some'oi  those  “  high  officials,”  but  the  mass  of  our  people  “can’t 
see  it.” 

Probably  those  scalps  of  white  men,  women  and  children,  one  of  them  fresh, 
not  three  days  taken,  found  drying  in  their  lodges,  were  taken  in  a  friendly, 
playful  manner;  or  possibly  those  Indian  saddle-blankets  trimmed  with  the  scalps 
of  white  women,  and  with  braids  and  fringes  of  their  hair,  were  kept  simply  as 
mementoes  of  their  owners’  high  affection  for  the  pale  face.  At  any  rate,  these 
delicate  and  tasteful  ornaments  could  not  have  been  taken  from  the  heads  of  the 
wives,  sisters  or  daughters  of  these  “high  officials.” 

_  That  “surrendering”  must  have  been  the  happy  thought  of  an  exceedingly 
vivid  imagination,  for  we  can  hear  of  nothing  of  the  kind  from  any  of  those  who 
were  engaged  in  the  battle.  On  the  contrary,  the  savages  fought  like  devils  to 
the  end,  and  one  of  our  pickets  was  killed  and  scalped  by  them  the  next  day 
after  the  battle,  and  a  number  of  others  were  fired  upon.  In  one  instance  a 
party  of  the  vidette  pickets  were  compelled  to  beat  a  hasty  retreat  to  save  their 
lives,  full  twenty-four  hours  after  the  battle  closed.  This  does  not  look  much 
like  the  Indians  had  surrendered. 

But  we  are  not  sure  that  an  investigation  may  not  be  a  good  thing.  It  should 
go  back  of  the  “affair  at  Fort  Lyon,”  as  they  are  pleased  to  term  it  down  east, 
however,  and  let  the  world  know  who  were  making  money  by  keeping  those 
Indians  under  the  sheltering  protection  of  Fort  Lyon;  learn  who  was  interested 
in  systematically  representing  that  the  Indians  were  friendly  and  wanted  peace. 
It  is  unquestioned  and  undenied  that  the  site  of  the  Sand  creek  battle  was  the 
rendezvous  of  the  thieving  and  marauding  bands  of  savages  who  roamed  over 
this  country  last  summer  and  fall,  and  it  is  shrewdly  suspected  that,  somebody 
was  all  the  time  making  a  very  good  thing  out  of  it.  By  all  means  let  there  be 
an  investigation,  but  we  advise  the  honorable  congressional  committee,  who  may 
be  appointed  to  conduct  it,  to  get  their  scalps  insured  before  they  pass  Plum 
creek  on  their  way  out. 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


59 


'Extract  from  the  message  of  Hon.  S.  H.  Elbert ,  acting  governor  of  Colorado 

Territory. 

INDIAN  WAR. 

Tlie  before  unbroken  peace  of  our  Territory  has  been  disturbed,  since  the  last 
spring,  by  an  Indian  war.  Allied  and  hostile  tribes  have  attacked  our  frontier 
settlements,  driven  in  our  settlers,  destroyed  their  homes,  attacked,  burned,  and 
plundered  our  freight  and  emigrant  trains,  and  thus  suspended  agricultural  pur¬ 
suits  in  portions  of  our  country,  and  interrupted  our  trade  and  commerce  with 
the  States.  This  has  for  the  time  seriously  retarded  the  prosperity  of  our  Ter- 
ritory. 

At  the  commencement  of  the  war  the  general  government,  taxed  to  the  utmost 
in  subduing  the  rebellion,  was  unable  to  help  us,  and  it  became  necessary  to 
look  to  our  own  citizens  for  protection.  They  everywhere  responded  with  pa-  * 
triotism  and  alacrity.  Militia  companies  were  organized  in  the  frontier  counties, 
and  secured  local  protection.  Much  credit  is  due  to  Captain  Tyler’s  company 
of  militia  for  the  important  service  they  rendered  in  opening  and  protecting  our 
line  of  communication  with  the  States. 

In  response  to  the  call  of  the  governor  for  a  regiment  of  cavalry  for  hundred- 
day  service,  over  a  thousand  of  our  citizens — the  large  majority  of  them  leaving 
lucrative  employment — rapidly  volunteered,  and  in  that  short  time,  despite  the 
greatest  difficulties  in  securing  proper  equipments,  organized,  armed,  made  a 
long  and  severe  campaign  amid  the  snows  and  storms  of  winter,  and  visited  upon 
these  merciless  murderers  of  the  plains  a  chastisement  smiting  and  deserved. 
The  gratitude  of  the  country  is  due  to  the  men  who  thus  sacrificed  so  largely 
their  personal  interests  for  the  public  good,  and  rendered  such  important  service 
to  the  Territory;  and  their  work,  if  it  can  be  followed  up  with  a  vigorous  winter 
campaign,  would  result  in  a  permanent  peace. 

The  necessity  of  such  a  campaign,  and  the  imperative  demand  for  immediate 
and  complete  protection  for  our  line  of  communication  with  the  States,  has  been, 
and  is  now  being,  earnestly  urged  on  the  government  at  Washington,  and  with 
a  prospect  of  success.  These  efforts  should  be  seconded  by  your  honorable 
body  with  whatever  influence  there  may  be  in  resolution  or  memorial,  setting 
forth  the  facts  and  necessities  of  our  situation. 


V 


PAPERS  FROM  THE  WAR  DEPARTMENT. 


War  Department,  Adjutant  General’s  Office. 

Washington,  March  28,  1865. 

Sir  :  In  reply  to  your  letter  of  the  15th  instant,  addressed  to  the  Secretary 
of  War,  I  have  the  honor  to  transmit  herewith  copies  of  the  orders  and  reports 
called  for  in  relation  to  Indian  affairs  in  the  department  of  Kansas,  when  com¬ 
manded  byfMajor  General  Curtis. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

*  E.  D.  TOWNSEND, 


Hon.  D.  W.  Gooch, 


Assistant  Adjutant  General. 


Acting  Chairman  Committee  o?t  Conduct  of  the  War. 


60 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Colorado  Superintendency, 

Denver ,  C.  T.,  June  16,  1864. 

Sir  :  You  will  immediately  make  necessary  arrangements  for  the  feeding  and 
support  of  all  the  friendly  Indians  of  the  Cheyenne  and  Arapahoe  Indians  at 
Fort  Lyon,  and  direct  the  friendly  Comanches  and  Kiowas,  if  any,  to  remain  {ft 
Fort  Larned.  You  will  make  a  requisition  on  the  military  commander  of  the 
post  for  subsistence  for  the  friendly  Indians  of  his  neighborhood. 

If  no  agent  there  to  attend  to  this,  deputize  some  one  to  do  it.  These  friendly 
bands  must  be  collected  at  places  of  rendezvous,  and  all  intercourse  between  them 
and  tribes  or  individuals  engaged  in  warfare  with  us  prohibited;  this  arrange¬ 
ment  will  tend  to  withdraw  from  the  conflict  all  who  are  not  thoroughly  iden¬ 
tified  with  the  hostile  movement,  and,  by  . affording  a  safe  refuge,  will  gradually 
collect  those  who  may  become  tired  of  war  and  desire  peace. 

The  war  is  opened  in  earnest,  and  upon  your  efforts  to  keep  quiet  the  friendly, 
as  nucleus  for  peace,  will  depend  its  duration  to  some  extent  at  least.  You  can 
send  word  to  all  these  to  come  as  directed  above,,  but  do  not  allow  the  families 
of  those  at  war  to  be  introduced  into  the  camp.  I  have  established  a  camp  for 
our  northern  friendly  bands  on  Cache-la-Poudre,  and  as  soon  as  my  plan  is  ap¬ 
proved  by  the  military  I  will  issue  a  proclamation  to  the  Indians ;  please  spare 
no  effort  to  carry  out  this  instruction,  and  keep  me  advised  by  every  mail  of 
the  situation. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

JOHNEVANS, 

Governor  and  Ex-Officio  Superintendent  Indian  Affairs. 

Major  S.  Gf.  Colby,  Fort  Lyon,  Colorado  Territory. 


A  true  copy: 


W.  W.  DENISON, 


Second  Lieutenant  1st  Colorado  Veteran  Cavalry ,  and 

Acting  Regimental  Adjutant. 


U.  S.  Military  Telegraph. 

[By  Telegrapli  from - ,  186 — .] 

To - - . 

George  Evans  to  Major  Colby,  at  Fort  Lyon,  instructing  him  to  make  ar¬ 
rangements  for  feeding  friendly  Indians  near  Fort  Lyon.  General  instructions 
about  collecting  together  all  friendly  Indians  at  places  of  rendezvous,  as  a  mea¬ 
sure  to  stop  the  war  with  the  red  skins.  Thinks  by  affording  refuge  of  this 
kind  that  those  at  'war  now  may  become  tired,  and  collect  at  those  places,  and 
sue  for  peace,  &c. 

Adjutant  General’s  Office,  March  — ,  1865. 

Official : 


Assistant  Adjutant  General. 

— 

ft 

Executive  Department,  Colorado  Territory, 

Denver*,  June  29,  1864. 

Dear  Sir  :  I  enclose  a  circular  to  the  Indians  of  the  plains.  You  will,  by 
every  means  you  can,  get  the  contents  to  all  these  Indians,  as  many  that  are 
now  hostile  may  come  to  the  friendly  camp,  and  when  they  all  do,  the  war  will 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


61 


be  ended.  Use  the  utmost  economy  in  providing  for  those  who  come  in,  as  the 
Secretary  of  the  Interior  confines  me  to  the  amount  of  our  appropriations,  and 
they  may  be  exhausted  before  the  summer  is  out. 

You  will  arrange  to  carry  out  the  plan  of  the  circular  at  Lyon  and  Larned. 

You  will  use  your  utmost  vigilance  to  ascertain  how  many  of  your  Indians 
are  hostile,  where  they  are,  and  what  plans  they  propose,  and  report  to  me  by 
every  mail  at  least.  For  this  purpose  you  will  enlist  the  active  aid  of  Mr.  John 
Smith  and  his  son,  and  of  such  other  parties  as  you  may  judge  can  be  of  essen¬ 
tial  service.  Mr.  0.  A.  Cook  reports  to  me  that  Mr.  Bent  has  given  you  import¬ 
ant  information  in  regard  to  the  plans  and  strength  of  the  hostile  combinations 
on  the  plains. 

Please  be  careful  and  report  to  me  in  detail  all  the  reliable  information  you 
can  get  promptly,  as  above  directed. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

JNO.  EVANS, 

Governor  Colorado  Territory  and  Superintendent  Indian  Affairs. 

Major  S.  G.  Colby, 

U.  S.  Indian  Agent ,  Fort  Lyon,  Colorado  Territory. 


A  true  copy  : 


W.  W.  DENISON, 

Second  Lieutenant ,  1st  Colorado  Veteran  Cavalry, 

Acting  Regimental  Adjutant. 


Colorado  Superintendency,  Indian  Affairs, 

Denver ,  June  27,  1864. 

To  the  friendly  Indians  of  the  plains : 

Agents,  interpreters,  and  traders  will  inform  the  friendly  Indians  of  the  plains 
that  some  members  of  their  tribes  have  gone  to  war  with  the  white  people ;  they 
steal  stock  and  run  it  off,  hoping  to  escape  detection  and  punishment. 

In  some  instances  they  have  attacked  and  killed  soldiers  and  murdered 
peaceable  citizens.  For  this  the  Great  Father  is  angry,  and  will  certainly  hunt 
them  out  and  punish  them;  but  he  does  not  want  to  injure  those  who  remain 
friendly  to  the  whites.  He  desires  to  protect  and  take  care  of  them.  For  this 
purpose  I  -  direct  that  all  friendly  Indians  keep  away  from  those  who  are  at 
war,  and  go  to  places  of  safety. 

Friendly  Arapahoes  and  Cheyennes  belonging  on  the  Arkansas  river  will  go 
to  Major  Colby,  United  States  Indian  agent,  at  Fort  Lyon,  who  will  give  them 
provisions,  and  show  them  a  place  of  safety.  Friendly  Kiowas  and  Comanclies 
.  will  go  to  Fort  Larned,  where  they  will  be  cared  for  in  the  same  way. 

Friendly  Sioux  will  go  to  their  agent  at  Fort  Laramie  for  directions.  Friendly 
Arapahoes  and  Cheyennes  of  the  Upper  Platte  will  go  to  Camp  Collins,  on  the 
Cache-la-Poudre,  where  they  will  be  assigned  a  place  of  safety,  and  provisions 
will  be  given  them. 

The  object  of  this  is  to  prevent  friendly  Indians  from  being  killed  through 
mistake ;  none  but  those  who  intend  to  be  friendly  with  the  whites  must  come 
to  these  places.  The  families  of  those  who  have  gone  to  war  with  the  whites 
must  be  kept  away  from  among  the  friendly  Indians. 


62 


> 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


The  war  on  hostile  Indians  will  be  continued  until  they  are  all  effectually 
subdued. 

JOHN  EVANS, 

Governor  of  Colorado  and  Superintendent  of  Indian  Affairs. 

A  true  copy : 

W.  W.  DENISON, 

Second  Lieutenant  1st  Colorado  Veteran  Cavalry , 

Acting  Regimental  Adjutant. 


Official : 


Adjutant  General’s  Office,  March  — ,  1865. 


Assistant  Adjutant  General. 


Fort  Riley,  July  23,  1864. 

Major  General  H.  W.  Halleck: 

The  Indian  difficulties  west  of  this  point  are  serious,  and  I  have  come  here  to 
rally  a  force  on  the  borders  to  repress  the  mischief.  The  stages  not  coming 
through,  we  have  not  definite  intelligence.  We  only  know  that  they  have  run 
off  our  stock  from  Earned  and  Walnut  creek,  murdering  some  men.  Small 
parties  of  Indians  have  come  within  thirty  miles  of  this  place.  I  have  ordered 
the  quartermaster  to  buy  horses  to  mount  dismounted  cavalry,  and  requested 
militia  colonels  to  call  out  seven  hundred  militia  to  join  me.  In  this  way  I 
hope  to  raise  a  thousand  men.  I  go  on  to  Saline  to-morrow.  I  think  stealing 
is  the  main  object  of  the  Indians. 

S.  R.  CURTIS,  Major  General. 

Headquarters  of  the  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

Official : 

D.  C.  WAGER,  A.  A.  G. 


Saline,  Kansas,  July  26,  1864,  via  Leavenworth. 
General  H.  W.  Halleck  : 

The  stage  has  just  arrived  from  Laramie.  The  damage  done  by  Indians 
amounts  to  ten  teamsters  killed,  five  wounded,  two  of  them  scalped,  and  the 
stealing  of  about  three  hundred  cattle.  Our  posts  are  safe. 

S.  R.  CURTIS,  Major  General. 


Official : 


Headquarters  of  the  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

D.  C.  WAGER,  A.  A.  G. 


Fort  Leavenworth,  August  8,  1S64. 

Major  General  Halleck,  Chief  of  Staff : 

I  have  returned  from  Upper  Arkansas.  At  Earned  divided  my  force  in  all 
directions,  going  myself  with  those  scouting  southward  towards  Red  river. 
Could  not  overtake  Indians,  but  scared  them  away  from  Santa  Fe  route,  where 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


63 


stages  and  trains  move  regularly.  Have  made  district  of  Upper  Arkansas,  as¬ 
signing  General  Blunt  to  command.  Have  increased  and  improved  the  organi¬ 
zation  of  troops,  giving  stringent  orders  against  allowing  Indians  inside  of  our 
line.  Discharged  militia,  and  directed  continual  caution.  The  Kiowas,  Coman- 
clies  and  Big  Mouth  Arapahoes  are  evidently  determined  to  do  all  the  mischief 
they  can.  I  hope  no  favor  will  be  offered  them  by  authorities  at  Washington 
till  they  make  ample  remuneration  for  their  outrages. 

S.  II.  CURTIS, 

Major  General . 


Official : 


Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

D.  C.  WAGER,  A.  A.  G. 


Fort  Leavenworth,  August  10,  1864. 
Major  General  Halleck,  Chief  of  Staff : 

Indians  have  attacked  and  killed  inhabitants  on  Little  Blue,  this  side  Fort 
Kearney,  on  overland  stage  route.  Stage  just  arrived  at  Atchison  without  pas¬ 
sengers.  I  have  requested  governor  to  send  iftilitia  after  them,  and  telegraphed 
commander  of  Kearney  to  come  down  on  them  if  he  has  force,  but  forces  are 
scarce  in  that  region.  Cannot  some  of  General  Sully’s  command  move  to  Ne¬ 
braska  1 

S.  R.  CURTIS, 

Major  General . 


Official : 


Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

D.  C.  WAGER,  A.  A.  G. 


Headquarters  of  the  Army, 

Washington,  D.  C.,  August  13,  1864. 

Major  General  Curtis,  J Fort  Leavenworth  : 

The  contractor  of  the  overland  mail  line  has  represented  through  the  Post 
Office  Department  that  more  protection  against  Indians  is  required  along  the 
line,  and  that  two  armed  men  should  accompany  each  coach.  He  also  asks 
that  orders  be  given  to  the  military  not  to  use  the  grain,  forage,  and  stores  of 
the  line. 

Please  see  that  these  requests  are  carried  out  as  far  as  you  are  able. 

H.  W.  HALLECK, 

Major  General  and  Chief  of  Staff . 


Official ; 


Headquarters  of  the  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

D.  C.  WAGER,  A.  A .  G. 


64 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Fort  Leavenworth,  August  13,  1864. 

General  Halleck  : 

Your  despatch  just  received,  and  telegraphed  to  General  Curtis,  at  Omaha. 
The  following  has  just  been  received  from  General  Mitchell,  commanding  dis¬ 
trict  of  Nebraska,  to  General  Curtis,  Fort  Leavenworth : 

“Just  heard  from  a  company  of  militia  sent  up  the  Little  Blue  from  Kearney. 
They  scoured  the  country  for  forty  miles  up  and  down  the  stream;  found  no 
Indians.  I  have  parties  out  in  every  direction  from  each  post  chasing  Indians. 
Everything  will  be  done  that  I  can  do  with  my  present  force.  I  am  raising 
militia  as  fast  as  I  can  ;  the  governor  has  authorized  the  raising  of  twelve  com¬ 
panies.  I  have  received  to-day -  toward  one  company  in  this  vicinity,  of 

staunch  men. 

“  B.  B.  MITCHELL,  Brigadier  General  ” 

C.  S.  CHARLOTTE, 

Major ,  A.  A.  G.,  Department  of  Kansas. 


Official : 


Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

D.  C.  WAGER,  A.  A.  G. 


* 

Omaha,  August  16,  1864. 

Major  General  H.  W.  Halleck,  Chief  of  Staff: 

Yours  of  the  13th,  concerning  the  furnishing  of  escorts  for  overland  mail  line 
to  defend  it  against  Indians,  will  be  complied  with.  I  am  here  to  look  after 
Indian  troubles  that  are  quite  extensive  on  the  line  and  against  the  border  set¬ 
tlements.  I  have  troops  arriving  on  the  Blue,  where  the  mischief  was  greatest. 
General  Mitchell  telegraphs  from  Fort  Kearney  that  he  thinks  that  region  is 
threatened  by  a  large-  force  of  Indians  collecting  on  the  Republican.  I  am 
sending  out  militia  in  small  parties  to  join  forces  which  I  have  gathered  below, 
and  will  soon  be  upon  them,  be  they  many  or  few. 

S.  R.  CURTIS,  Major  General. 


Official: 


Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

E>.  C.  WAGER,  A.  A.  G. 


Omaha,  August  18,  1864. 

Major  General  II.  W.  Halleck: 

General  Mitchell  telegraphs  from  Fort  Kearney  that  Captain  Mussey  encoun¬ 
tered  five  hundred  well-armed  Indians  on  Elk  creek,  near  Republican ;  had  a 
fight ;  killed  ten  Indians,  and  lost  two  soldiers ;  drove  Indians  ten  miles,  but 
had  to  fall  back,  pursued  by  Indians,  thirty  miles. 

S.  R.  CURTIS,  Major  General. 

Headquarters  Army,  March  IS,  1865. 


Official 


E.  C.  WAGER,  A.  A.  G. 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


65 


Denver,  August  IS,  1864. 

lion.  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of  War: 

Extensive  Indian  depredations,  with  murder  of  families,  occurred  yesterday 
thirty  miles  south  of  Denver.  Our  lines  of  communication  are  cut,  and  our 
crops,  our  sole  dependence,  are  all  in  exposed  localities,  and  cannot  be  gathered 
by  our  scattered  population.  Large  bodies  of  Indians  are  undoubtedly  near  to 
Denver,  and  we  are  in  danger  of  destruction  botli  from  attack  of  Indians  and 
starvation.  I  earnestly  request  that  Colonel  Ford’s  regiment  of  2d  Colorado 
volunteers  be  immediately  sent  to  our  relief.  It  is  impossible  to  exaggerate  our 
danger.  We  are  doing  all  we  can  for  our  defence. 

JNO.  EVANS,  Governor. 

Headquarters  Army,  March  IS,  1S65. 

Official : 

D.  C.  WAGER,  A.  A.  G. 


Denver,  August  22,  1S64. 

E.  M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of  War : 

No  government  saddles  within  seven  hundred  miles  from  here;  no  govern¬ 
ment  horses  to  mount  hundred-days  regiment  of  cavalry,  nearly  full.  Unlim¬ 
ited  information  of  contemplated  attack  by  a  large  body  of  Indians,  in  a  few 
days,  along  the  entire  line  of  our  settlements.  Order  Captain  Mullin,  quarter¬ 
master  here,  to  purchase  horses,  and  Lieutenant  Hawley,  district  ordnance 
officer,  to  purchase  horse  equipments.  Necessity  imperative. 

JNO.  EVANS, 

Governor  of  Colorado  Territory. 
This  application  should  be  granted  at  once. 

J.  M.  CHIVINGTON, 

Colonel  Commanding. 


Official : 


Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

D.  C.  WAGER,  A.  A.  G. 


Headquarters  of  the  Army, 

Washington,  D.  C.,  August  23,  1S64. 

Governor  John  Evans,  Denver ,  Colorado  Territory: 

The  Secretary  of  War  directs  me  to  say  that  a  recent  law  requires  all  caval¬ 
ry  horses  to  be  purchased  under  directions  of  Colonel  Ekin,  of  the  quartermas¬ 
ter’s  department.  If  there  is  such  a  pressing  necessity  that  purchases  cannot 
be  made  in  time,  the  military  authorities  can  resort  to  impressment.  General 
Curtis  is  the  proper  judge  of  such  necessity  in  his  department. 

•  H.  W.  HALLECK, 

Major  General,  Chief  of  Staff. 


Official : 


Part  VI - 5 


Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

D.  C.  WAGER,  A.  A  G. 


66 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Department  of  Kansas, 

Fort  Kearney ,  August  28,  1SG4. 

Major  General  IIalleck,  Chief  of  Staff: 

Indians  in  small  bands  continue  to  commit  depredations,  but  seem  more  cau¬ 
tious  moving  westward.  Have  effectually  scoured  the  country  east  of  99th 
meridian.  Indians  going  west  of  settlements.  Overland  mail  agents  have 
withdrawn  stock  and  gone  east.  I  think  they  can  run  through  with  such  es¬ 
corts  as  I  can  furnish.  Militia  very  tardy  in  coming  forward,  many  turning 
back  before  reaching  this  point. 

Some  fifty  murders  have  been  committed  by  Indians  on  this  line,  and  consid¬ 
erable  private  stock  stolen,  but  government  has  lost  but  little. 

S.  R.  CURTIS,  Major  General. 


Official : 


Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

D.  C.  WAGER,  A.  A.  G. 


Headquarters  of  the  Army, 

Washington,  D.  C.,  September  3,  1864. 

Major  General  Curtis,  Fort  Kearney: 

The  civil  officers  of  Montana  have  asked  for  military  escort  to  that  Territory. 
The  Secretary  of  War  authorizes  you  to  give  such  escort,  if,  in  your  opinion, 
you  can  spare  troops  for  that  purpose ;  but,  first  of  all,  the  overland  mail  route 
and  the  frontier  posts  require  protection  from  the  Indians. 

The  Secretary  of  War  authorizes  you  to  raise  hundred-days  men  in  Nebraska, 
without  bounties. 

H.  w.  halleck, 

Major  General ,  Chief  of  Staff. 


Official : 


Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

D.  C.  WAGER,  A.  A.  G. 


Denver,  SejHember  7,  1864. 

V 

Hon.  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of  War : 

Pray  give  positive  orders  for  our  second  Colorado  cavalry  to  come  out. 
Have  notice  published  that  they  will  come  in  detachments  to  escort  trains  up 
the  Platte  on  certain  days.  Unless  escorts  are  sent  thus  we  will  inevitably  have 
a  famine  in  addition  to  this  gigantic  Indian  war.  Flour  is  forty-five  dollars  a 
barrel,  and  the  supply  growing  scarce,  with  none  on  the  way.  Through  spies 
we  got  knowledge  of  the  plan  of  about  one  thousand  warriors  in  camp  to  strike 
our  frontier  settlements,  in  small  bands,  simultaneously  in  the  night,  for  an  ex¬ 
tent  of  300  miles.  It  was  frustrated  at  the  time,  but  we  have  to  fear  another 
such  attempt  soon.  Pray  givq  the  order  for  our  troops  to  come,  as  requested,  at 
once,  as  it  will  be  too  late  for  trains  to  come  this  season. 

JOHN  EVANS,  Governor. 


Official : 


Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

D.  C.  WAGER,  A.  A.  G. 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


67 


Camp  of  Solomon’s  River, 

Via  Lawrence ,  Kansas ,  September  16,  1864. 

Major  General  Halleck,  Chief  of  Staff : 

I  struck  this  river  near  lOOtli  parallel ;  sent  scouts  south  to  head  of  Saline, 
find  ng  no  large  body  of  Indians.  Divided  command  ;  sent  large  portion  up 
valley,  to  strike  Ofallon’s  bluff;  with  remainder,  two  hundred  and  eighty-five, 
came  down,  scouring  the  country  on  all  sides.  Buffalo  plenty.  Indians  only 
in  small  parties,  escaping  souili.  Shall  reach  settlements  on  Smoky  Hill  river 
to-morrow.  No  signs  of  great  concentration  of  Indians.  Bands  of  hunters 
steal  and  scalp,  but  can  be  routed  by  small  armed  force.  Stage  stations,  ranches, 
and  settlements  must  have  enclosures  for  themselves  and  stock, and  a  few  troops, 
carefully  distributed,  can  protect  settlements  and  lines  of  commerce. 

S.  R.  CURTIS,  Major  General. 


Official : 


Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

D.  C.  WAGER,  A.  A.  G. 


Headquarters  Department  of  Kansas,  , 
Fort  Leavenworth ,  September  19,  1864. 

I  am  in  receipt  of  a  copy  of  letters  from  the  honorable  Secretary  of  the 
Interior  and  Commissioner  of  Indian  Affairs,  with  your  indorsement  to  take 
such  action  as  I  may  “  deem  best.”  It  is  stated  that  I  have  ordered  the  In¬ 
dians  not  to  make  their  usual  hunt.  This  is  erroneous.  I  may  have  suggested 
that  it  would  be  dangerous  for  our  friendly  Indians  to  go,  but  I  have  desired 
the  Pawnees  to  follow  and  operate  when  I  bad  driven  away  the  hostile  bands. 
Yet  I  see  great  difficulty  in  discriminations,  and  also  fear  that  some  bands  of 
our  friendly  Indians  might  mingle  with  foes  if  they  come  in  proximity.  If  the 
friendly  Indians  could  be  united  for  the  purpose  of  hunting  and  lighting  with 
our  troops,  it  would  be  easy  to  organize  and  so  equip  them  as  to  avoid  difficulty. 
In  my  recent  reconnoissance  I  took  about  seventy-five  Pawnees  with  me  as 
scouts,  and,  to  avoid  mistakes,  dressed  them  with  a  blowse  and  hats.  It  gave 
them  a  distinctive  and  graphic  appearance,  which  could  not  be  mistaken.  Any 
other  than  an  associate  arrangement  seems  almost  impossible. 

1  appreciate  the  importance  of  allowing  or  aiding  the  friendly  Indians  to  hunt 
buffalo ;  but  any  general  movement  by  them  would  lead  to  confusion  and  diffi¬ 
culty,  not  only  with  my  troops,  but  with  the  border  settlements  ;  for  the  people, 
being  terribly  alarmed,  would  make  very  little  difference  in  their  resentment 
and  raids. 

I  will  do  all  I  can  to  favor  the  friendly  Indians  in  any  rational  arrangement 
to  hunt  the  buffalo,  and  believe,  with  the  honorable  Secretary,  that,  properly 
associated  with  the  troops,  they  would  strengthen  our  efforts  to  suppress  the 
hostile  tribes. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  general,  your  obedient  servant, 

S.  R.  CURTIS, 

Major  General. 

Major  General  H.  W.  Halleck,  Chief  of  Staff,  Washington . 


Official  copy  : 


Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

J.  C.  KELTON,  A.  A.  G. 


i 


68 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


t  Denver,  September  19,  1864. 

Hon.  E.  M.  Stanton,  Secretary  of  War : 

Train  with  ordnance  and  ordnance  stores  en  route  to  New  Mexico,  with  mules, 
stolen  by  Indians  at  Fort  Lyon,  Colorado.  We  need  such  stores  for  3d  regi¬ 
ment  Colorado  volunteers,  cavalry,  one  hundred  day  men,  now  full.  Authorize 
me  by  telegraph  to  take  them.  Will  not  be  used,  if  reach  New  Mexico,  before 
next  year.  Indian  warriors  congregated  eighty  miles  from  Lyon,  three  thousand 
strong. 

J.  M.  CHIVINGTON, 

Colonel  Commanding,  District  Colorado. 


Official : 


Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

D.  C.  WAGER,  A.  A.  G. 


Headquarters  of  the  Army, 
Washington,  D.  C.,  September  20,  1864. 

Colonel  Chivington,  Denver  City : 

The  chief  of  ordnance  objects  to  the  diversion  of  the  train  sent  to  New 
Mexico.  You  must  make  requisition  for  your  wants  in  the  usual  way. 

H.  W.  IIALLECK, 

Major  General,  Chief  of  Staff. 


Official : 


Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

D.  C.  WAGER,  A.  A.  G. 


Denver  City,  September  22,  1864. 

Major  General  Hai.leck,  Chief  of  Staff: 

Have  regiment  100  days  men  ready  for  field.  Train  on  the  way  from  Fort 
Leavenworth,  but  cannot  get  here  in  time  because  of  the  Indian  troubles  on  the 
Platte  route.  Are  four  hundred  miles  back,  and  laid  up.  The  time  of  this 
regiment  will  expire  and  Indians  will  still  hold  road.  This  is  no  ordinary  case. 

J.  M.  CHIVINGTON, 

Colonel  Commanding. 


Official : 


Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

D.  C.  WAGER,  A.  A.  G. 


Headquarters  of  the  Army, 
Washington,  D.  C.,  September  23,  1864. 
Colonel  Chivington,  Denver  City : 

You  will  communicate^  your  wants  to  your  superior  officer,  General  Curtis, 
at  Fort  Leavenworth. 

H.  W.  IIALLECK, 

Major  General,  Chief  of  Staff. 


Official : 


Headquarters  Army,  March  IS,  1865. 

D.  C.  WAGER,  A.  A.  G. 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


69 


Headquarters  of  the  Army, 

Washington,  D.  C.,  September  24,  18G4. 

Major  General  Curtis,  Fort  Leavenworth : 

General  Rosecrans  lias  been  directed  to  give  you  the  regiment  of  Colorado 
cavalry  at  or  near  Kansas  city.  All  your  available  forces,  not  required  against 
western  Indians,  should  be  thrown  south  on  the  Fort  Scott  route.  Large  re- 
enforcemeuts  have  been  sent  to  the  Arkansas  river  to  cut  off  the  enemy’s  retreat. 

H.  W.  HALLECK, 

Major  General,  Chief  of  Staff. 


Official : 


Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

D.  C.  WAGER,  A.  A.  G. 


Fort  Leavenworth,  September  26,  1864. 

Major  General  Halleck: 

Despatch  received.  Had  already  begun  moving  troops  and  supporting  my 
southeast.  But  a  full  regiment  of  hundred-days  men  and  part  of  the  1st 
Colorado  going  out  this  week.  My  main  dependence  must  be  in  militia.  If 
Price’s  forces  come  westward  the  m.litia  are  notified  to  be  ready. 

S.  R.  CURTIS,  Major  General. 

Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

Official : 

D.  C.  WAGER,  A.  A.  G. 


Fort  Leavenworth,  October  7,  1S64. 
Major  General  Halleck,  Chief  of  Staff'. 

General  Blunt  came  upon  a  party  of  Arapahoes  and  other  liost'le  Indians, 
supposed  to  be  four  thousand,  with  fifteen  hundred  warriors,  on  the  twenty -fifth 
ultimo.  This  was  about  one  hundred  miles  west  of  Larned,  in  Pawnee  fork. 
The  Indians  overpowered  the  advance,  but  the  main  force  coming  up  routed 
and  pursued  them.  Ninety-one  dead  Indians  were  left,  and  we  lost  two  killed 
and  seven  wounded.  General  Blunt’s  force  was  less  than  five  hundred.  He 
pursued  for  several  days. 

S.  R.  CURTIS,  Major  General. 


Official : 


Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

D.  C.  WAGER,  A.  A.  G. 


Headquarters  of  the  Armv, 

Washington,  D.  C.,  October  16,  1S64. 

Brigadier  General  Conner,  Salt  Lalce  City: 

Give  all  the  protection  in  your  power  to  the  overland  route  between  you  and 


70 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Fort  Kearney,  without  regard  to  department  lines.  General  Curtis’s  forces  have- 
been  diverted  by  rebel  raids  from  Arkansas. 

H.  W.  HALLECK, 

Major  General,  Chief  of  Staff. 


Official : 


Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

D.  C.  WAGER,  A.  A.  G. 


Headquarters,  Fort  Lyon ,  C.  T.,  November  6,  1864. 

Sir:  I  have  the  honor  to  report  that  I  arrived  at  this  post  and  assumed 
command  November  2,  in  obedience  to  Special  Orders  No.  4,  headquarters  of 
district,  October  17,  1864.  Major  E.  W.  Wynkoop,  1st  cavalry  of  Colorado, 
was  in  command  of  the  post.  One  hundred  and  thirteen  lodges  of  Arapahoe 
Indians,  under  their  chiefs  Little  Raven,  Left  Hand,  Nervah,  Storms,  and 
Knock  Knee,  and  numbering,  in  men,  women  and  children,  652  persons,  were 
encamped  in  a  body  about  two  miles  from  the  post,  and  were  daily  visiting  the 
post,  and  receiving  supplies  from  the  commissary  department,  the  supplies  being 
issued  by  Lieutenant  C.  M.  Copett,  assistant  commissary  of  supplies,  under 
orders  from  Major  E.  W.  Wynkoop,  commanding  post. 

I  immediately  gave  instructions  to  arrest  all  Indians  coming  within  the  posfc,. 
until  I  could  learn  something  more  about  them.  Went  down  and  met  their  head 
chiefs,  half  way  between  the  post  and  their  camp,  and  demanded  of  them  by 
what  authority  and  for  what  purpose  they  were  encamped  here.  They  replied 
that  they  had  always  been  on  peaceable  terms  with  the  whites,  had  never  de¬ 
sired  any  other  than  peace,  and  could  not  be  induced  to  fight.  That  other 
tribes  were  at  war,  and,  therefore,  they  had  come  into  the  vicinity  of  a  post,  in 
order  to  show  that  they  desired  peace,  and  to  be  where  the  travelling  public 
would  not  be  frightened  by  them,  or  the  Indians  be  harmed  by  travellers  or 
soldiers  on  the  road. 

I  informed  them  that  I  could  not  permit  any  body  of  armed  men  to  camp  in 
the  vicinity  of  the  post,  nor  Indians  visit  the  post,  except  as  prisoners  of  war. 
They  replied  that  they  had  but  very  few  arms  and  but  few  horses,  but  were 
here  to  accept  any  terms  that  I  proposed.  I  then  told  them  that  I  should  de¬ 
mand  their  arms  and  all  the  stock  they  had  in  their  possession  which  had  ever 
belonged  to  white  men ;  they  at  once  accepted  these  terms.  I  then  proceeded 
with  a  company  of  cavalry  to  the  vicinity  of  their  camp,  leaving  my  men  se¬ 
creted,  and  crossed  to  their  camp,  received  their  arms  from  them,  and  sent  out 
men  to  look  through  their  herd  for  United  States  or  citizens’  stock,  and  to  take 
all  stock  except  Indian  ponies;  found  ten  mules  and  four  horses,  which  have 
been  turned  over  to  the  acting  assistant  quartermaster.  Their  arms  arc  in  very 
poor  condition,  and  but  few,  with  little  ammunition.  Their  horses  far  below 
the  average  grade  of  Indian  horses.  In  fact,  these  that  are  here  could  make 
but  a  feeble  fight  if  they  desired  war.  I  have  permitted  them  to  remain  en- 
cmipcd  near  the  post,  unarmed,  as  prisoners,  until  your  wishes  can  be  heard  in 
the  matter;  in  the  interval,  if  I  can  learn  that  any  of  their  warriors  have  been 
engaged  in  any  depredations  that  have  been  committed,  shall  arrest  them,  and 
place  all  such  in  close  confinement. 

I  am  of  opinion  that  the  warriors  of  the  Arapahoes,  who  have  been  engaged 
in  war,  are  all  now  on  the  Smoky  Hill,  or  with  the  Sioux  Indians,  and  have  all 
the  serviceable  arms  and  horses  belonging  to  the  tribe,  while  these  here  are  too* 
poor  to  light,  even  though  they  desired  war. 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


71 


Nine  Cheyenne  Indians  to-day  sent  in,  wishing  to  see  me.  They  state  that 
600  of  that  tribe  are  now  35  miles  north  of  here,  coming  towards  the  post,  and 
2,000  about  75  miles  away,  waiting  for  better  weather  to  enable  them  to  come 
in.  I  shall  not  permit  them  to  come  in,  even  as  prisoners,  for  the  reason  that  if 
I  do,  I  shall  have  to  subsist  them  upon  a  prisoner’s  rations.  I  shall,  however, 
demand  their  arms,  all  stolen  stock,  and  the  perpetrators  of  all  depredations.  I 
am  of  the  opinion  that  they  will  not  accept  this  proposition,  but  that  they  will 
return  to  the  Smoky  Hill.  They  pretend  that  they  want  peace,  and  I  think 
they  do  now,  as  they  cannot  fight  during  the  winter,  except  where  a  small  band 
of  them  can  find  an  unprotected  train  or  frontier  settlement.  I  do  not  think  it 
is  policy  to  make  peace  with  them  now,  until  all  perpetrators  of  depredations 
are  surrendered  up  to  be  dealt  with  as  we  may  propose. 

The  force  effective  for  the  field  at  the  post  is  only  about  100,  and  one  com¬ 
pany,  (K,  New  Mexico  volunteers,)  sent  here  by  order  of  General  Carlton,  com¬ 
manding  department  of  New  Mexico,  were  sent  with  orders  to  remain  sixty 
days,  and  then  report  back  to  Fort  Union.  Their  sixty  days  will  expire  on 
the  10th  of  November  (instant.)  Shall  I  keep  them  here  for  a  longer  period,  or 
permit  them  to  return? 

The  Kiowas  and  Comanches,  who  have  all  the  stock  stolen  upon  the  Arkan¬ 
sas  route,  are  reported  south  of  the  Arkansas  river  and  towards  the  Red  river. 
The  Cheyennes  are  between  here  and  the  Smoky  Hill;  part  of  the  Arapahoes 
are  near  this  post ;  the  remainder  north  of  the  Platte.  With  the  bands  divided  in 
this  way,  one  thousand  cavalry  could  now  overtake  them  and  punish  some  of 
them  severely,  I  think,  but  with  the  force  here  it  can  only  be  made  available  to 
protect  the  fort.  I  shall  not  permit  the  Cheyennes  to  camp  here,  but  will  per¬ 
mit  the  Arapahoes  now  here  to  remain  in  their  present  camp  as  prisoners  until 
your  action  is  had  in  the  matter. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

'  SCOTT  I.  ANTHONY, 

Major  1st  Cavalry  of  Colorado.  Commanding  Post . 

To - - - -> 

A.  A.  A.  G.  District  of  Upper  Arkansas ,  Fort  Riley,  Kansas. 


[Indorsed.] 

Headquarters  District  of  Upper  Arkansas, 

Fort  Riley ,  November  22,  1S64. 

Respectfully  forwarded  for  the  information  of  the  general  commanding,  re¬ 
spectfully  asking  for  instruction  in  regard  to  the  Arapahoe  Indians  kept  and 
fed  as  prisoners  at  Fort  Lyon.  Major  Anthony  has  been  instructed  to  carry  out 
general  field  order  No.  2,  July  3L,  1864,  fully,  until  further  instructions  from 
department  headquarters.  I  would  also  state  that  I  have  learned,  unofficially, 
that  on  Saturday,  the  12th  instant,  two  white  men  were  killed  and  five  wagons 
destroyed  near  Fort  Larned  by  a  party  of  Indians  numbering  about  thirty. 
Have  written  to  commanding  officer  at  Fort  Larned  in  reference  to  it,  and  in¬ 
structed  him  to  report  all  cases  of  Indian  depredations  that  may  come  to  his 
knowledge. 

R.  I.  HENNING, 

Major '2d  Wisconsin  Cavalry,  Commanding  District. 


72 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Fort  Leavenworth,  December  1,  1864. 
Major  General  H.  W.  Halleck,  Chief  of  Staff: 

I  am  informed  by  telegraph  from  Neosho  crossing,  about  one  hundred  and 
twenty  miles  below  Fort  Scott,  that  the  train  carrying  supplies  to  Fort  Gibson 
is  halted  because  of  a  large  rebel  force  in  front.  This  is  beyond  my  depart¬ 
ment  lines,  and  I  am  unable  to  do  much,  but  have  ordered  a  regiment  of  my 
troops  under  Colonel  Moonlight  to  support  the  escort  commanded  by  Major 
Phillips  in  going  forward  or  back  as  circumstances  seem  to  require.  Indian 
troubles  now  demand  all  my  force,  and  large  numbers  are  crowding  into  Fort 
Lyon  as  prisoners  of  war,  while  others  in  small  bands  are  attacking  stages  and 
trains.  Under  these  circumstances,  I  cannot  furnish  escorts  to  carry  provisions 
for  Indians  and  troops  beyond  my  department  lines  ;  and  your  attention  is  called 
to  the  necessity  of  furnishing  General  Steele  with  forces  sufficient  and  in  posi¬ 
tion  to  guard  the  lines  to  Fort  Gibson  and  Fort  Scott,  or  have  the  troops  and 
Indians  now  there  to  fall  back  where  they  get  provisions. 

S.  II.  CURTIS,  Major  General. 

Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

Official : 

*  D.  0.  WAGER,  A.  A.  G. 


Fort  Leavenworth,  December  8,  1864. 
Major  General  II.  W.  Halleck,  Chief  of  Staff : 

Colonel  Chivington,  after  a  march  of  three  hundred  miles  in  ten  days,  on  the 
29th  returned.  He  came  upon  a  Cheyenne  camp  of  one  hundred  and  thirty 
lodges  at  the  south  bend  of  Big  Sandy,  Cheyenne  county,  Colorado.  He  at¬ 
tacked  at  daylight,  killing  over  four  hundred  Indians  and  capturing  the  same 
number  of  ponies.  Among  the  killed  are  chiefs  Black  Kettle,  White  Antelope, 
and  Little  Robe.  Our  loss  is  nine  killed  and  thirty- eight  wounded.  Our  troops 
encountered  snow  two  feet  deep. 

S.  R.  CURTIS, 

Major  General ,  Commanding. 


Official : 


Headquarters  Army,  March  IS,  1865. 

I).  C.  WAGER,  A.  A.  G. 


Headquarters  Department  of  Kansas, 

Fort  Leavenworth ,  December  30,  1S64. 

Several  papers  have  been  referred  to  me  concerning  irregularities  charged  on 
General  Blunt  and  others  before  I  came  in  this  command,  and  entirely  outside. 
Yet,  as  some  of  the  parties  are  in  my  command,  I  may  do  something  if  I  can 
get  men  disconnected  with  Kansas  affairs  and  worthy  of  credence.  There  is  so 
much  political  and  personal  strife  in  our  service,  it  is  almost  impossible  to  get 
an  honest,  impartial  determination  of  facts. 

A  shift  of  troops,  so  as  to  put  officers  and  men  out  of  their  own  home  localities, 
wou»d  greatly  improve  my  command,  and  I  wish  especially  that  some  of  my 
Kansas  regiments  may  be  sent  to  the  front  and  troops  of  other  States  sent  to  me. 
I  have  ordered  the  11th  Kansas  to  Colorado,  far  enough  from  their  homes,  but 
the  15th  and  16th  Kansas  might  well  be  changed. 

The  1st  Colorado,  the  3d  Colorado,  and  many  companies  of  other  regiments, 
have  to  be  mustered  out  under  the  provisions  of  Circular  No.  36. 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


73 


I  am  also  informed  that  Fort  Smith  and  Fayetteville,  in  the  department  of 
Arkansas,  are  being  evacuated.  Fort  Gibson,  in  the  same  department,  is  gar¬ 
risoned  with  dismounted  Indian  troops,  so  that  my  southern  border  is  more  ex¬ 
posed  than  formerly. 

The  Indians  on  the  plains  continue  to  act  in  bands  of  fifty  or  one  hundred  at 
various  points,  and  I  desire  to  make  new  efforts  to  crush  them  during  the  latter 
part  of  winter.  Under  these  circumstances,  I  feel  it  my  duty  to  urge  the  sending 
of  more  troops  of  other  States  to  aid  in  keeping  open  the  overland  lines,  escort 
trains,  put  down  the  Indians,  and  strengthen  the  defences  which  overlook  the 
enemy’s  approaches  from  Texas. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  general,  your  obedient  servant, 

S.  It.  CURTIS,  Major  General. 

Major  General  H.  W.  Halleck, 

Chief  of  Staff,  Washington,  D.  C. 


Official  copy: 


Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

J.  C.  KELT  ON,  A.  A.  G. 


*  Headquarters  of  the  Army, 

Washington,  D.  C.,  January  3,  1S65. 

General  :  Your  communications  proposing  a  winter’s  campaign  against  the  "  : 
Indians,  and  asking  for  more  troops,  were  sent  to  General  Grant  immediately 
on  their  receipt.  If  he  has  acted  on  the  matter,  his  orders  have  gone  directly 
to  you,  as  nothing  on  the  subject  has  been  received  here. 

I  write  this  to  inform  you  that  the  matter  was  duly  attended  to  by  me. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

H.  W.  HALLECK, 

Major  General ,  Chief  if  Staff. 

Major  General  Curtis, 

Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas. 


Official  copy : 


Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

J.  C.  KELTON,  A.  A.  G. 


[Dated  Denver,  January  8,  1865. — Received  January  9,  3  p.  m  ] 

J.  B.  Chaffee,  45  William  : 

Urge  the  government  to  send  troops  on  Platte  route.  Indians  burning  trains 
and  slaying  emigrants. 

GEO.  E.  CLARK, 
CHAS.  A.  COOK. 

Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1S65. 

Official  copy : 

J.  C.  KELTON,  A.  A.  G. 
New  York,  January  10,  1865. 

Dear  Judge  :  I  received  the  enclosed  despatch  this  a.  m.  You  cannot  be 
too  urgent  with  the  Secretary  of  War,  or  the  President,  about  our  Indian  troubles. 
Unless  something  is  done  to  settle  this  trouble,  we  are  virtually  killed  as  a 
Territory.  You  can  hardly  realize,  without  seeing  it,  the  large  amount  of  ma¬ 
chinery  en  route  for  our  Territory  to  work  the  mines  with.  Everything  in  the 


74 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS 


way  of  supplies  is  exorbitantly  high,  all  on  account  of  the  hazard  of  transport¬ 
ation.  Emigration  is  limited  on  account  of  the  danger  of  travel.  It  is  pecu¬ 
liarly  disastrous  to  us  now  because  so  many  eastern  capitalists  have  been  and 
are  investing  in  our  mines,  and  are  preparing  to  open  and  develop  them. 

I  am  inclined  to  the  opinion  that  our  administration,  both  civil  and  military, 
have  failed  to  comprehend  the  situation.  I  mean  Evans  and  Chivington.  I 
think  this  whole  difficulty  could  have  been  arrested ;  but  this  is  nothing  to  the 
case  ijow.  This  must  be  attended  to  immediately,  or  our  prospects  are  blasted 
for  some  time  to  come,  and  the  development  of  a  rich  mining  country  indefinitely 
postponed.  For  God’s  sake,  urge  some  action.  I  can’t  come  over  just  now,  or 
I  would  give  you  my  views  regarding  what  action  ought  to  be  taken  ;  but 
anything,  so  that  some  steps  are  taken  to  protect  the  line  of  travel. 

There  is  no  use  to  depend  on  General  Curtis,  Evans,  Chivington,  or  any  other 
politician. 

Yours  of  the  9tli  received  this  morning. 

Truly,  &c., 

J.  B.  CHAFFEE. 

Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

Official  copy: 

J.  C.  KELTON,  A.  A.  G. 


Headquarters  op  the  Army, 

Washington ,  D.  C.f  January  11,  1865. 

Major  General  Curtis,  Fort  Leavenworth : 

Statements  from  respectable  sources  have  been  received  here  that  the  conduct 
of  Colonel  Chivington’s  command  towards  the  friendly  Indians  has  been  a  series 
of  outrages  calculated  to  make  them  all  hostile.  You  will  inquire  into  and  re¬ 
port  on  this  matter,  and  will  take  measures  to  have  preserved  and  accounted  for 
all  plunder  taken  from  the  Indians  at  Fort  Lyons  and  other  places. 

H.  W.  HALLECK, 

Major  General ,  Chief  of  Staff. 


Official' : 


Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

D.  C.  WAGER,  A.  A.  G. 


War  Department,  January  11,  1865. 

.fudge  Rennet,  delegate  from  Colorado  Territory,  presents  a  letter  and  tele¬ 
gram  from  J.  B.  Chaffee  relative  to  the  Indian  depredations  on  the  mail  route  to 
Colorado,  and  the  general  unsettled  condition  of  the  country,  owing  to  the  active 
hostility  of  the  Indians,  incited  mainly  by  the  recent  attack  of  Colonel  Chiving¬ 
ton  at  Fort  Lyons.  The  attention  of  the  government  is  called  to  the  immediate 
necessity  of  sending  additional  troops  to  that  region  to  protect  the  route. 

Respectfully  referred  to  General  Halleck. 

By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

JAS.  A.  HARDIE, 

Colonel  and  Inspector  General. 

Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1885. 


Official  copy  : 


J.  C.  KELTON,  A.  A.  G . 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


75 


Headquarters  Department  of  Kansas, 

Fort  Leavenworth,  January  12,  1865. 

General:  Your  despatch  of  yesterday,  directing  me  to  investigate  Colonel 
Chivington’s  conduct  towards  the  Indians,  is  received,  and  will  be  obeyed. 
Colonel  Chivington  has  been  relieved  by  Colonel  Moonlight,  and  is  probably  out 
of  the  service,  under  provisions  of  Circular  No.  36,  War  Department. 

Although  the  colonel  may  have  transgressed  my  field  orders  concerning  Indian 
warfare,  (a  copy  of  which  is  here  enclosed,)  and  otherwise  acted  very  much 
against  my  views  of  propriety  in  his  assault  at  Sand  creek,  still  it  is  not  true, 
as  Indian  agents  and  Indian  traders  are  representing,  that  such  extra  severity 
is  increasing  Indian  war.  On  the  contrary,  it  tends  to  reduce  their  numbers,  and 
bring  them  to  terms.  Their  bands  are  more  united,  perhaps,  at  this  time  than 
during  the  summer,  but  this  results  from  their  necessities  and  surroundings. 
They  are  in  a  destitute  condition,  and  must,  at  this  season  of  the  year,  resort  to 
desperate  measures  to  procure  horses  and  provisions ;  hence  we  see  a  continual 
effort  to  overpower  our  little  posts,  or  our  trains  and  stages.  Their  lodges  are 
now  between  the  Arkansas  and  Platte,  and  they  shift  their  assaults  so  as  to 
attack  to  the  best  advantage.  I  am  collecting  and  arranging  troops  near  Fort 
Riley,  but  need  more  force  to  make  another  effort  to  destroy  them.  I  will  be 
glad  to  save  the  few  honest  and  kindly  disposed,  and  protest  against  the  slaughter 
of  women  and  children;  although,  since  General  Harney’s  attack  of  the  Sioux 
many  years  ago  at  Ash  Hollow,  the  popular  cry  of  settlers  and  soldiers  on  the 
frontier  favors  an  indiscriminate  slaughter,  which  is.  very  difficult  to  restrain.  I 
abhor  this  style,  but  so  it  goes  from  Minnesota  to  Texas.  I  fear  that  Colonel 
Chivington’s  assault  at  Sand  creek  was  upon  Indians  who  had  received  some 
encouragement  to  camp  in  that  vicinity  under  some  erroneous  supposition  of  the 
commanding  officer  at  Lyon  that  he  could  make  a  sort  of  “  city  of  refuge”  at 
such  a  point.  However  wrong  that  may  have  been,  it  should  have  been  respected, 
and  any  violation  of  known  arrangements  of  that  sort  should  be  severely  rebuked. 
Blit  there  is  no  doubt  a  portion  of  the  tribe  assembled  were  occupied  in  making 
assaults  on  our  stages  and  trains,  and  the  tribes  well  know  that  we  have  to  hold 
the  whole  community  responsible  for  acts  they  could  restrain,  if  they  would 
properly  exert  their  efforts  in  that  way.  It  is  almost  impossible  to  properly  try 
officers  in  my  command,  if  they  have  a  high  rank,  my  troops  all  being  widely 
scattered  and  much  employed. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be  your  obedient  servant, 

S.  R.  CURTIS,  Major  General. 


Official  copy  : 


Headquarters  of  the  Army, 

Washington,  March  18,  1865. 

-  - ,  A.  A.  G. 


GENERAL  FIELD  ORDERS  No.  1. 

[Extract.] 

,  Headquarters  Department  of  Kansas, 

In  the  Field,  Fort  Ellsworth,  July  27,  1864. 
******* 

II.  Hunters  will  be  detailed  for  killing  game,  but  the  troops  must  not  scatter 
and  break  down  stock  to  chase  buffalo.  Indians  at  war  with  us  will  be  the 
object  of  our  pursuit  and  distinction,  but  women  and  children  must  be  spared. 
All  horses,  ponies,  and  property  taken  Avill  be  placed  in  charge  of  Quartermas- 


76 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


ter  P.  0.  Taylor,  who  will  have  it  properly  collected,  or  sent  back  to  safe  place 
for  future  disposition ;  this  is  necessary  to  prevent  the  accumulation  of  useless 
baggage. 

#**#**# 

By  order  of  Major  General  Curtis. 

JOHN  WILLIAMS, 

Assistarit  Adjutant  General. 

Official  copy  :  JOHN  WILLIAMS.  A.  G.  A. 

Headquarters  of  the  Army, 

Washington,  March  IS,  1865. 

Official  copy  :  - ,  A.  A.  G. 


GENERAL  FIELD  ORDERS  No.  2. 


Headquarters  Department  of  Kansas, 

In  the  Field,  Fort  Lamed,  July  31,  1864. 

I.  At  all  military  posts  or  stations  west  of  the  Kansas  and  Nebraska  settle¬ 
ments  in  this  department,  stockades  or  abatis  enclosures  must  be  made  for  the 
troops  and  stock,  and  animals  must  be  kept  in  such  enclosures  at  night,  anc\ 
never  herded  during  the  day  without  distant  and  careful  pickets,  who  can  give 
warning  of  approaching  enemies  in  time  to  preserve  the  stock  from  surprise. 

II.  Indians  and  their  allies  or  associates  will  not  be  allowed  within  the  forts 
except  blindfolded,  and  then  they  must  be  kept  totally  ignorant  of  the  character 
and  number  of  our  forces.  Neglect  of  this  concealment  Will  be  followed  by 
the  most  severe  and  summary  punishment. 

Commanders  of  forts  and  stations  will  furnish  escorts  according  to  their 
best  judgments,  keeping  in  view  the  safety  of  their  own  posts,  the  stage  or 
public  property  to  be  guarded,  and  the  preservation  of  the  horses. 

These  precautions  must  not  be  relaxed  without  permission  of  the  commander 
of  the  department,  and  all  officers,  of  whatever  grade,  will  report  promptly  to 
the  nearest  and  most  available  assistance,  and  to  district  and  department  head¬ 
quarters,  any  patent  neglect  of  this  order,  or  any  palpable  danger  to  a  command. 

The  industry  and  skill  displayed  by  Lieutenant  Ellsworth,  and  the  troops 
under  his  command,  in  the  erection  of  a  block- house  and  other  protection  for 
his  troops  and  animals  at  Smoky  Hill  crossing,  deserve  special  commendation, 
while  the  negligence  exhibited  elsewhere,  especially  at  this  post,  while  under 
its  former  commander,  is  deprecated  and  denounced. 

By  command  of  Major  General  S.  K.  Curtis. 

JOHN  WILLIAMS, 

Assistant  Adjutant  General. 


Official  : 


Official  copy  : 


JOHN  WILLIAMS,  A  A.  G. 

Headquarters  of  the  Army, 

Washington,  March  IS,  1865. 

- ,  A.  A.  G. 


Headquarters  Department  of  Kansas, 

Fort  Leavenworth,  January  30,  1S65. 

Governor  :  Yours  of  the  20th  is  just  received,  and  I  telegraph  the  latest 
news.  I  was  provoked  at  the  course  taken  by  the  commanding  officer  at 
Julesburg,  who  took  his  entire  force  to  escort  prisoners  through,  leaving  that 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


77 


post  for  a  few  days  entirely  vacated.  I  have  telegraphed  a  proper  rebuke,  and 
trust  this  will  not  again  occur.  None  of  my  military  stations  have  been  dis¬ 
turbed.  They  are  all  intact,  and  generally  too  strong  to  be  taken  by  assault. 
All  we  need  is  three  or  four  regiments,  which  it  seems  to  me  will  be  sufficient. 
Most  of  these  I  would  keep  moving  in  the  country  infested  by  foes.  1  fear 
your  Interior  Department  will  make  me  trouble,  by  pioposing  military  evolutions 
which  conflict  with  my  own.  After  traversing  most  of  the  plains  last  summer, 
up  the  Arkansas,  up  the  Platte,  and  near  the  head  of  every  stream  between 
these  rivers,  my  personal  knowledge,  coupled  with  that  obtained  from  my 
officers,  is  abundant  to  enable  me  to  understand  the  matter,  and  I  am  only  de¬ 
sirous  of  doing  what  I  consider  necessary  to  make  a  finish,  as  near  as  may  be, 
of  these  troubles.  But  1  cannot  carry  on  war  on  other  people’s  plans.  I  want 
no  fancy  movements,  such  as  occurred  last  summer,  when  one  of  your  militia 
companies  marched  down  the  line,  passing  my  troops,  and  claiming  to  have 
“  opened  the  overland  route,”  as  though  others  had  not  been  over  most  of  the 
places  on  the  Blue,  and  on  Plum  creek  and  elsewhere,  where  most  of  the  losses 
had  transpired.  This  move  of  Chivington  against  the  bands  that  had  been 
congregated  on  Sand  creek,  at  the  instance  of  Major  Wynkoop,  was  also  an 
inspiration  of  over-zeal  which  did  not  emanate  from  my  headquarters.  1  name 
these  things,  governor,  to  secure  unity  of  action,  not  to  find  fault. 

On  every  occasion  last  summer  I  took  the  field  promptly,  and,  although  I 
did  not  get  to  Denver,  I  was  at  the  slaughter- ground  near  Larned  on  the 
Arkansas,  and  on  the  Plum  and  Blue  on  the  Platte,  making  overland  journeys 
between,  with  active,  efficient  forces  extending  over  two  thousand  miles;  so 
that  my  zeal  and  energy  cannot  be  doubted.  I  protest  my  desire  to  pursue 
and  punish  the  enemy  everywhere,  in  his  lodges  especially;  but  1  do  not  be¬ 
lieve  in  killing  womeu  and  children  who  can  be  taken,  and,  if  need  be,  camped 
east  of  the  Mississippi,  where  they  can  be  kept  and  cared  for.  I  always  did 
and  do  consider  the  Ash  Hollow  massacre  a  monstrous  outrage,  but  the  pro¬ 
motion  and  laudation  that  followed  that  transaction  should  excuse  the  indiscre¬ 
tion  and  cruelty  of  excited  and  outraged  frontier  soldiers,  who  have  always  heard 
Ash  Hollow  warfare  extolled  as  the  very  brilliant  point  of  gloiious  Indian  waifare. 

In  my  first  movement  last  summer,  when  in  pursuit  of  the  Indians,  I  tried 
to  restrain  this  plan  of  warfare,  by  issuing  an  order  against  the  massacre  of 
women  and  children,  believing  that  taking  such  captive  and  bringing  them 
away  would  just  as  effectually  mortify  and  annoy  the  Indian  robbers  and  war¬ 
riors.  Let  me  say,  too,  that  I  see  nothing  new  in  all  this  Indian  movement 
since  the  Chivington  affair,  except  that  Indians  are  more  frightened  and  keep 
further  away.  By  pushing  them  hard  this  next  month,  before  grass  recruits 
their  ponies,  they  will  be  better  satisfied  with  making  war  and  robbery  a  busi¬ 
ness.  I  would  send  into  iheir  lines  some  friendly,  reliable  Arapahoes  and 
Cheyennes,  and  separate  tiibes,  so  as  to  save  such  as  may  be  willing  to  make 
peace  and  fight  the  bad  Indians. 

Such  are  my  views.  I  am  not  anxious  to  have  the  job  of  operating  matters  ; 
but  while  I  have  command,  I  want  unity  of  action,  or  no  cross  or  counter  cur¬ 
rents,  I  have  written  this,  because  I  see  by  telegraph  that  matters  are  spoken 
of  as  being  organized  at  Washington,  where  I  fear  less  is  known  of  details. 

I  am,  governor,  yours  truly, 

S.  R.  CURTIS,  Major  General. 

His  Excellency  Governor  Jno.  Evans,  Washington,  D  C. 

Headquarters  of  the  Army, 

Washington,  March  18,  1866. 


Official  copy  : 


,  A.  A.  G. 


78 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS 


Headquarters  Department  of  Kansas, 

Fort  Leavenworth,  January  30,  1865. 

General:  Governor  Evans  writes  ine,  that  lie  fears  Chivington’s  conduct 
at  Sand  creek  may  embarrass  military  matters  on  the  plains.  1  have  written 
him  fully,  and  enclose  you  a  copy  of  my  letter. 

There  is  no  new  feature  in  these  Indian  troubles,  except  that  Indians  seem 
more  frightened.  More  forces  and  more  prudence  will  keep  the  lines  open  and 
subdue  the  hostile  tribes.  {Some  accounts  of  great  combinations  go  the  rounds  ; 
but  I  put  no  confidence  in  such  stories. 

The  Indians  of  the  plains  are  generally  robbers  and  murderers,  and  act  only 
from  motives  of  hunger  and  avarice  in  their  assaults,  and  by  fear  in  their  for¬ 
bearance. 

Settlements  have  increased,  and  our  lines  of  communication  have  become 
more  convenient  for  their  assaults,  till  they  become  more  troublesome  and  ven¬ 
turesome.  The  carelessness  of  emigration  invited  their  assaults.  It  is  folly  to 
attribute  the  Indian  troubles  to  the  wrongs  committed  by  white  men.  While 
we  may  condemn  these,  it  is  really  more  indulgence  than  cruelty  that  endured 
and  continues  their  warfare.  They  have  no  great  armies ;  they  are  not  com¬ 
bined  ;  their  action  is  in  separate  bands  of  separate  tribes.  A  thousand  men 
with  light  artillery  can  whip  their  greatest  possible  combinations;  but  it  is  de¬ 
sirable  to  have  three  or  four  more  regiments,  so  that  a  movable  force  of  say 
two  thousand  can  take  a  shifting  attitude,  going  to  a  central  point  and  throw¬ 
ing  out  detachments  as  circumstances  seem  to  require.  Such  a  force  must  fol¬ 
low  the  buffalo,  as  the  Indians  do,  and  must  not  go  beyond  reasonable  prox¬ 
imity  to  the  lines  of  travel,  but  remain  near  enough  to  the  little  posts  that  guard 
the  travel  and  trains  that  follow  the  routes  up  the  Platte  and  up  the  Arkansas. 

1  send  you  a  map  of  the  overland  route  to  the  mountains  with  stations  marked. 
I  have  required  our  troops  to  erect  defences  against  Indian  assaults,  and  a  few 
men  can  in  this  way  hold  position,  and  a  few  more  accompany  the  stage  or 
train  to  adjacent  stations.  Such  forts  cost  nothing  of  conse  tuence,  and  have 
already  saved  men  and  stores  in  several  instances. 

Forces  are  necessary  on  these  lines  and  in  the  edge  of  settlements;  but  a 
movable  force  generally  stationed  between  the  Platte  and  Arkansas,  as  I  have 
suggested,  and  nearest  the  eastern  settlements  where  it  can  be  most  economi¬ 
cally  supplied,  will,  in  my  judgment,  be  the  proper  organization  for  the  coun¬ 
try.  I  have  in  a  former  letter  expressed  my  purpose  to  do  all  I  can  to  con¬ 
tinue  the  campaign  during  the  winter. 

I  specially  urge  the  extension  of  the  telegraph  at  least  to  Riley.  The  ad¬ 
vantage  will,  in  my  judgment,  greatly  exceed  the  cost.  I  need  connexion  with 
the  Indian  and  buffalo  range,  so  I  can  direct  matters  on  the  Platte  to  corre¬ 
spond  with  intelligence  arriving  from  the  Santa  Fe  route.  Our  telegraph  com¬ 
pany  can  extend  the  line  with  only  a  cost  of  about  ten  thousand  dollars ;  but 
it  is  proper  to  say  my  request  last  season  was  disapproved  by  the  honorable 
the  Secretary  of  War,  and  this  is  a  renewal  of  the  request. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  general,  your  obedient  servant, 

S.  R.  CURTIS, 

Major  General . 

Maj  or  General  II.  W.  Halleck, 

Chief  of  Staff,  Washington,  D.  C. 

P.  S. — February  2. — I  delayed  this  for  the  map,  which  does  not  satisfy  me, 
and  will  be  delayed  a  few  days  for  revision.  I  have  ordered  all  possible  force 
to  Julesburg,  where  Indian  difficulties  continue.  I  have  information,  also,  that 
a  council  of  the  chiefs  have  determiucd  to  try  to  draw  off  troops  from  the  Ar- 


MASSACRE  OF  CI1EYENNE  INDIANS. 


79 


kansas  line,  by  attacking  the  Platte  line.  I  have  to  act  in  view  of  their  shift¬ 
ing  assaults. 

S.  II.  CURTIS,  Major  General. 


Official  copy  : 


Headquarters  of  the  Army, 

Washington ,  March  18,  186.5. 


i 


Headquarters  of  the  Army, 

Washington,  D.  (J.,  February  1,  1865. 

General:  I  transmit  herewith  a  copy  of  a  letter  from  General  Conner  in 
regard  to  the  defence  of  the  overland  mail  route,  and  also  several  papers  from 
General  Curtis  on  this  subject. 

These  papers  and  others  were,  on  their  receipt,  forwarded  to  Lieutenant  Gen¬ 
eral  Grant,  and  have  been  returned  without  any  instructions  from  him,  so  far 
as  I  am  informed. 

It  is  therefore  presumed  that  he  deems  the  large  cavalry  force  in  the  depart¬ 
ment  of  Kansas  as  sufficient  for  present  purposes,  without  taking  others  from 

active  duty  in  the  field. 

It  is  proper  to  state  in  this  connexion,  that  others  report  these  stories  of  In¬ 
dian  hostilities  as  greatly  exaggerated,  if  not  mostly  gotten  up  for  purposes  of 
speculation ;  and  respectable  authorities  assert  that  they  are  encouraged  by  the 
agents  of  the  Overland  Mail  Company,  in  order  to  cover  their  frequent  failure 
to  transport  the  mails  according  to  contract. 

Be  this  as  it  may,  it  is  highly  important  that  the  roads  to  New  Mexico,  Col¬ 
orado,  Utah  and  Idaho  should  be  properly  protected  from  Indian  hostilities,  so 
that  there  may  be  no  interruption  in  the  transmission  of  supplies  and  the  mails. 

You  will  transmit  these  papers,  with  the  necessary  instructions,  to  General 
Dodge,  who  will  give  the  whole  matter  his  immediate  care  and  attention. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

H.  W.  HALLECK, 

.  Major  General ,  Ch  ief  of  Staff. 

Major  General  John  Pope, 
frt.  Louis ,  Missouri. 

Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

Official  copy  : 

J.  C.  KELTON,  A.  A.  G. 

Senate  Chamber, 

February  13,  1865. 

Sir  :  We  are  appointed  by  the  Committee  on  Indian  Affairs  of  the  Senate  a 
sub-committ.  e  to  confer  with  the  President  and  yourself  on  the  subject  of  trans¬ 
ferring  the  Indian  country,  with  one  tier  of  counties  of  western  Arkansas,  to 
the  Missouri-Kansas  Department.  We  refrain  from  giving  reasons  or  argu 
ment,  believing  you  are  already  of  opinion  the  change  should  be  promptly  made, 
and  merely  submit  the  request. 

Yours,  &c., 


Hon.  E.  M.  Stanton, 

Seer  eta  y  of  War. 


JAMES  HARLAN, 
J.  H.  LANE. 


80 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


N.  B. — I  saw  General  Grant  Saturday  night,  who  informed  me  he  had  no 
objection  to  the  change. 

J.  H.  LANE. 

We  earnestly  recommend  that  the  Indian  troops  now  in  the  service  in  the 
Indian  country  be  mustered  out  of  the  service  with  their  arms  in  time  to  raise  a 
crop  for  their  destitute  families  this  season,  if  other  troops  are  substituted. 

JAMES  HARLAN, 

J.  R.  DOOLITTLE, 

M.  S.  WILKINSON, 

B.  GRATZ  BROWN, 

0.  R.  BUCKALEW, 
Committee  on  Indian  Affairs. 


Official  copy : 


Headquarters  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

J.  C.  KELTON,  A.  A.  G. 


War  Department, 

January  23,  1865. 

Case  of  application  of  Ben  Holladay  that  General  Curtis  may  be  ordered  to 
re-enforce  Julesburg  (crossing  of  the  Platte)  immediately. 

Referred  to  Major  General  Halleck,  chief  of  staff. 

By  order  of  the  Secretary  of  War. 

JAMES  A.  HARDIE, 

Colonel  and  Inspector  General. 


Official  copy : 


Headquarters  of  the  Army, 

March  18,  1865. 

J.  C.  KELTON, 

Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant  General. 


[From  Julesburg,  dated  14. — Received  January  16,  1865.] 

4 

Ben  Holladay  : 

I  arrived  here  to-day  with  fifteen  (15)  men ;  shall  try  and  hold  station ;  sol¬ 
diers  all  gone  ;  only  the  wounded  ;  station  badly  tom  up  ;  messenger  robbed ; 
great  deal  of  property  destroyed. 

R.  R.  THOMAS, 

Di  visio?i  Adjutant. 


Official  copy : 


Headquarters  of  the  Army, 

March  18,  1865. 

J.  C.  KELTON, 

Colonel  and,  Assistant  Adjutant  General . 


[Dated  New  York  21,  1865. — Received  Washington,  January  21,  1865.] 


(Care  of  Senator  Pomeroy,  15th  and  F  sts.) 

Reuben  Thomas  telegraphs  cannot  hold  Julesburg.  If  he  does  not  the  In- 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


81 


dians  liave  conquered  the  country,  from  Kearney  to  Denver,  beyond  hope  this 
winter. 

BEN  IIOLLADAY. 


Official  copy : 


Headquarters  of  the  Army, 

March  18,  1865. 

J.  0.  KELTON, 

Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant  General. 


[Dated  New  York  21,  1865,  11  o’clock. — Received  Washington,  January  21,  1865.] 


To  George  B.  Jolts,  care  of  Senator  Pomeroy  : 

Try  to  have  order  sent  to  Curtis  or  Mitchell  to  help  them  at  Julesburg,  or  he 
will  abandon. 

B.  HOLLADAY. 


Official  copy : 


Headquarters  of  the  Army, 

March  18,  1865. 

J.  0.  KELTON, 

Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant  General. 


Fort  Lyon,  Colorado  Territory, 

January  15,  1865. 

Sir:  In  purAiance  of  Special  Order  No.  43,  headquarters,  district  of  Upper 
Arkansas,  directing  me  to  assume  command  of  Fort  Lyon,  as  well  as  to  investi¬ 
gate  and  immediately  report  in  regard  to  late  Indian  proceedings  in  this  vicinity, 
I  have  the  honor  to  state  that  I  arrived  at  this  post  on  the  evening  of  the  14th 
of  January,  1865,  assumed  command  on  the  morning  of  the  15th  of  January, 
1865,  and  the  result  of  my  investigation  is  as  follows  : 

As  explanatory,  I  beg  respectfully  to  state  that,  while  formerly  in  command 
of  this  post,  on  the  4th  day  of  September,  1864,  and  after  certain  hostilities  on 
the  part  of  the  Cheyenne  and  Arapahoe  Indians,  induced,  as  I  have  had  ample 
proof,  by  the  overt  acts  of  white  men,  three  Indians  (Cheyennes)  were  brought 
as  prisoners  to  me,  who  had  been  found  coming  toward  the  post,  and  who  had 
in  their  possession  a  letter  written,  as  I  ascertained  afterwards,  by  a  half-breed 
in  the  Cheyenne  camp,  as  coming  from  Black  Kettle  and  other  prominent  chiefs 
of  the  Cheyenne  and  Arapahoe  nations,  the  purport  of  which  was  that  they  de¬ 
sired  peace,  had  never  desired  to  be  at  war  with  the  whites,  &c.,  as  well  as  stat¬ 
ing  that  they  had  in  their  possession  some  white  prisoners,  women  and  children, 
whom  they  were  willing  to  deliver  up  providing  that  peace  was  granted  them. 
Knowing  that  it  was  not  in  my  power  to  insure  and  offer  them  the  peace  for 
which  they  sued,  but  at  the  same  time  anxious,  if  possible,  to  accomplish  the 
rescue  of  the  white  prisoners  in  their  possession,  I  finally  concluded  to  risk  an 
expedition  with  the  command  I  could  raise,  numbering  one  hundred  and  twenty- 
seven  men,  to  their  rendezvous,  where  I  was  informed  they  were  congregated 
to  the  number  of  two  thousand,  and  endeavor  by  some  means  to  procure  the 
aforesaid  white  prisoners,  and  to  be  governed  in  my  course  in  accomplishing  the 
same  entirely  by  circumstances.  Having  formerly  made  lengthy  reports  in  re¬ 
gard  to  the  details  of  my  expedition,  1  have  but  to  say  that  I  succeeded,  pro- 
Part  VI - 6 


82 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


cured  four  white  captives  from  the  hands  of  these  Indians,  simply  giving  them 
in  return  a  pledge  that  I  would  endeavor  to  procure  for  them  the  peace  for  which 
they  so  anxiously  sued,  feeling  that,  under  the  proclamation  issued  by  John 
Evans,  governor  of  Colorado  and  superintendent  of  Indian  affairs,  a  copy  of 
which  becomes  a  portion  of  this  report,  even  if  not  by  virtue  of  my  position  as  a 
United  States  officer,  highest  in  authority  in  the  country  included  within  the 
bounds  prescribed  as  the  country  of  the  Arapahoe  and  Cheyenne  nations,  I 
could  offer  them  protection  until  such  time  as  some  measures  might  be  taken 
by  those  higher  in  authority  than  myself  in  regard  to  them.  I  took  with  me 
seven  of  the  principal  chiefs,  including  Black  Kettle,  to  Denver  city,  for  the 
purpose  of  allowing  them  an  interview  with  the  governor  of  Colorado,  by  that 
means  making  a  mistake  of  which  I  have  since  become  painfully  aware — that  of 
proceeding  with  the  chiefs  to  the  governor  of  Colorado  Territory,  instead  of  to 
the  headquarters  of  my  district,  to  my  commanding  officer.  In  the  consultation 
with  Governor  Evans,  the  matter  was  referred  entirely  to  the  military  authorities. 
Colonel  J.  M.  Chivington,  at  that  time  commander  of  the  district  of  Colorado, 
was  present  at  the  council  held  with  these  Indian  chiefs,  and  told  them  that  the 
whole  matter  was  referred  to  myself,  who  would  act  toward  them  according  to 
.the  best  of  my  judgment,  until  such  time  as  I  could  receive  instructions  from 
the  proper  authorities.  Returning  to  Fort  Lyon,  I  allowed  the  Indians  to  bring 
their  villages  to  the  vicinity  of  the  post,  including  their  squaws  and  pappooses, 
and  in  such  a  position  that  I  could  at  any  moment,  with  the  garrison  I  had, 
have  annihilated  them,  had  they  given  any  evidence  of  hostility  of  any  kind,  in 
any  quarter. 

I  then  immediately  despatched  my  adjutant,  Lieutenant  W.  W.  Denison, 
with  a  full  statement,  to  the  commanding  general  of  the  department,  asking  for 
instructions ;  but  in  the  mean  while  various  false  rumors  having  reached  district 
headquarters  in  regard  to  my  course,  I  was  relieved  from  the  command  of  Fort 
Lyon,  and  ordered  to  report  at  headquarters.  Major  Scott  J.  Anthony,  1st 
cavalry  of  Colorado,  who  had  been  ordered  to  assume  command  of  Fort  Lyon, 
previous  to  my  departure  held  a  consultation  with  the  chiefs,  in  my  presence, 
and  told  them  that  though  acting  under  strict  orders,  under  the  circumstances, 
he  could  not  materially  differ  from  the  course  which  I  had  adopted,  and  allowed 
them  to  remain  in  the  vicinity  of  the  post,  with  their  families,  assuring  them 
perfect  safety  until  such  time  as  positive  orders  should  be  received  from  head¬ 
quarters  in  regard  to  them.  I  left  the  post  on  the  25th  day  of  November,  for 
the  purpose  of  reporting  at  district  headquarters.  On  the  second  day  after  leav¬ 
ing  Fort  Lyon,  while  on  the  plains,  I  was  approached  by  three  Indians,  one  of 
whom  stated  to  me  that  he  had  been  sent  by  Black  Kettle  to  warn  me  that 
about  two  hundred  Sioux  warriors  had  proceeded  down  the  road  between  where 
I  was  and  Fort  Larned,  to  make  war,  and  desired  that  I  should  be  careful; 
another  evidence  of  these  Indians  good  faith.  All  of  his  statement  proved  after¬ 
wards  to  be  correct.  Having  an  escort  of  twenty-eight  men,  I  proceeded  on  my 
way,  but  did  not  happen  to  fall  in  with  them. 

From  evidence  of  officers  at  this  post,  I  understand  that  on  the  27th  day  of 
November,  1864,  Colonel  J.  M.  Chivington,  with  the  3d  regiment  of  Colorado 
cavalry  (one-hundred-days  men)  and  a  battalion  of  the  1st  Colorado  cavalry, 
arrived  at  Fort  Lyon,  ordered  a  portion  of  the  garrison  to  join  him,  under  the 
command  of  Major  Scott  J.  Anthony,  and  against  the  remonstrance  of  the 
officers  of  the  post,  who  stated  to  him  the  circumstances  of  which  he  was  well 
aware,  attacked  the  camp  of  friendly  Indians,  the  major  portion  of  which  were 
composed  of  women  and  children.  The  affidavits  which  become  a  portion  of 
this  report  will  show,  more  particularly  than  I  can  state,  the  full  particulars  of 
that  massacre.  Every  one  whom  I  have  spoken  to,  either  officer  or  soldier, 
agrees  in  the  relation  that  the  most  fearful  atrocities  were  committed  that  ever 
were  heard  of.  Women  and  children  were  killed  and  scalped,  children  shot  at 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


83 


their  mothers’  breasts,  and  all  the  bodies  mutilated  in  the  most  horrible  manner. 
Numerous  eye-witnesses  have  described  scenes  to  me,  coming  under  the  eye  of 
Colonel  Chivington,  of  the  most  disgusting  and  horrible  character;  the  dead  bodies 
of  females  profaned  in  such  a  manner  that  the  recital  is  sickening ;  Colonel  J.  M. 
Chivington  all  the  time  inciting  his  troops  to  these  diabolical  outrages.  Pre¬ 
vious  to  the  slaughter  commencing  he  addressed  his  command,  arousing  in  them, 
by  his  language,  all  their  worst  passions,  urging  them  on  to  the  work  of  com¬ 
mitting  all  these  atrocities.  Knowing  himself  all  the  circumstances  of  these  In¬ 
dians  resting  on  the  assurances  of  protection  from  the  government,  given  them 
by  myself  and  Major  Scott  J.  Anthony,  he  kept  his  command  in  entire  igno¬ 
rance  of  the  same ;  and  when  it  was  suggested  that  such  might  be  the  case  he 
denied  it,  positively  stating  that  they  were  still  continuing  their  depredations, 
and  laid  there  threatening  the  fort.  I  beg  leave  to  draw  the  attention  of  the 
colonel  commanding  to  the  fact  established  by  the  enclosed  affidavits,  that  two- 
thirds  or  more  of  that  Indian  village  were  women  and  children,  and  he  is  aware 
whether  or  not  the  Indians  go  to  war  taking  with  them  their  women  and  chil¬ 
dren.  I  desire  also  to  state  that  Colonel  J.  M.  Chivington  is  not  my  superior 
officer,  but  is  a  citizen  mustered  out  of  the  United  States  service;  and  also, 
that  at  the  time  this  inhuman  monster  committed  this  unprecedented  atrocity 
he  was  a  citizen,  by  reason  of  his  term  of  service  having  expired,  he  having 
lost  his  regulation  command  some  months  previous. 

Colonel  Chivington  reports  officially  that  between  five  and  six  hundred  In¬ 
dians  were  left  dead  upon  the  field.  I  have  been  informed  by  Captain  Booth, 
district  inspector,  that  lie  visited  the  field  and  counted  but  sixty-nine  bodies,  and 
by  others  who  were  present  that  but  a  few,  if  any,  over  that  number  were  killed, 
and  that  two-thirds  of  them  were  women  and  children.  I  beg  leave  to  further 
state,  for  the  information  of  the  colonel  commanding,  that  I  have  talked  to  every 
officer  in  Fort  Lyon,  and  many  enlisted  men,  and  that  they  unanimously  agree 
that  all  the  statements  I  have  made  in  this  report  are  correct. 

In  conclusion,  allow  me  to  say  that  from  the  time  I  held  the  consultation  with 
the  Indian  chiefs  on  the  head- waters  of  Smoky  Hill,  up  to  the  date  of  the  mas¬ 
sacre  by  Colonel  Chivington,  not  one  single  depredation  had  been  committed  by 
the  Cheyenne  and  Arapahoe  Indians.  The  settlers  of  the  Arkansas  valley 
had  returned  to  their  ranches  from  which  they  had  fled,  had  taken  in  their  crops, 
and  had  been  resting  in  perfect  security  under  assurances  from  myself  that  they 
would  be  in  no  danger  for  the  present,  by  that  means  saving  the  country  from 
what  must  inevitably  become  almost  a  famine  were  they  to  lose  their  crops ;  the 
lines  of  communication  were  opened  and  travel  across  the  plains  rendered  per¬ 
fectly  safe  through  the  Cheyenne  and  Arapahoe  country.  Since  this  last  hor¬ 
rible  murder  by  Colonel  Chivington  the  country  presents  a  scene  of  desolation. 
All  communication  is  cut  off  with  the  States  except  by  sending  large  bodies  of 
troops,  and  already  over  a  hundred  whites  have  fallen  as  victims  to  the  fearful 
vengeance  of  these  betrayed  Indians.  All  this  country  is  ruined.  There  can 
be  no  such  thing  as  peace  in  the  future  but  by  the  total  annihilation  of  all 
the  Indians  on  the  plains.  I  have  the  most  reliable  information  to  the  effect 
that  the  Cheyennes  and  Arapahoes  have  allied  themselves  with  the  Kiowas 
Comanches,  and  Sioux,  and  are  congregated  to  the  number  of  five  or  six  thou¬ 
sand  on  the  Smoky  Hill. 

Let  me  also  draw  the  attention  of  the  colonel  commanding  to  the  fact  stated 
by  affidavit,  that  John  Smith,  United  States  interpreter,  a  soldier,  and  a  citi¬ 
zen,  were  present  in  the  Indian  camp,  by  permission  of  the  commanding  officer 
of  this  post — another  evidence  to  the  fact  of  these  same  Indians  being  regarded 
as  friendly ;  also,  that  Colonel  Chivington  states,  in  his  official  report,  that  he 
fought  from  nine  hundred  to  one  thousand  Indians,  and  left  from  five  to  six 
hundred  dead  upon  the  field,  the  sworn  evidence  being  that  there  were  but  five 


84 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


hundred  souls  in  the  village,  two-thirds  of  them  being  women  and  children,  and 
that  there  were  but  from  sixty  to  seventy  killed,  the  major  portion  of  whom 
were  women  and  children. 

It  will  take  many  more  troops  to  give  security  to  travellers  and  settlers  in  this 
country,  and  to  make  any  kind  of  successful  warfare  against  these  Indians.  I 
am  at  work  placing  Fort  Lyon  in  a  state  of  defence,  having  all,  both  citizens 
and  soldiers,  located  here  employed  upon  the  works,  and  expect  soon  to  have 
them  completed,  and  of  such  a  nature  that  a  comparatively  small  garrison  can 
hold  the  fort  against  any  attack  by  Indians. 

Hoping  that  my  report  may  receive  the  particular  attention  of  the  colonel 
commanding,  I  respectfully  submit  the  same. 

Your  obedient  servant, 


E.  W.  WYNKOOP, 

Major  Com' g  1st  Colorado  Cavalry  and  Fort  Lyon. 


Lieutenant  J.  E.  Tap  pan, 

Act' g  Ass't  Adj't  General ,  District  of  Upper  Arkansas. 

Adjutant  General’s  Office,  March,  1865. 

Official ; 


9 

Assistant  Adjutant  General. 


Fort  Lyon,  Colorado  Territory, 

January  15,  1865. 

Personallyappeared  before  me  John  Smith,  United  States  Indian  interpreter, 
who,  after  being  duly  sworn,  says ; 

That  on  the  4th  day  of  September,  1864,  he  was  appointed  Indian  interpreter 
for  the  post  of  Fort  Lyon,  and  has  continued  to  serve  in  that  capacity  up  to  the 
present  date;  that  on  the  4th  day  of  September,  1864,  by  order  of  Major  E.  W. 
Wynkoop,  commanding  post  of  Fort  Lyon,  he  was  called  upon  to  hold  a  con¬ 
versation  with  three  Cheyenne  Indians,  viz:  One  Eye,  and  two  others,  who 
had  been  brought  in  to  the  post  that  day;  that  the  result  of  the  interview  was 
as  follows  :  One  Eye,  Cheyenne,  stated  that  the  principal  chiefs  and  sub¬ 
chiefs  of  the  Cheyenne  and  Arapahoe  nations  had  held  a  consultation  and 
agreed  to  a  man,  of  the  chiefs  and  sub-chiefs,  to  come  or  send  some  one  who  was 
well  acquainted  with  the  parties  at  the  post,  and  finally  agreed  to  send  himself, 
One  Eye,  with  a  paper  written  by  George  Bent,  half-breed,  to  the  effect 
that  they,  the  Cheyennes  and  Arapahoes,  had  and  did  agree  to  turn  over  to 
Major  E.  W.  Wynkoop,  or  any  other  military  authority,  all  the  white  prisoners 
they  had  in  their  possession,  as  they  were  all  anxious  to  make  peace  with  the 
whites,  and  never  desired  to  be  at  war.  Major  E.  W.  Wynkoop  then  asked 
One  Eye,  he  having  lived  among  whites,  and  known  to  have  always  been 
friendly  disposed  towards  them,  whether  he  thought  the  Indians  were  sincere, 
and  -whether  they  would  deliver  the  white  prisoners  into  his  (Major  Wynkoop’s) 
hands.  His  reply  was,  that  at  the  risk  of  his  life  he  would  guarantee  their  sin¬ 
cerity.  Major  Wynkoop  then  told  him  that  he  would  detain  him  as  a  prisoner 
for  the  time,  and  if  he  concluded  to  proceed  to  the  Indian  camp  he  would  take 
him  with  him  and  hold  him  as  a  hostage  for  their  (the  Indian’s)  good  faith. 

One  Eye  also  stated  that  the  Cheyenne  and  Arapahoe  nations  were  congre¬ 
gated,  to  the  number  of  two  thousand,  on  the  head- waters  of  the  Smoky  Hill, 
including  some  forty  lodges  of  Sioux;  that  they  had  rendezvoused  there,  and 
brought  in  their  war  parties  for  the  purpose  of  hearing  what  would  be  the  result 
of  their  message  by  which  they  had  sued  for  peace,  and  would  remain  until  they 
heard  something  definite.  Major  Wynkoop  told  One  Eye  that  he  would  pro- 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


85 


ceed  to  tlie  Indian  camp  and  take  him  with  him.  One  Eye  replied  that  he  was 
perfectly  willing  to  be  detained  a  prisoner,  as  well  as  to  remain  a  hostage  for  the 
good  faith  of  the  Indians,  but  desired  the  major  to  start  as  soon  as  possible,  for 
fear  the  Indians  might  separate. 

On  the  6th  day  of  September  I  was  ordered  to  proceed  with  Major  Wynkoop 
and  his  command  in  the  direction  of  the  Indian  encampment.  After  a  four  days’ 
march,  came  in  sight  of  the  Indians,  and  one  of  the  three  Indians  before  men¬ 
tioned  was  sent  to  acquaint  the  chiefs  with  whit  was  the  object  of  the 
expedition,  with  the  statement  that  Major  Wynkoop  desired  to  hold  a  con¬ 
sultation  with  the  chiefs.  On  the  10th  day  of  September,  1864,  the  consultation 
was  held  between  Major  Wynkoop  and  his  officers,  and  the  principal  chiefs  of 
the  Cheyenne  and  Arapahoe  nations.  Major  Wynkoop  stated  through  me, 
to  the  chiefs,  that  he  had  received  their  message;  that  acting  on  that,  he  had 
come  to  talk  with  them ;  asked  them  whether  they  all  agreed  to  and  indorsed 
the  contents  of  the  letter  which  he  had  in  his  possession,  and  which  had  been 
brought  in  by  One  Eye.  Receiving  an  answer  in  the  affirmative,  he  then  told 
the  chiefs  that  he  had  not  the  authority  to  conclude  terms  of  peace  with  them, 
but  that  he  desired  to  make  a  proposition  to  them  to  the  effect  that  if  they  would 
give  him  evidence  of  their  good  faith  hy  delivering  into  his  hands  the  white 
prisoners  they  had  in  their  possession,  he  would  endeavor  to  procure  for  them 
peace,  which  would  be  subject  to  conditions  that  he  would  take  with  him  what 
principal  chiefs  they  might  select,  and  conduct  them  in  safety  to  the  governor 
of  Colorado,  and  whatever  might  be  the  result  of  their  interview  with  him,  return 
them  in  safety  to  their  tribe. 

Black  Kettle,  the  head  chief  of  the  Cheyenne  nation,  replied  as  follows : 

That  the  Cheyenne  and  Arapahoe  nations  had  always  endeavored  to  observe 
the  terms  of  their  treaty  with  the  United  States  government;  that  some  years 
previously,  when  the  white  emigration  first  commenced  coming  to  what  is  now 
the  Territory  of  Colorado,  the  country  which  was  in  possession  of  the  Cheyenne 
and  Arapahoe  nations,  they  could  have  successfully  made  war  against  them, 
the  whites.  They  did  not  desire  to  do  so — had  invariably  treated  them  with 
kindness,  and  had  never,  to  their  knowledge,  committed  any  destruction  what¬ 
ever;  that  until  the  last  few  months  they  had  gotten  along  in  perfect  peace  and 
harmony  with  their  white  brethren,  but  while  a  hunting  party  of  their  young 
men  were  proceeding  north,  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  South  Platte  river,  hav¬ 
ing  found  some  loose  stock  belonging  to  white  men,  which  they  were  taking  to 
a  ranch  to  deliver  them  up,  they  were  suddenly  confronted  by  a  party  of  United 
States  soldiers  and  ordered  to  deliver  up  their  arms.  A  difficulty  immediately 
ensued,  which  resulted  in  the  killing  and  wounding  several  on  both  sides. 

A  short  time  after  this  occurrence  took  place,  a  village  of  pappooses,  squaws 
and  old  men,  located  on  what  is  known  as  the  Cedar  canon,  a  short  distance 
north  of  the  South  Platte  river,  who  were  perfectly  unaware  of  any  difficulty 
having  occurred  between  any  portion  of  their  tribe,  Cheyenne,  and  the  whites, 
were  attacked  by  a  large  party  of  soldiers,  and  some  of  them  killed  and  their 
ponies  driven  off.  After  this,  while  a  body  of  United  States  troops  were  pro¬ 
ceeding  from  the  Smoky  Hill  to  the  Arkansas  river,  they  reached  the  neighbor¬ 
hood  of  Sean  Bears’  band  of  the  Cheyenne  nation.  Sean  Bears’,  second 
chief  of  the  Cheyennes,  approached  the  column  of  troops  alone,  his  warriors  re¬ 
maining  off  some  distance,  he  not  dreaming  that  there  was  any  hostility  between 
his  nation  and  the.  whites.  He  was  immediately  shot  down,  and  fire  opened  upon 
his  band ;  the  result  of  which  was  a  fight  between  the  two  parties.  Presuming 
from  all  these  circumstances  that  war  was  inevitable,  the  young  men  of  the  Chey¬ 
enne  nation  commenced  to  retaliate  by  committing  various  depredations  all  the 
time,  which  he,  Black  Kettle,  and  other  principal  chiefs  of  the  Cheyenne 
nation,  was  opposed  to,  and  endeavored  by  all  means  in  their  power  to  restore 
pacific  relations  between  that  tribe  and  their  white  brethren,  but  at  various 


86 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS 


times,  when  endeavoring  to  approach  the  military  post  for  the  purpose  of  accom¬ 
plishing  the  same,  were  fired  upon  and  driven  off.  In  the  mean  time,  while  their 
brothers  and  allies,  the  Arapahoes,  were  on  perfectly  friendly  terms  with  the 
whites,  and  Left  Hand’s  band  of  that  nation  were  camped  in  close  vicinity 
to  Fort  Larned,  Left  Hand,  one  of  the  principal  chiefs  of  the  Arapahoe  na¬ 
tion,  learning  that  it  was  the  intention  of  the  Kiowas  on  a  certain  day  to 
drive  off  the  stock  from  Fort  Larned,  proceeded  to  the  commanding  officer  of 
that  post  and  informed  him  of  the  fact.  No  attention  was  paid  to  the  informa¬ 
tion  he  gave,  and  on  the  day  indicated  the  Kiowas  run  off  the  stock.  Left 
Hand  again  approached  the  post  with  a  portion  of  his  warriors,  for  the  pur¬ 
pose  of  offering  hi*  services  to  the  commanding  officer  there  to  pursue  and  en¬ 
deavor  to  regain  the  stock  from  the  Kiowa  Indians,  when  he  was  fired  upon 
and  was  obliged  hastily  to  leave. 

The  young  men  of  the  Arapahoe  nation,  supposing  it  was  the  intention  of  the 
whites  to  make  war  upon  them  as  well  as  the  Cheyennes,  also  commenced  retal¬ 
iating  as  they  were  able,  and  against  the  desire  of  most  of  their  principal  chiefs, 
who,  as  well  as  Black  Kettle  and  other  chiefs  of  the  Cheyennes,  were  bitterly 
opposed  to  hostility  with  the  whites. 

He  then  said  that  he  had  lately  heard  of  a  proclamation  issued  by  the  gov¬ 
ernor  of  Colorado,  inviting  all  friendly  disposed  Indians  to  come  in  to  the  differ¬ 
ent  military  posts,  and  that  they  would  be  protected  by  the  government.  Un¬ 
der  these  circumstances,  although  he  thought  the  whites  had  been  the  aggres¬ 
sors  and  forced  the  trouble  upon  the  Indians,  and  anxious  for  the  welfare  of  his 
people,  he  had  made  this  last  effort  to  communicate  again  with  the  military  au¬ 
thority,  and  he  was  glad  he  succeeded. 

He  then  arose,  shook  hands  with  Major  Wynkoop  and  his  officers,  stating 
that  he  was  still,  as  he  always  had  been,  a  friend  to  the  whites,  and,  as  far  as 
he  was  concerned,  he  was  willing  to  deliver  up  the  white  prisoners,  or  anything 
that  was  required  of  him,  to  procure  peace,  knowing  it  to  be  for  the  good  of  his 
people,  but  that  there  were  other  chiefs  who  still  thought  that  they  were  badly 
treated  by  the  “  white  brethren,”  who  were  willing  to  make  peace,  but  who  felt 
unwilling  to  deliver  up  the  prisoners  simply  on  the  promise  of  Major  Wynkoop 
that  he  would  endeavor  to  procure  them  peace.  They  desired  that  the  deliver¬ 
ing  up  the  white  prisoners  should  be  an  assurance  of  peace.  He  also  wrent  on 
to  state  that  even  if  Major  Wynkoop’s  proposition  was  not  accepted  there  by 
the  chiefs  assembled,  and  although  they  had  sufficient  force  to  entirely  over¬ 
power  Major  Wynkoop’s  small  command,  from  the  fact  that  he  had  come 
in  good  faith  to  hold  this  consultation,  he  should  return  unmolested  to  Fort 
Lyon. 

The  expressions  of  other  chiefs  were  to  the  effect  that  they  insisted  upon 
peace  as  the  conditions  of  their  delivering  up  the  white  prisoners. 

Major  Wynkoop  finally  replied  that  he  repeated  what  he  had  said  before, 
that  it  was  not  in  his  power  to  insure  them  peace,  and  that  all  he  had  to  say 
in  closing  was  that  they  might  think  about  his  proposition,  that  he  would  march 
to  a  certain  locality,  distant  twelve  miles,  and  there  await  the  result  of  their 
consultation  for  two  days,  advising  them  at  the  same  time  to  accede  to  his  pro¬ 
position  as  the  best  means  of  procuring  that  peace  for  which  they  were  anxious. 

Thg  white  prisoners  were  brought  in  and  turned  over  to  Major  Wynkoop 
before  the  time  had  expired  set  by  him,  and  Black  Kettle,  White  Antelope,  and 
Bull  Bear,  of  the  Cheyenne  nation,  as  well  as  Nevah  Nattanee,  Borcu,  and  Heap 
Buffalo,  of  the  Arapahoe  nation,  all  chiefs,  delivered  themselves  over  to 
Major  Wynkoop.  We  then  proceeded  to  Fort  Lyon,  and  from  there  to  Denver, 
Colorado  Territory,  at  which  place  Governor  Evans  held  a  consultation  with 
these  chiefs,  the  result  of  which  was  as  follows  : 

He  told  them  he  had  nothing  to  do  with  them;  that  they  would  return  with 
Major  Wynkoop,  who  would  reconduct  them  in  safety,  and  they  would  have  to 


87 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 

0 

await  the  action  of  military  authorities.  Colonel  Chivington,  then  in  command 
of  the  district,  also  told  them  that  they  would  remain  at  the  disposal  of  Major 
Wynkoop  until  higher  authority  had  acted  in  their  case.  The  Indians  appeared 
to  be  perfectly  satisfied,  presuming  that  they  would  eventually  be  all  right  as 
soon  as  these  authorities  could  be  heard  from,  and  expressed  themselves  so. 
Black  Kettle  embraced  the  governor  and  Major  Wynkoop,  and  shook  hands 
with  all  the  other  officials  present,  perfectly  contented,  deeming  that  the  matter 
was  settled.  On  our  return  to  Fort  Lyon  I  was  told  by  Major  Wynkoop  to  say 
to  the  chiefs  that  they  could  bring  their  different  bands,  including  their  families, 
to  the  vicinity  of  the  post  until  he  had  heard  from  the  big  chief;  that  he  pre¬ 
ferred  to  have  them  under  his  eye  and  away  from  other  quarters,  where  they 
were  likely  to  get  into  difficulties  with  the  whites. 

The  chiefs  replied  that  they  were  willing  to  do  anything  Major  Wynkoop 
might  choose  to  dictate,  as  they  had  perfect  confidence  in  him.  Accordingly, 
the  chiefs  went  after  their  families  and  villages  and  brought  them  in  ;  they  ap¬ 
peared  satisfied  that  they  were  in  perfect  security  and  safety  after  their  villages 
were  located,  and  Major  Wynkoop  had  sent  an  officer  to  headquarters  for  in¬ 
structions.  He,  Major  Wynkoop,  was  relieved  from  command  of  the  post  by 
Major  Scott  J.  Anthony,  and  I  was  ordered  to  interpret  for  him,  Major 
Anthony,  in  a  consultation  he  desired  to  hold  with  these  Indians.  The  con¬ 
sultation  that  then  took  place  between  Major  Anthony  and  these  Indians  was 
as  follows  : 

Major  Anthony  told  them  that  he  had  been  sent  here  to  relieve  Major  Wyn¬ 
koop,  and  that  he  would  from  that  time  be  in  command  of  this  post ;  that  he 
had  come  here  under  ordeis  from  the  commanders  of  all  the  troops  in  this 
country,  and  that  he  had  orders  to  have  nothing  to  do  with  Indians  whatever, 
for  they  heard  at  headquarters  that  the  Indians  had  lately  been  committing 
depredations,  &c.,  in  the  very  neighborhood  of  this  post,  but  that  since  his 
arrival  he  had  learned  that  these  reports  were  all  false ;  that  he  would  write  to 
headquarters  himself  and  correct  the  rumor  in  regard  to  them,  and  that  he 
would  have  no  objection  to  their  remaining  in  the  vicinity  of  Sand  creek,  where 
they  were  then  located,  until  such  a  time  as  word  might  be  received  from  the 
commander  of  the  department ;  that  he  himself  would  forward  a  complete  state¬ 
ment  of  all  that  he  had  seen  or  heard  in  regard  to  them,  and  that  he  was  in 
hopes  that  he  would  have  some  good  news  for  the  Indians  upon  receiving  an 
answer,  but  that  he  was  sorry  that  his  orders  were  such  as  to  render  it  im¬ 
possible  for  him  to  make  them  any  issues  whatever. 

The  Indians  then  replied  that  it  would  be  impossible  for  them  to  remain  any 
great  length  of  time,  as  they  were  short  of  provisions.  Major  Anthony  then 
told  them  that  they  could  let  their  villages  remain  where  they  were  and  send 
their  young  men  out  to  hunt  buffalo,  as  he  understood  that  the  buffaloes  had 
lately  come  close  in.  The  Indians  appeared  to  be  a  little  dissatisfied  with  the 
change  in  the  commanders  of  the  post,  fearing  that  it  boded  them  no  good  ;  but 
having  received  assurances  of  safety  from  Major  Anthony,  they  still  had  no  fears 
of  their  families  being  disturbed. 

On  the  26th  of  November  I  received  permission  from  Major  Scott  J.  Anthony, 
commanding  post,  to  proceed  to  the  Indian  village  on  Sand  creek  for  the  purpose 
of  trading  with  the  Indians,  and  started,  accompanied  by  a  soldier  named  David 
Louderback,  and  a  citizen,  Watson  Clark.  I  reached  the  village  and  commenced 
to  trade  with  them.  On  the  morning  of  the  29th  of  November  the  village  was 
attacked  by  Colonel  J.  M.  Chivington  with  a  command  of  from  nine  hundred  to 
one  thousand  men.  The  Indian  village  numbered  about  one  hundred  lodges, 
counting  altogether  five  hundred  souls,  two-thirds  of  whom  were  women  and 
children.  From  my  observation,  I  do  not  think  there  were  over  sixty  Indians 


/ 


88 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 

& 

that  made  any  defence.  I  rode  over  the  field  after  the  slaughter  was  over  and 
counted  from  sixty  to  seventy  dead  bodies,  a  large  majority  of  which  were 
women  and  children,  all  of  whose  bodies  had  been  mutilated  in  the  most  horrible 
manner.  When  the  troops  first  approached,  I  endeavored  to  join  them,  but  was 
repeatedly  fired  upon,  as  also  the  soldier  and  the  citizen  with  me. 

When  the  troops  began  approaching,  I  saw  Black  Kettle,  the  head  chief, 
•  hoist  the  American  flag  over  his  lodge,  as  well  as  a  white  flag,  fearing  there 
might  be  some  mistake  as  to  who  they  were.  After  the  fight  Colonel  Chiving- 
ton  returned  with  his  command  in  the  direction  of  Fort  Lyon,  and  then  pro¬ 
ceeded  down  the  Arkansas  river. 

JOHN  S.  SMITH, 

U.  S.  Interpreter. 


Sworn  and  subscribed  to  at  Fort  Lyon,  Colorado  Territory,  this  27th  day  of 
January,  1865. 

W.  P.  MINTON, 

Second  Lieut.  1st  New  Mexico  Vols.,  Post  Adjutant. 


Official : 


Adjutant  General’s  Office, 

March  — ,  1865. 

4 

- ,  A.  A.  G. 


Fort  Lyon,  Colorado  Territory, 

January  16, 1865. 

Personally  appeared  before  me  Lieutenant  James  D.  Cannan,  1st  New 
Mexico  volunteer  infantry,  who,  after  being  duly  sworn,  says : 

That  on  the  28th  day  of  November,  1864,  I  was  ordered  by  Major  Scott  J. 
Anthony  to  accompany  him  on  an  Indian  expedition  as  his  battalion  adjutant. 
The  object  of  that  expedition  was  to  be  a  thorough  campaign  against  hostile  In¬ 
dians,  as  I  was  led  to  understand.  I  referred  to  the  fact  of  there  being  a  friendly 
camp  of  Indians  in  the  immediate  neighborhood,  and  remonstrated  against 
simply  attacking  that  camp,  as  I  was  aware  that  they  were  resting  there  in 
fancied  security,  under  promises  held  out  to  them  of  safety  from  Major  G.  W. 
Wynkoop,  from  commander  of  the  post  of  Fort  Lyon,  as  well  as  by  Major  S.  J. 
Anthony,  then  in  command.  Our  battalion  was  attached  to  the  command  of 
Colonel  J.  M.  Chivington,  and  left  Fort  Lyon  on  the  night  of  the  28th  of  No¬ 
vember,  1864.  About  daybreak  on  the  morning  of  the  29th  of  November  we 
came  in  sight  of  the  camp  of  the  friendly  Indians  aforementioned,  and  was  or¬ 
dered  by  Colonel  Chivington  to  attack  the  same,  which  was  accordingly  done. 
The  command  of  Colonel  Chivington  was  composed  of  about  one  thousand 
men.  The  village  of  the  Indians  consisted  of  from  one  hundred  to  one  hun¬ 
dred  and  thirty  lodges,  and,  as  far  as  I  am  able  to  judge,  of  from  five  hundred 
to  six  hundred  souls,  the  majority  of  whom  were  women  and  children. 

In  going  over  the  battle-ground  the  next  day,  I  did  not  see  a  body  of  man, 
woman,  or  child  but  was  scalped;  and  in  many  instances  their  bodies  were 
mutilated  in  the  most  horrible  manner,  men,  women,  and  children — privates 
cut  out,  &c.  I  heard  one  man  say  that  he  had  cut  a  woman’s  private  parts 
out,  and  had  them  for  exhibition  on  a  stick ;  I  heard  another  man  say  that  he 
had  cut  the  fingers  off  of  an  Indian  to  get  the  rings  on  the  hand.  According 
to  the  best  of  my  knowledge  and  belief,  these  atrocities  that  were  committed 
were  with  the  knowledge  of  J.  M.  Chivington,  and  I  do  not  know  of  his  tak¬ 
ing  any  measures  to  prevent  them.  I  heard  of  one  instance  of  a  child  a  few 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


SO 


months  old  being  thrown  in  the  feed-box  of  a  wagon,  and  after  being  carried 
some  distance,  left  on  the  ground  to  perish.  I  also  heard  of  numerous  instances 
in  which  men  had  cut  out  the  private  parts  of  females,  and  stretched  them  over 
the  saddle-bows,  and  wore  them  over  their  hats,  while  riding  in  the  ranks.  All 
these  matters  were  a  subject  of  general  conversation,  and  could  not  help  being 
known  by  Colonel  J.  M.  Chivington. 

JAMES  D.  CANNAN, 

First  Lieutenant  Infantry ,  New  Mexico  Volunteers. 


Sworn  and  subscribed  to  before  me  this  27th  day  of  January,  1865,  at  Fort 
Lyon,  Colorado  Territory. 


W.  P.  MINTON, 


Second  Lieut.,  1st  New  Mexico  Vols.,  Post  Adjutant. 


Deposition  of  Lieutenant  Canaan,  1st  New  Mexico  Volunteers. 

Was  ordered  by  Major  Anthony  to  accompany  him  as  his  adjutant  on  an 
Indian  expedition — object,  thorough  campaign.  States  that  he  referred  to  the 
camp  of  friendly  Indians,  and  remonstrated  against  attacking  that  camp. 

About  daybreak,  November  29,  Colonel  Chivington  ordered  the  attack;  gives 
particulars  of  the  barbarities  of  our  men,  cutting  out  privates, 

Adjutant  General’s  Office,  March.  — ,  1865. 

Official : 


Assistant  Adjutant  General. 


Fort  Lyon,  Colorado  Territory, 

January  16,  1865. 

Personally  appeared  before  me  Captain  R.  A.  Hill,  1st  New  Mexico  volunteer 
infantry,  who,  after  being  duly  sworn,  says : 

That,  as  an  officer  in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  he  was  on  duty  at 
Fort  Lyon,  Colorado  Territory;  at  the  time  there  was  an  understanding  between 
the  chiefs  of  the  Arapahoe  and  Cheyenne  nations  and  Major  E.  W.  Wynkoop 
with  regard  to  their  resting  in  safety  with  their  villages  in  the  vicinity  of  Fort 
Lyon  until  such  time  as  orders  in  regard  to  them  could  be  received  from  the 
commanding  general  of  the  department;  that  after  Major  Wynkoop  being  re¬ 
lieved  from  the  command  of  Fort  Lyon,  Colorado  Territory,  the  same  under¬ 
standing  existed  between  Major  Scott  J.  Anthony  and  the  aforesaid  Indians; 
that,  to  the  best  of  his  knowledge  and  belief,  the  village  of  Indians  massacred 
by  Colonel  J.  M.  Chivington  on  the  29th  day  of  November,  1864,  were  the  same 
friendly  Indians  heretofore  referred  to. 

R.  A.  HILL, 

Captain  1st  Infantry,  New  Mexico  Volunteers . 

Sworn  and  subscribed  to  before  me  this  27th  day  of  January,  1865. 

W.  P.  MINTON, 

Second  Lieut.  1st  Infantry,  New  Mexico  Vols.  Post  Adjutant. 


90 


MASSACRE  OP  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Deposition  of  Captain  R.  A.  Hill ,  1st  N civ  Mexico  infantry. 

Was  on  duty  at  Fort  Lyon  at  time  these  Indians  were  camping  near  said  fort; 
that  they  were  then,  by  permission  of  Major  Wynkoop  and  Major  Anthony, 
waiting  until  instructions  could  be  received  from  headquarters  how  to  act  in 
their  case. 

To  the  best  of  his  knowledge,  these  Indians  were  the  same  massacred  by 
Colonel  Chivington  November  29. 

Adjutant  General’s  Office,  March  — ,  I860. 

Official : 


Assistant  Adjutant  General 


Fort  Lyon,  Colorado  Territory, 

January  27,  1865. 

Personally  appeared  before  me  Second  Lieutenant  W.P.  Minton,  first  regiment, 
New  Mexico  infantry  volunteers,  and  Lieutenant  C.  M.  Cossitt,  first  cavalry  of 
Colorado,  who,  after  being  duly  sworn,  say : 

That  on  the  28th  day  of  November,  1864,  Colonel  J.  M.  Chivington,  with  the 
third  regiment  of  Colorado  cavalry  (one-hundred-days  men)  and  a  battalion  of 
the  first  cavalry  of  Colorado,  arrived  at  this  post,  and  on  the  29th  of  November 
attacked  a  village  of  friendly  Indians  in  this  vicinity,  and,  according  to  representa¬ 
tions  made  by  others  in  our  presence,  murdered  their  women  and  children,  and 
committed  the  most  horrible  outrages  upon  the  dead  bodies  of  the  same ;  that 
the  aforesaid  Indians  were  recognized  as  friendly  by  all  parties  at  this  post, 
under  the  following  circumstances,  viz : 

That  Major  E.  W.  Wynkoop,  formerly  commander  of  the  post,  had  given 
them  assurances  of  safety  until  such  time  as  he  could  hear  from  the  command¬ 
ing  general  of  the  department  in  consequence  of  their  having  sued  for  peace, 
and  given  every  evidence  of  their  sincerity  by  delivering  up  the  white  prisoners 
they  had  in  their  possession,  by  congregating  their  families  together  and  leaving 
them  at  the  mercy  of  the  garrison  of  Fort  Lyon,  who  could  have  massacred 
them  at  any  moment  they  felt  so  disposed ;  that  upon  Major  Wynkoop  being 
relieved  from  the  command  of  Fort  Lyon  and  Major  Scott  J.  Anthony  assuming 
command  of  the  same,  it  was  still  the  understanding  between  Major  Anthony 
and  the  Indians  that  they  could  rest  in  the  security  guaranteed  them  by  Major 
Wynkoop. 

Also,  that  Colonel  J.  M.  Chivington,  on  his  arrival  at  the  post  of  Fort  Lyon, 
was  aware  of  the  circumstances  in  regard  to  these  Indians,  from  the  fact  that 
different  officers  remonstrated  with  him,  and  stated  to  him  how  these  Indians 
were  looked  upon  by  the  entire  garrison;  that,  notwithstanding  these  re¬ 
monstrances,  and  in  the  face  of  all  these  facts,  lie  committed  the  massacre 
aforementioned. 

W.  P.  MINTON, 

Second  Lieut.  1st  Infantry ,  New  Mexico  Volunteers. 

C.  M.  COSSITT, 

First  Lieutenant  1st  Cavalry  of  Colorado. 

Sworn  and  subscribed  to  before  me  this  27th  day  of  January,  1865. 

W.  W.  DENISON, 

Second  Lieutenant  1st  Colorado  Veteran  Cavalry , 

Acting  Regimental  Adjutant. 

• 

Adjutant  General’s  Office,  March  — ,  1865- 


Assistant  Adjutant  General. 


Official : 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


91 


Fort  Lyon,  Colorado,  January  27,  1865. 

Personally  appeared  before  me  Samuel  G.  Colley,  who,  being  duly  sworn,  on 
oath  deposes  and  says : 

That  he  is  now,  and  has  been  for  the  past  three  years,  United  States  agent 
for  the  Arapahoe  and  Cheyenne  Indians. 

That  in  the  month  of  June  last  he  received  instructions  from  Hon.  John 
Evans,  governor  and  ex-officio  superintendent  Indian  affairs  for  Colorado  Terri¬ 
tory,  directing  him  to  send  out  persons  into  the  Indian  country  to  distribute 
printed  proclamations,  (which  he  was  furnished  with,)  inviting  all  friendly  In¬ 
dians  to  come  in  to  the  different  places  designated  in  said  proclamation,  and 
they  would  be  protected  and  fed.  That  he  caused  the  terms  of  said  proclama¬ 
tion  to  be  widely  disseminated  among  the  different  tribes  of  Indians  under  his 
charge,  and  that  in  accordance  therewith  a  large  number  of  Arapalioes  and 
Cheyennes  came  into  this  post,  and  provisions  were  issued  to  them  by  Major  E. 
W.  Wynkoop,  commanding,  and  myself. 

That  on  the  4th  day  of  September  last  two  Cheyenne  Indians  (One  Eye  and 
Mauimick)  came  into  this  post  with  information  that  the  Arapalioes  and  Chey¬ 
ennes  had  several  white  prisoners  among  them  that  they  had  purchased,  and 
were  desirous  of  giving  them  up  and  making  peace  with  the  whites. 

That  on  the  6th  day  of  September  following  Major  E.  W.  Wynkoop  left  this 
post  with  a  detachment  of  troops  to  rescue  said  prisoners,  and  that  after  an  absence 
of  several  days  he  returned,  bringing  with  him  four  white  prisoners  which  he 
received  from  the  Arapahoe  and  Cheyenne  Indians.  He  was  accompanied  on 
his  return  by  a  number  of  the  most  influential  men  of  both  tribes,  who  were 
unanimously  opposed  to  war  with  the  whites,  and  desired  peace  at  almost  any 
terms  that  the  whites  might  dictate. 

That  immediately  upon  the  arrival  of  Major  Wynkoop  at  this  post  large 
numbers  of  Arapalioes  and  Cheyennes  came  in  and  camped  near  the  post. 

Major  Wynkoop  selected  several  of  the  most  prominent  chiefs  of  both  na¬ 
tions  and  proceeded  to  Denver  to  council  with  Superintendent  Evans ;  after  his 
return  he  held  frequent  councils  with  the  Indians,  and  at  all  of  them  distinctly  - 
stated  that  he  was  not  empowered  to  treat  with  them,  but  that  he  had  de¬ 
spatched  a  messenger  to  the  headquarters  of  the  department,  stating  their 
wishes  in  the  matter,  and  that  as  soon  as  he  received  advices  from  there  he 
would  inform  them  of  the  decision  of  General  Curtis  respecting  them. 

That  until  that  time,  if  they  placed  themselves  under  his  protection,  they 
should  not  be  molested.  That  the  Indians  remained  quietly  near  the  post  until 
the  arrival  of  Major  Anthony,  who  relieved  Major  Wynkoop. 

Major  Anthony  held  a  council  with  the  Indians,  and  informed  them  that  he 
was  instructed  not  to  allow  any  Indians  in  or  near  the  post,  but  that  he  had 
found  matters  here  much  better  than  he  had  expected,  and  advised  them  to  go 
out  and  camp  on  Sand  creek  until  he  could  hear  from  General  Curtis.  He 
wished  them  to  keep  him  fully  advised  of  all  the  movements  of  the  Sioux, 
which  they  promptly  did. 

He  also  promised  them  that  as  soon  as  he  heard  from  General  Curtis  he 
would  advise  them  of  his  decision. 

From  the  time  that  Major  Wynkoop  left  this  post  to  go  out  to  rescue  the 
white  prisoners  until  the  arrival  of  Colonel  Chivington  here,  which  took  place 
on  the  28th  of  November  last,  no  depredations  of  any  kind  had  been  committed 
by  the  Indians  within  two  hundred  miles  of  this  post. 

That  upon  Colonel  Chivington’s  arrival  here  with  a  large  body  of  troops  he 
was  informed  where  these  Indians  were  encamped,  and  was  fully  advised  under 
what  circumstances  they  had  come  in  to  this  post,  and  why  they  were  then  on 
Sand  creek.  That  he  was  remonstrated  with  both  by  officer^  and  civilians  at 


92 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


tliis  post  against  making  war  upon  those  Indians.  That  he  was  informed  and 
fully  advised  that  there  was  a  large  number  of  friendly  Indians  there,  together 
with  several  white  men  who  were  there  at  the  request  of  himself  (Oolley)  and 
by  permission  of  Major  Anthony.  That  notwithstanding  his  knowledge  of  the 
facts  as  above  set  forth,  he  is  informed  that  Colonel  Chivington  did,  on  the 
morning  of  the  29th  of  November  last,  surprise  and  attack  said  camp  of  friendly 
Indians,  and  massacre  a  large  number  of  them,  (mostly  women  and  children,) 
and  did  allow  the  troops  under  his  command  to  mangle  and  mutilate  them  in 
the  most  horrible  manner. 

S.  G.  COLLEY, 

United  States  Indian  Agent. 


Sworn  and  subscribed  to  before  me  this  28th  day  of  January,  1865,  at  Fort 
Lyon,  Colorado  Territory. 

W.  P.  MINTON, 

Second  Lieut.  1st  Infantry ,  New  Mexico  Vols.,  Post  Adjutant. 


Headquarters  Department  of  the  Missouri, 

St.  Louis , -  — ,  186 — . 

Deposition  of  Samuel  G.  Colley,  United  States  agent  for  the  Arapahoe  and 
Cheyenne  Indians,  says  that  in  June  last,  obedient  to  instructions  from  Governor 
Evans,  Colorado  Territory,  he  distributed  printed  proclamations  through  the  In¬ 
dian  country,  inviting  all  friendly  Indians  to  come  to  the  different  places  desig¬ 
nated  in  said  proclamation.  That  the  Indians  in  question  came  to  Fort  Lyon; 
provisions  were  issued  to  them  by  Major  Wynkoop.  That  two  of  the  chiefs  re¬ 
ported  they  had  several  white  prisoners  which  they  purchased,  and  which  they 
wished  to  give  up.  That  Major  Wynkoop,  on  the  6th  of  September,  went  an$. 
rescued  the  prisoners.  On  his  return,  was  accompanied  by  influential  men  of 
both  tribes  unanimously  for  peace  at  any  terms  almost  the  whites  might  dictate.. 
Major  Wynkoop  proceeded  with  the  chiefs  to  council  with  Governor  Evans. 
Major  Wynkoop  repeatedly  stated  that  he  had  not  the  power  to  treat  with  them, 
but  was  waiting  instructions  from  General  Curtis,  and  until  that  time  he  would 
protect  them.  These  Indians  kept  the  commander  of  the  post  fully  advised  of 
the  movements  of  the  Sioux.  No  depredations  were  committed  within  two 
hundred  miles  of  the  post  while  these  Indians  were  in  the  vicinity  of  the  post. 

Upon  Colonel  Chivington’s  arrival  he  was  informed  where  the  Indians  were 
and  advised  of  the  circumstances  that  brought  them.  He  was  remonstrated 
with  by  officers  and  civilians  against  making  war.  Notwithstanding  Colonel 
Chivington’s  knowledge  of  these  facts,  on  the  29th  November  he  surprised 
ana  attacked  said  camp  of  friendly  Indians,  killed  a  large  number,  mostly 
women,  and  allowed  his  troops  to  mangle  and  mutilate  bodies. 


Deposition  of  Lieutenants  Minton  and  Cossitt. 

Colonel  Chivington,  with  3d  Colorado  cavalry  and  battalion  of  1st  Colorado 
cavalry,  attacked,  on  the  29th  November,  a  village  of  friendly  Indians,  and, 
according  to  representation,  murdered  women  and  children  in  horrible  manner. 
Indians  were  recognized  friendly.  They  were  there  and  on  assurance  from 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


93 


Maj  or  Wynkoop  of  safety.  Indians  earned  the  friendship  by  giving  up  white 
prisoners.  Colonel  Chivington  was  acquainted  with  circumstances,  and  was 
remonstrated  with  against,  &c. 

Adjutant  General’s  Office,  March  — ,*  1865. 

Official : 


Assistant  Adjutant  General. 


Fort  Lyon,  Colorado  Territory, 

January  27,  1865. 

Personally  appeared  before  me  Private  David  Louderback,  1st  cavalry  of 
Colorado,  and  R.  W.  Clark,  citizen,  who,  after  being  duly  sworn,  say  : 

That  they  accompanied  John  Smith,  United  States  Indian  interpreter,  on 
the  26th  day  of  November,  1864,  by  permission  of  Major  Scott  J.  Anthony, 
commanding  post  of  Fort  Lyon,  Colorado  Territory,  to  the  village  of  the 
friendly  Cheyenne  and  Arapahoe  Indians,  on  Sand  creek,  close  to  Fort  Lyon, 
Colorado  Territory,  he,  John  Smith,  having  received  permission,  to  trade 
with  the  aforesaid  friendly  Indians ;  that  on  the  morning  of  the  29th  day  of 
November,  1864,  the  said  Indian  village  was  attacked,  while  deponents  were 
in  the  same,  by  Colonel  J.  M.  Chivington,  with  a  command  of  about  1,000 
men  ;  that,  according  to  their  best  knowledge  and  belief,  the  entire  Indian  vil¬ 
lage  was  composed  of  not  more  than  500  souls,  two-thirds  of  which  were 
women  and  children ;  that  the  dead  bodies  of  women  and  children  were  after¬ 
wards  mutilated  in  the  most  horrible  manner  ;  thatf  it  was  the  understanding 
of  the  deponents,  and  the  general  understanding  of  the  garrison  of  Fort  Lyon, 
that  this  village  were  friendly  Indians ;  that  they  had  been  allowed  to  remain 
in  the  locality  they  were  then  in  by  permission  of  Major  Wynkoop,  former 
commander  of  the  post,  and  by  Major  Anthony,  then  in  command,  as  well  as 
from  the  fact  that  permission  had  been  given  John  Smith  and  the  deponents  to 
visit  the  said  camp  for  the  purpose  of  trading. 

R.  W.  CLARK, 

DAVID  H.  LOUDERBACK. 

Sworn  and  subscribed  to  before  me  this  27th  day  of  January,  1865. 

W.  P.  MINTON, 

Second  Lieut.  New  Mexico  Vols.,  Post  Adjutant. 

Deposition  of  David  Louderback ,  1st  Colorado  cavalry ,  and  R.  W.  Clark , 

citizen. 

They  were  in  camp  of  Indians  with  John  Smith,  interpreter,  who  had  per¬ 
mission  to  trade  with  the  Indians.  On  the  morning  of  29th  November  camp 
was  attacked  by  Colonel  Chivington’s  command  of  1,000  men,  while  they  were 
in  camp ;  dead  bodies  of  women  and  children  were  horribly  mutilated  ;  that  it 
was  their  understanding,  and  general  understanding  of  garrison  Fort  Lyon, 
that  these  Indians  were  friendly ;  that  they  were  allowed  to  remain  there  by 
Major  Wynkoop  and.  Major  Anthony. 

Adjutant  General’s  Office,  March  — ,  1865. 

Official : 


Assistant  Adjutant  General . 


94 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


War  Department,  February  14,  1865. 

Resolutions  of  Kansas  legislature,  requesting  the  Secretary  of  War  to  place 
a  sufficient  force  under  General  Curtis  to  enable  him  to  protect  the  Kansas 
frontier  and  the  overland  and  Santa  Fe  routes. 

Referred  to  General  Halleck,  chief  of  staff,  February  14,  1865. 

Copy  sent  to  General  Grant  some  days  ago. 

H.  W.  HALLECK, 

Major  General ,  and  * Chief  of  Staff. 


Official  : 


Headquarters  of  the  Army, 

March  18,  1865. 


J.  C.  KELTON,  Colonel,  A.  A.  G. 


CONCURRENT  RESOLUTIONS  in  relation  to  the  overland  travel  and  the  settlers  upon 

the  frontier. 

Whereas  the  Indian  massacres  which  occurred  upon  the  border  of  our  State 
during  the  summer  and  fall  of  1864,  and  which  are  now  being  re-enacted  by 
the  hostile  tribes  of  Indians  upon  the  overland  route  to  California,  Nevada,  and 
New  Mexico,  and  the  Territories  of  Colorado  and  Idaho,  interfere  and  retard 
the  settlement  and  development  of  the  mineral  resources  of  these  Territories, 
and  interrupt  the  overland  communication  to  and  from  the  Pacific  and  the 
Territories  of  Colorado  and  Idaho;  and  whereas  the  military  force  on  said  route 
i3  entirely  inadequate  and  insufficient  to  chastise  the  hostile  tribes  of  Indians, 
and  to  keep  them  from  committing  their  murderous  attacks  upon  emigrants  to 
those  Territories  and  Pacific  States,  and  to  keep  the  line  of  communication 
open  from  the  Missouri  river,  in  the  State  of  Kansas,  to  said  States  of  Cali¬ 
fornia  and  Nevada,  and  Territories  of  Colorado  and  Idaho  and  New  Mexico; 
and  whereas  it  is  necessary  to  the  settlement  of  the  northern  and  western  por¬ 
tion  of  our  State  that  the  hostile  tribes  of  Indians  be  prevented,  if  possible, 
from  committing  their  murderous  attacks  upon  our  frontier  settlers  and  the 
overland  mail :  Therefore 

Be  it  resolved  by  the  house  of  representatives  of  the  State  of  Kansas,  (the 
senate  concurring  therein,)  That  the  Secretary  of  War  be,  and  he  is  hereby, 
requested  to  place  a  sufficient  military  force  in  the  hands  of  Major  General 
Curtis,  commanding  this  department,  to  enable  him  to  give  sufficient  and  ample 
protection  to  the  frontier  of  Kansas  and  the  overland  and  Santa  Fe  routes. 

Resolved,  That  the  secretary  of  state  be  instructed  to  forward  copies  of  this 
preamble  and  resolution  to  the  Secretary  of  War  and  our  senators  and  rep¬ 
resentatives  in  Congress. 

Passed  by  both  liou*ses. 

D.  M.  EMMERT,  Chief  Clerk. 


I,  R.  A.  Barker,  secretary  of  state,  do  hereby  certify  that  the  above  is  a  true 
mid  correct  copy  of  a  concurrent  resolution,  the  original  of  which  is  on  file  in 
my  office. 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


95 


In  testimony  whereof,  I  have  set  my  hand  and  affixed  the  official  seal  of  my 
office  this  21st  day  of  January,  A.  D.  1865. 

R.  A.  BARKER, 

Secretary  of  State. 


Official  copy : 


Headquarters  of  the  Army,  March  18,  1865. 

J.  0.  KELTON, 

Colonel  and  Assistant  Adjutant  General. 


Headquarters  District  of  Colorado, 

Denver,  February  13,  1865. 

General  :  The  condition  of  military  affairs  in  this  Territory  for  the  last 
three  months  has  caused  quite  a  stir  at  home,  and  a  very  great  commotion 
abroad,  and  justly  so.  To  enable  you  to  properly  appreciate  the  wants  and 
necessities  of  this  people,  so  as  to  apply  a  remedy;  to  arrive  at  a  desirable  con¬ 
clusion  as  to  the  cause  of  existing  hostilities  on  the  part  of  the  Indians ;  to 
define  my  position  as  district  commander,  and  to  lay  before  you  the  many  diffi¬ 
culties  and  embarrassments  which  I  have  had  to  contend  against  since  assuming 
command,  as  well  as  to  inform  you  of  the  steps  taken,  and  the  means  provided 
for  carrying  out  the  behests  of  the  government  and  protection  of  this  Territory, 
I  deem  it  my  dut y,  first  duty,  to  give  you  a  concise  history  of  events  which 
may  be  relied  upon  for  present  information  and  future  guidance.  Had  I  been 
possessed  of  certain  facts  from  reliable  sources  when  1  assumed  command  of  this 
district,  on  the  4th  of  January,  but  a  little  over  a  month  ago,  it  might  have 
been  possible  to  arrange  matters  so  as  to  have  fended  off  part,  at  least,  of  the 
present  troubles,  which  will  have  (if  not,  indeed,  already)  one  good  effect,  viz: 
to  change  the  policy  of  the  government  respecting  the  treatment  of  the  Indians 
on  the  plains.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  origin  of  the  present  difficulties, 
whether  the  white  men  or  the  red  were  the  aggressors,  matters  not  now.  We 
are  in  every  respect  the  superior  of  the  Indians,  and  can  afford  to  wage  a  war 
of  their  own  choosing,  even  to  extermination. 

When  I  assumed  command  of  this  district  there  were  but  about  two  hun¬ 
dred  (200)  men  all  told,  and  they  were  scattered  over  an  area  of  three  hundred 
(300)  miles,  and  yet  with  this  command,  I  was  expected  to  protect  the  route 
from  Denver  to  Julesburg,  a  distance  of  one  hundred  and  ninety  (190)  miles, 
while  only  forty  (40)  of  the  two  hundred  (200)  soldiers  were  on  that  line, 
stationed  forty  (10)  miles  from  Denver.  The  balance  were  on  the  Arkansas 
river  and  at  Fort  Garland.  My  district  extends  about  sixty  (60)  miles  on  the 
overland  route  from  Denver,  and  yet  I  am  called  upon  to  protect  as  far  as 
Julesburg,  in  the  northeast  corner  of  Colorado  Territory,  with  no  troops  at 
my  command,  while  on  the  north  there  are  plenty,  as  also  from  Julesburg  to 
Kearney,  which,  in  my  opinion,  from  what  I  have  seen  of  them,  and  heard  from 
reliable  sources,  had  better  be  sent  to  some  new  field  of  operations.  I  have 
special  reference  to  the  stations  from  Kearney  to  Julesburg.  I  cannot  say  who 
is  to  blame  for  this,  but  it  is  not  the  less  true.  I  see  every  reason  why  the 
district  of  Colorado  should  embrace  the  Territory,  and  none  for  it  being  as  it  now 
stands  defined.  Fort  Lyon  was  not  in  my  command  when  I  arrived  here,  and 
has  but  lately  been  added,  which  gives  me  about  two  hundred  and  fifty  (250) 
more  effective  men  in  the  district,  but  not  for  operations  on  the  overland  route, 
as  they  are  needed  in  the  southern  portion  of  the  Territory  to  protect  the  Santa 
Fe  route. 

About  the  end  of  December,  1864,  the  3d  regiment  Colorado  cavalry  (one- 


96 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


hundred-days  men)  were  mustered  out  of  the  service,  thus  denuding  the  district  of 
troops,  and  at  a  time,  too,  when  the  Indians  had  suffered  an  overwhelming  defeat, 
m-  or  been  subjected  to  a  wholesale  massacre  at  the  hands  of  Colonel  Chivington, 
then  commanding  district;  (I  give  you  these  distinctions,  as  the  people  here 
are  divided  on  the  question;)  at  a  time  when  the  Indians  were  burning  for  revenge 
on  the  white  men,  women,  and  children,  in  retaliation  for  the  killed  by  Colonel 
Chivington,  commanding,  for  it  is  useless  to  deny  this  fact;  at  a  time  when  the 
severity  of  the  winter  prevented  the  making  of  a  campaign  with  any  hope  of 
success  on  our  side,  even  had  the  troops  been  at  my  command.  In  view  of  these 
facts,  and  knowing,  as  he  did,  that  the  Territory  would  be  exposed  to  Indian 
assaults  and  depredations,  while  denuded  of  troops,  I  question  much  the  policy 
and  propriety  of  the  Sand  creek  battle  fought  by  Colonel  Chivington  on  the 
29th  of  November,  1864.  This  matter  is  now  under  investigation  by  a  commis- 
sion  appointed  under  instructions  from  Major  General  Curtis,  so  that  in  course 
of  time  it  will  speak  for  itself. 

After  having  become  possessed  of  all  these  facts,  I  looked  around  to  see  what 
could  be  done  in  the  premises  to  save  the  country.  I  first  made  a  statement  to 
Major  General  Curtis,  which,  by  the  way,  has  never  been  acknowledged,  and 
impressed  upon  him  the  necessity  for  making  certain  changes  and  of  hurrying 
out  re-enforcements.  Finding  no  response  or  relief  from  that  quarter,  I  next 
called  upon  the  governor  regarding  the  turning  out  of  the  militia,  which  was 
deemed  impracticable,  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  law  has  so  many  defections. 
I  then  suggested  to  the  legislature,  which  was  in  session,  the  propriety  of 
amending  the  militia  law,  but  no  answer  came  or  action  taken.  In  consulta¬ 
tion  with  the  governor  and  other  prominent  men  of  the  Territory,  it  was  deemed 
most  expedient  and  best  to  urge  the  passage  of  a  bill  issuing  territorial  bonds, 
which  could  be  cashed  at  par  by  moneyed  men,  and  the  same  used  to  pay  volun¬ 
teers  a  bounty  for  three  (3)  months’  service,  and  purchase  horses  on  which  to 
mount  them,  (for  there  are  none  in  the  quartermaster’s  hands,  nor  any  money 
to  purchase  them  with ;)  and  these  men  were  to  be  placed  under  my  command, 
and  used  in  opening  and  keeping  open  the  overland  stage  route.  The  house 
and  council  could  not  agree  on  this  bill;  so  after  over  two  weeks’  delay,  and  no 
good  resulted  from  their  action,  I  was  compelled  to  proclaim  martial  law,  shut 
up  all  houses  of  business,  stop  all  labor  and  traffic,  and  keep  matters  so  until 
they  furnished  me  three  hundred  and  sixty  (360)  mounted  men,  which  I  would 
arm  and  equip.  These  men  are  now  being  raised,  and  I  expect  by  the  20th 
to  have  the  most  of  them  in  the  field.  My  position  has  been,  and  is,  anything 
but  a  pleasant  one — isolated  from  all  support,  a  stranger  in  the  land,  cut  off  from 
all  communication,  threatened  and  attacked  by  hostile  Indians,  being  in  a  com¬ 
munity  divided  against  itself,  and  compelled  to  proclaim  martial  law,  with  not 
a  man  at  my  back  to  enforce  obedience  to  the  same ;  yet  I  have  succeeded  by 
first  stirring  up  the  public  mind,  and  preparing  it  for  the  result  which  had  to 
follow,  unless  I  chose  to  back  down,  and  yield  my  authority,  which  no  living 
soldier  will  do. 

I  enclose,  for  your  information  on-this  subject,  copies  of  a  correspondence  be¬ 
tween  myself,  the  governor,  and  the  legislature  on  these  troubles,  also  an  article 
from  the  Journal,  a  newspaper  published  in  the  mountains,  which  will  define 
to  you  my  position,  and  show  you  what  I  have  had  to  contend  with.  I  made 
it  my  business  to  visit  the  mountains  officially  on  the  very  day  when  excite¬ 
ment  was  at  the  highest  pitch.  On  the  day  but  one  after  that  article  was  writ¬ 
ten  I  addressed  a  meeting  of  about  fifteen  hundred  (1,500)  citizens,  in  which  I 
pointed  out  to  them  at  whose  door  the  blame  lay,  the  duties  they  owed  them¬ 
selves  and  the  government,  and  my  reasons  for  proclaiming  martial  law.  I 
was  unanimously  sustained,  and  that  night  one  hundred  and  twenty  (120)  men 
were  sworn  in  for  three  months.  This  was  the  quota  required  by  the  governor 
to  fill  my  call. 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


97 


I  enclose  you  a  copy  of  the  order  establishing’  martial  law,  as  also  the  gov¬ 
ernor’s  call  in  accordance  therewith.  To  assert  your  authority  here ,  in  trying 
cases,  is  very  different  from  asserting  it  in  any  other  portion  of  the  Union. 

Men  of  influence  and  wealth  in  the  east  are  interested  to  a  very  great  amount 
in  the  mining  companies,  so  that  they  readily  obtain  an  official  ear  in  Washing¬ 
ton  to  a  one-sided  story,  which  invariably  works  injustice  to  those  in  authority 
and  responsible.  I  therefore  respectfully  ask,  general,  that  you  forward  this, 
or  a  copy,  to  Washington,  that  I  may  stand  right  on  the  record. 

I  am  not  afraid  to  assume  any  responsibility  commensurate  with  the  sur¬ 
rounding  circumstances,  and  which  is  for  the  good  of  the  service ;  but  I  am 
afraid  of  the  snake-like  winding  of  hypocrisy ,  backed  by  a  grovelling,  sensual 
desire.  If  men  will  adhere  to  truth,  I  will  cheerfully  abide  every  issue. 

In  the  hope  this  will  prove  satisfactory  and  of  use  to  you  in  your  adminis¬ 
tration,  and  satisfy  your  mind  regarding  my  position  and  the  steps  I  have 
taken  in  the  premises, 

I  have  the  honor  to  remain,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

T.  MOONLIGHT, 

Colonel  11th  Kansas  Cavalry ,  Commanding. 

Major  General  G.  M.  Dodge, 

Commanding  Department  of  the  Missouri, 

Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas. 


Headquarters  District  of  Colorado, 

Denver ,  January  7,  1865. 

Sir  :  As  matters  now  stand  in  this  district  (having  in  a  manner  no  troops) 
there  is  great  danger  of  being  overrun  by  the  Indians.  Troops  could  at  the 
present  time  be  raised  better  than  at  any  other  time,  and  now  is  the  time  we 
require  them.  Will  you,  as  acting  governor,  communicate  with  the  authorities 
on  the  subject  (the  governor  being  in  Washington)  to  obtain  this  authority?  It 
is  of  immense  importance  to  the  Territory,  and  the  only  way  to  receive  speedy 
relief  from  the  danger  surrounding,  and  prevent  starvation. 

I  submit  this  for  your  consideration  and  action,  and  my  name  may  be  used  by 
you  in  this  connexion  on  your  despatches. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

T.  MOONLIGHT, 

Colonel  1 1th  Kansas  Cavalry,  Commanding. 

Hon.  Samuel  H.  Elbert. 


Headquarters  District  of  Colorado, 

Denver,  C.  T.,  January  8,  1865. 

Sir  :  Owing  to  the  depredations  of  Indians,  we  are,  at  present,  shut  up  from 
telegraphic  communications  with  the  east,  and,  therefore,  beyond  the  reach  of 
immediate  support  from  any  quarter,  leaving  us  to  ourselves  to  act  in  the  prem¬ 
ises.  Should  the  troubles  continue,  I  will  be  constrained  to  call  on  the  able- 
bodied  men  to  muster  for  the  protection  of  the  line  of  transportation.  If  you 
have  any  special  views  on  the  subject,  I  would  be  pleased  to  have  them. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

T.  MOONLIGHT, 

Colonel  1 1th  Kansas  Cavalry,  Commanding. 

Hon.  S.  H.  Elbert, 

Secretary  and  Acting  Governor. 

Part  vi - 7 


98 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Headquarters  District  of  Colorado, 

Denver,  January  9,  IS 65. 

Gentlemen  :  Learning  that  the  legislative  body  of  Colorado  Territory  is 
now  in  session,  I  respectfully  suggest  for  your  consideration  the  propriety  of  im¬ 
mediately  reorganizing  the  militia  law.  Your  country  is  in  a  manner  isolated 
from  the  balance  of  the  federal  government,  on  which  you  depend  for  supplies 
Your  line  of  transportation  is  now  inoperative,  and  it  devolves  upon  you,  th  ’ 
representatives  of  the  people,  to  take  a  step  in  a  direction  that  will  insure  you 
at  least,  an  active  and  efficient  militia  force  to  guard  over  your  interests.  As> 
matters  now  stand,  the  militia  must  be  called  out  sooner  or  later,  and  I  make 
these  suggestions  that  there  may  be  no  misunderstanding  between  the  civil  and 
military. 

Gentlemen,  pardon  my  intrusion,  I  mean  it  for  your  good. 

Very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

T.  MOONLIGHT, 

Colonel  11  th  Kansas  Cavalry,  Commanding . 

Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives, 

Colorado  City,  Colorado  Territory. 


Headquarters  District  of  Colorado, 

Denver,  January  17,  1865. 

Sir  :  By  reason  of  the  scarcity  of  troops  in  th  is  district,  our  natural  enemies 
the  Indians,  have  possessed  themselves  of  our  lines  of  communication.  They 
have  burned  ranches,  killed  innocent  women  and  children,  destroyed  government 
property  wherever  it  was  found,  driven  off  the  stage  stock,  killed  the  drivers  and 
passengers  travelling  on  the  coaches ;  in  short,  they  are  making  it  a  war  of  ex¬ 
termination.  We  may  look  in  vain  for  such  timely  military  assistance  as  will 
protect  the  lives  arid  property  of  settlers  ;  nor  can  we  hope  for  an  eastern  com¬ 
munication  this  winter,  unless  the  citizens  of  the  Territory  band  themselves 
together  in  a  military  organization,  and  spring  to  arms  at  your  call  as  chief 
executive.  The  blood  of  the  innocent  and  unoffending  martyrs  cries  aloud  for 
vengeance,  and  starvation  stares  in  the  face  the  living.  You  nor  I  cannot  longer 
remain  inactive,  and  be  considered  guiltless.  It  devolves  upon  the  militia,  as 
matters  now  stand  to  open  the  overland  route,  and  keep  it  open  until  troops  can 
be  had  from  the  east  to  make  war  on  these  savages  of  the  plains,  until  there 
remains  not  a  vestige  of  their  originality.  On  behalf  of  the  general  govern¬ 
ment,  and  on  my  own  responsibility,  (trusting  to  the  justice  of  the  cause  for  my 
own  protection,)  I  will  furnish  carbines  to  the  first  mounted  and  accepted  com¬ 
pany,  and  rifled  weapons  of  improved  pattern  to  all  the  balance ;  also,  rations  for 
the  same  as  United  States  troops,  and  forage  for  the  animals,  with  the  proper 
allowance  of  transportation,  and  also  horse  equipments.  My  scouts  inform  me 
that  the  Indian  spies  are  now  prowling  around  the  very  skirts  of  this  place,  so 
that,  in  addition  to  your  call  for  militia  for  field  service,  the  city  companies 
should  at  once  be  placed  on  a  war  footing,  having  daily  drills,  with  appointed 
places  of  rendezvous,  that  we  may  not  be  caught  napping. 

I  am,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

T.  MOONLIGHT, 

Colonel  11th  Kansas  Cavalry,  Commanding. 

Hon.  S.  H.  Elbert, 

Acting  Governor,  Colorado  Territory. 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


99 


Headquarters  District  of  Colorado, 

Denver,  January  25,  1865. 

Sir  :  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  communication  of 
yesterday,  from  Golden  City,  making  inquiries  as  to  the  number  of  troops  in  this 
district,  and  the  disposition  made  of  them.  I  will  cheerfully  give  you  the  desired 
information. 

At  Fort  Lyon,  which  lias  lately  been  placed  in  my  district,  there  are  about 
300  men.  The  mustering  officer,  Captain  J.  C.  Anderson,  has  but  returned 
after  completing  the  organization  of  the  1st  regiment,  by  consolidating  it  into 
six  maximum  companies.  About  forty  men  are  at  Fort  Garland,  but  these  now 
will  be  increased  to  100.  About  forty  men  are  at  Camp  Fillmore,  but  these  will 
be  increased  to  100  also,  as  companies  will  be  stationed  together  at  posts  so 
remote.  One  company  will  be  stationed  here  of  100  men  in  place  of  the  strag¬ 
glers  now  doing  duty.  One  company  will  be  divided  and  stationed  at  Bijou 
Basin  and  Living  Springs.  This  leaves  only  two  companies  at  Fort  Lyon.  In 
addition  to  these,  there  are  about  seventy-five  (75)  recruits  of  the  2d  Colorado ; 
part  of  them  are  now  at  or  near  Junction,  and  the  balance  will  join  in  a  few  days. 
There  are  about  sixty  men  now  at  Valley  Station,  but  these  must  be  changed, 
owing  to  the  new  organization.  There  are  about  500  men,  all  told,  for  duty, 
scattered  from  Fort  Lyon,  via  Garland,  Fillmore,  Denver,  and  on  route  to  Valley 
Station,  a  distance  of  about  450  miles. 

The  committee  will  see  from  this  that  so  widely  spread  are  the  troops,  that, 
even  in  a  case  of  emergency,  it  would  not  be  possible  to  get  together  more  than 
200  men  in  thirty-six  hours. 

Trusting  this  may  be  of  service  to  you  in  your  proceedings,  I  remain,  very 
respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

T.  MOONLIGHT, 

Colonel  1 1th  Kansas  Cavalry,  Commanding. 

D.  H.  Nichols, 

Chairman  of  Committee  on  Military  Affairs. 


Headquarters  District  of  Colorado, 

Denver,  January  31,  1865. 

Sir  :  I  have  been  looking  eagerly  and  waiting  patiently  for  the  passage  of  the 
bill  which  was  designed  to  relieve  the  people  of  this  Territory  from  the  rav¬ 
ages  of  the  Indians.  That  bill  was  introduced  at  my  suggestion,  as  the  most 
feasible  of  all  plans  to  raise  troops  rapidly  and  voluntarily  for  the  opening  of 
the  overland  route,  and  the  keeping  of  it  open  until  succor  could  arrive  from  the 
States.  The  Indians  are  every  day  becoming  more  desperate,  and  to-day  there 
stands  not  a  ranch,  out  of  the  many  that  were  between  Valley  Station  and 
Julesburg,  and  but  very  few  on  this  side,  and  all  since  the  introduction  of  that 
bill.  I  trusted  implicitly  in  the  patriotism  and  fidelity  of  the  legislature,  and 
that  their  wisdom  and  judgment  would  at  once  foresee  the  necessity  of  taking 
steps  to  defend  their  homes,  their  little  ones,  and  the  property  of  the  people  whom 
they  represent.  Am  I  mistaken  ?  God  forbid  !  Yet  every  indication  of  late 
seems  to  blight  my  fondest  hopes.  I  cannot  longer  await  the  action  of  your 
honorable  body,  for  this  night’s  despatches  from  Junction  inform  me  that  about 
three  thousand  (3,000)  Indians  are  marching  up  the  Platte  on  both  sides. 
Unless  the  legislature,  within  forty-eight  hours,  does  something  to  relieve  suffer¬ 
ing  humanity,  and  save  this  country  from  ruin  and  devastation,  I  will  be  com¬ 
pelled,  much  against  my  will,  to  proclaim  martial  law,  shut  up  all  houses  of 
business,  and  force  every  man  able  to  bear  arms  into  the  ranks,  and  send  them 


100 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


out  to  protect  tlieir  brethren,  kill  off  the  Indians,  and  establish  permanent 
communication  with  the  east.  I  cannot  quietly  look  on  and  perform  my  duty 
to  this  people,  my  country ,  and  my  God. 

I  have  weighed  this  matter  well  in  my  own  mind,  and  what  I  have  stated  is 
my  firm  resolve,  with  a  lingering  hope  that  your  honorable  body  will  yet,  and 
immediately,  save  this  Territory  from  destruction,  and  themselves  from  the  in¬ 
dignation  of  an  infuriated  people. 

I  have  the  honor  to  remain,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

T.  MOONLIGHT, 

Colonel  11th  Kansas  Cavalry,  Commanding. 

Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives,  Golden  City. 


Headquarters  District  of  Colorado, 

Denver,  February  4,  1865. 

Dear  Sir:  I  send  this  communication  by  special  messenger,  and  respectfully 
ask  that  an  answer  to  this,  as  well  as  that  of  January  31,  ultimo,  be  returned. 
Time  passes,  and  the  danger  increases — hence  the  urgency  of  my  request. ' 

I  have  been  informed  from  various  sources  that  a  portion  of  the  house  took 
exceptions  to  my  letter  of  the  31st  of  January,  as  being  threatening  and  coer¬ 
cive  in  its  tone.  Permit  me  to  say  that  nothing  was  further  from  my  mind  or 
intention.  Liberty  is  a  boon  I  prize  too  highly  to  wilfully  deprive  others  of  its 
blessing,  and  the  course  that  I  fear  I  must  pursue  for  the  salvation  of  this  peo¬ 
ple  is  forced  upon  me  by  a  combination  of  circumstances  which,  in  my  humble 
opinion,  the  legislature  might,  within  the  past  two  weeks,  have  scattered  to  the 
winds.  This  they  have  not  done;  therefore  I  must  do  something. 

Dn  invitation  of  your  honorable  body,  and  on  the  speaker’s  stand,  in  their 
presence,  did  I  make  known  my  feelings  on  the  Indian  question.  There  I 
urged  the  passage  of  that  bill,  and  there  I  told  them  that  I  was  opposed  to 
martial  law.  My  acts  have  not  belied  my  words ;  but  the  time  has  come  when 
“patience  ceases  to  be  a  virtue,”  and  when  inactivity  is  a  wilful  “dereliction 
of  duty.”  So  far,  I  have  been  patient  in  the  extreme,  though  not  inactive.  I 
have  nothing  to  retract  in  my  letter  of  January  31,  but  will  adhere  closely  to 
my  decision.  I  may  err  in  addressing  the  house,  and  not  the  council.  Should 
such  be  the  case,  it  must  be  attributed  to  my  ignorance  of  parliamentary  rules, 
for  I  suppose  that  a  measure  of  this  kind  would  be  acted  upon  in  joint  ballot. 

I  have  the  honor  to  be,  very  respectfully,  your  obedient  servant, 

T.  MOONLIGHT, 

Colonel  11th  Kansas  Cavalry,  Commanding. 

Hon.  Speaker  of  House  of  Representatives, 

Golden  City ,  Colorado  Territory. 


Headquarters  District  of  Colorado, 
Denver,  Colorado  Territory,  February  6,  1865. 

Sir:  I  have  the  honor  to  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  your  communication  of 
the  4th  instant,  (in  behalf  of  the  house  of  which  you  are  an  honorable  member,) 
in  which  I  am  informed  that  the  bill  authorizing  the  issuing  of  $200,000  bonds  for 
the  purpose  of  mounting  the  militia  called  for,  paying  the  bounty,  &c.,  was  not 
likely  to  pass ;  and  also  that  a  bill  was  likely  to  pass,  (superseding  the  bond 
bill,)  giving  bounties  to  men  who  would  enlist  in  the  two  Colorado  regiments 
now  in  the  field,  and  also  that  it  had  been  represented  to  the  house,  as  coming 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


101 


'from  me,  that  a  sufficient  number  of  men  could  be  obtained  in  this  way,  so  as 
to  avoid  the  necessity  of  proclaiming  martial  law. 

In  reply,  I  would  state  that  I  am  very  sorry  the  bond  bill  did  not  pass  over 
two  weeks  ago,  for,  to  my  mind,  it  was  the  surest  and  most  honorable  way  that 
men  could  be  raised  and  horses  procured.  I  have  never  stated  that  a  sufficient 
number  of  men  could  be  enlisted  for  the  old  regiments,  so  as  to  meet  the  exi¬ 
gencies  of  the  case;  and  even  could  these  men  be  persuaded  to  enlist,  I  have 
not  at  present  the  horses  on  which  to  mount  them.  I  should  be  pleased  to  see 
a  bill  pass  authorizing  the  payment  of  a  liberal  bounty  to  recruits  for  the  1st  and 
2d  Colorado  regiments,  for  I  think  the  regiments  might  be  recruited  up  to  the 
maximum ;  but  1  am  sorry  to  say  that  such  a  bill  at  this  late  hour  would  not 
meet  the  necessities  of  the  times.  Men  and  horses  must  be  had  immediately, 
or  else  we  must  yield  ourselves  living  sacrifices  to  inhuman  savages ;  and  who 
of  us  all  are  prepared  to  do  this  ?  I  beg  of  you  not  to  defeat  the  bounty  bill  be¬ 
cause  of  the  lateness  of  the  hour  which  gave  it  birth,  for,  in  my  estimation,  it 
will  be  of  great  assistance  and  good.  I  am  more  than  sorry  that  I  have  now 
no  other  alternative  but  to  proclaim  martial  law  and  suspend  all  business  until 
a  sufficient  number  of  men  (mounted)  are  had  to  open  the  overland  road  and 
protect  the  frontier  settlers  of  the  Territory.  When  I  modified  martial  law,  as 
it  existed  under  the  former  district  commander,  I  never  expected  to  be  com¬ 
pelled  to  recreate  it  with  renewed  severity. 

Accept  my  thanks  for  your  courtesy,  and  believe  me,  with  esteem  and  re¬ 
spect,  your  obedient  servant, 

T.  MOONLIGHT, 

Colonel  1 1th  Kansas  Cavalry ,  Commanding. 

Hon.  E.  T.  Holland, 

.  Chairman  of  Military  Committee. 


A  true  copy : 


Official : 


Headquarters  Department  of  the  Missouri, 

St.  Louis,  Missouri,  March  9,  1865. 

J.  F.  BENNETT,  A.  A.  G. 
Adjutant  General’s  Office,  March  — ,  1865. 

-  - ,  A.  A.  G. 


Testimony  of  Colonel  J.  M.  Chivington. 

Interrogatories  propounded  to  John  M.  Chivington  by  the  Joint  Committee 
on  the  Conduct  of  the  War,  and  answers  thereto  given  by  said  Chivington  re¬ 
duced  to  writing,  and  subscribed  and  sworn  to  before  Alexander  W.  Atkins, 
notary  public,  at  Denver,  in  the  Territory  of  Colorado. 

1st  question..  What  is  your  place  of  residence,  your  age  and  profession  ? 
Answer.  My  place  of  residence  is  Denver,  Colorado;  my  age,  forty-five  years ; 
I  have  been  colonel  of  1st  Colorado  cavalry,  and  was  mustered  out  of  the 
service  on  or  about  the  eighth  day  of  January  last,  and  have  not  been  engaged 
in  any  business  since  that  time. 

2d  question.  Were  you  in  November,  1864,  in  any  employment,  civil  or 
military,  under  the  authority  of  the  United  States;  and  if  so,  what  was  that 
employment,  and  what  position  did  you  hold  ? 

Answer.  In  November,  1864,  I  was  colonel  of  1st  Colorado  cavalry,  and  in 
command  of  the  district  of  Colorado. 

Sdjjquestion.  Did  you,  as  colonel  in  command  of  Colorado  troops,  about  the  29tli 
of  November,  1864,  make  an  attack  on  an  Indian  village  or  camp  at  a  place  known 


102 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


as  Sand  creek  ?  If  so,  state  particularly  the  number  of  men  under  your  com¬ 
mand  ;  how  armed  and  equipped ;  whether  mounted  or  not ;  and  if  you  had  any 
artillery,  state  the  number  of  guns,  and  the  batteries  to  which  they  belonged. 

Answer.  On  the  29th  day  of  November,  1S64,  the  troops  under  my  com¬ 
mand  attacked  a  camp  of  Cheyenne  and  Arapaho  Indians  at  a  place  known 
as  Big  Bend  of  Sandy,  about  forty  miles  north  of  Fort  Lyon,  Colorado  Terri¬ 
tory.  There  were  in  my  command  at  that  time  about  (500)  five  hundred  men  of 
the  3d  regiment  Colorado  cavalry,  under  the  immediate  command  of  Colonel 
George  L.  Slioup,  of  said  3d  regiment,  and  about  (250)  two  hundred  and  fifty 
men  of  the  1st  Colorado  cavalry;  Major  Scott  J.  Anthony  commanded  one  bat¬ 
talion  of  said  1st  regiment,  and  Lieutenant  Luther  Wilson  commanded  another 
battalion  of  said  1st  regiment.  The  3d  regiment  was  armed  with  rifled 
muskets,  and  Star’s  and  Sharp’s  carbines.  A  few  of  the  men  of  that  regiment 
had  revolvers.  The  men  of  the  1st  regiment  were  armed  with  Star’s  and 
Sharp’s  carbines  and  revolvers.  The  men  of  the  3d  regiment  were  poorly 
equipped  ;  the  supply  of  blankets,  boots,  hats,  and  caps  was  deficient.  The 
men  of  the  1st  regiment  were  well  equipped  ;  all  these  troops  were  mounted. 
I  had  four  12-pound  mountain  howitzers,  manned  by  detachments  from  cavalry 
companies ;  they  did  not  belong  to  any  battery  company. 

4th  question.  State  as  nearly  as  you  can  the  number  of  Indians  that  were 
in  the  village  or  camp  at  the  time  the  attack  was  made ;  how  many  of  them 
were  warriors ;  how  many  of  them  were  old  men,  how  mauy  of  them  were 
women,  and  how  many  of  them  were  children  1 

Answer.  From  the  best  and  most  reliable  information  I  could  obtain,  there 
were  in  the  Indian  camp,  at  the  time  of  the  attack,  about  eleven  (11)  or  twelve 
{12)  hundred  Indians  :  of  these  about  seven  hundred  were  warriors,  and  the 
remainder  were  women  and  children.  I  am  not  aware  that  there  were  any  old 
men  among  them.  There  was  an  unusual  number  of  males  among  them,  for  the 
reason  that  the  war  chiefs  of  both  nations  were  assembled  there  evidently  for 
some  special  purpose. 

5tli  question.  At  what  time  of  the  day  or  night  was  the  attack  made  1  Was 
it  a  surprise  to  the  Indians  ?  What  preparation,  if  any,  had  they  made  for  de¬ 
fence  or  offence  ? 

Answer.  The  attack  was  made  about  sunrise.  In  my  opinion  the  Indians  were 
surprised  ;  they  began,  as  soon  as  the  attack  was  made,  to  oppose  my  troops,  how¬ 
ever,  and  were  soon  fighting  desperately.  Many  of  the  Indians  were  armed 
with  rifles  and  many  with  revolvers ;  I  think  all  had  bows  and  arrows.  They 
had  excavated  trenches  under  the  bank  of  Sand  creek,  which  in  the  vicinity 
of  the  Indian  camp  is  high,  and  in  many  places  precipitous.  These  trenches 
were  two  to  three  feet  deep,  and,  in  connexion  with  the  banks,  were  evidently  de¬ 
signed  to  protect  the  occupants  from  the  fire  of  an  enemy.  They  were  found 
at  various  points  extending  along  the  banks  of  the  creek  for  several  miles 
from  the  camp ;  there  were  marks  of  the  pick  and  shovel  used  in  excavating 
them  ;  and  the  fact  that  snow  was  seen  in  the  bottoms  of  some  of  the  trenches, 
while  all  snow  had  disappeared  from  the  surface  of  the  country  generally, 
sufficiently  proved  that  they  had  been  constructed  some  time  previously. 
The  Indians  took  shelter  in  these  trenches  as  soon  as  the  attack  was  made, 
and  from  thence  resisted  the  advance  of  my  troops. 

6tli  question.  What  number  did  you  lose  in  killed,  what  number  in  wounded, 
and  what  number  in  missing  ? 

Answer.  There  were  seven  men  killed,  forty-seven  wounded,  and  one  was 
missing. 

7th  question.  What  number  of  Indians  were  killed;  and  what  number  of 
the  killed  were  women,  and  what  number  were  children  1 

Answer.  From  the  best  information  1  could  obtain,  I  judge  there  were  five 
hundred  or  six  hundred  Indians  killed  ;  I  cannot  state  positively  the  number 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


103 


killed,  nor  can  I  state  positively  tlie  number  of  women  and  children  killed. 
Officers  who  passed  over  the  field,  by  my  orders,  after  the  battle,  for  the  pur¬ 
pose  of  ascertaining  the  number  of  Indians  killed,  report  that  they  saw  but 
few  women  or  children  dead,  no  more  than  would  certainly  fall  in  an  attack 
upon  a  camp  in  which  they  were.  I  myself  passed  over  seme  portions  of  the 
field  after  the  fight,  and  I  saw  but  one  woman  who  had  been  killed,  and  one 
who  had  hanged  herself;  I  saw  no  dead  children.  From  all  I  could  learn,  I 
arrived  at  the  conclusion  that  but  few  women  or  children  had  been  slain.  I  am 
of  the  opinion  that  when  the  attack  was  made  on  the  Indian  camp  the  greater 
number  of  squaws  and  children  made  their  escape,  while  the  warriors  remained 
to  fight  my  troops. 

8th  question.  State,  as  nearly  as  you  can,  the  number  of  Indians  that  were 
wounded,  giving  the  number  of  women  and  the  number  of  children  among 
the  wounded. 

Answer.  I  do  not  know  that  any  Indians  were  wounded  that  were  not  killed  ; 
if  there  were  any  wounded,  I  do  not  think  they  could  have  been  made  pris¬ 
oners  without  endangering  the  lives  of  soldiers  ;  Indians  usually  fight  as  long 
as  they  have  strength  to  resist.  Eight  Indians  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  troops 
alive,  to  my  knowledge  ;  these,  with  one  exception,  were  sent  to  Fort  Lyon  and 
properly  cared  for. 

9th  question.  What  property  was  captured  by  the  forces  under  your  com¬ 
mand  !  State  the  number  of  horses,  mules  and  poneys,  buffalo  robes,  blankets, 
and  also  all  other  property  taken,  specifying  particularly  the  kinds,  quality,  and 
value  thereof. 

Answer.  There  were  horses,  mules,  and  poneys  captured  to  the  number  of 
about  six  hundred.  There  were  about  one  hundred  buffalo  robes  taken.  Some 
of  this  stock  had  been  stolen  by  the  Indians  from  the  government  during  last 
spring,  summer  and  fall,  and  some  of  the  stock  was  the  property  of  private 
citizens  from  whom  they  had  been  stolen  during  the  same  period.  The  horses 
that  belonged  to  the  government  were  returned  to  the  officers  responsible  for 
them ;  as  nearly  as  could  be  learned,  the  horses  and  mules  that  were  owned  by  pri¬ 
vate  citizens  were  returned  to  them  on  proof  of  ownership  being  furnished ; 
such  were  my  orders  at  least.  The  poneys,  horses,  and  mules  for  which  no  owner 
could  be  found,  were  put  into  the  hands  of  my  provost  marshal  in  the  field, 
Captain  J.  J.  Johnson,  of  company  E,  3d  Colorado  cavalry,  with  instructions 
to  drive  them  to  Denver  and  turn  them  over  to  the  acting  quartermaster  as 
captured  stock,  taking  his  receipt  therefor.  After  I  arrived  in  Denver  I  again 
directed  Captain  Johnson  to  turn  these  animals  over  to  Captain  Gorton,  assist¬ 
ant  quartermaster,  as  captured  stock,  which  I  presume  he  did.  Colonel  Tlios. 
Moonlight  relieved  me  of  the  command  of  the  district  soon  after  I  arrived  in 

Denver,  that  is  to  say,  on  the  -  day  of - ,  A.  D.  186—,  and  I  was 

mustered  out  of  the  service,  the  term  of  service  of  my  regiment  having  expired. 
My  troops  were  not  fully  supplied  with  hospital  equipage,  having  been  on  forced 
marches.  The  weather  was  exceedingly  cold,  and  additional  covering  for  the 
wounded  became  necessary  ;  I  ordered  the  buffalo  robes  to  be  used  for  that  pur¬ 
pose.  I  know  of  no  other  property  of  value  being  captured.  It  is  alleged  that 
groceries  were  taken  from  John  Smith,  United  States  Indian  interpreter  for  Upper 
Arkansas  agency,  who  was  in  the  Indian  camp  at  the  time  of  the  attack,  trading 
goods,  powder,  lead,  caps,  &c.,  to  the  Indians.  Smith  told  me  that  these  gro¬ 
ceries  belonged  to  Samuel  G.  Colby,  United  States  Indian  agent.  I  am  not 
aware  that  these  things  were  taken  ;  I  am  aware  that  Smith  and  D.  D.  Colby, 
son  of  the  Indian  agent,  have  each  presented  claims  against  the  government 
for  these  articles.  The  buffalo  robes  mentioned  above  were  also  claimed  by 
Samuel  G.  Colby,  D.  D.  Colby  and  John  Smith.  One  bale  of  buffalo  robes 
was  marked  S.  S.  Soule,  1st  Colorado  cavalry,  and  I  am  informed  that  one 
bale  was  marked  Anthony,  Major  Anthony  being  in  command  of  Fort  Lyon  at 


104 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


that  time.  I  cannot  say  what  has  been  done  with  the  property  since  I  was  re¬ 
lieved  of  the  command  and  mustered  out  of  service.  There  was  a  large  quan¬ 
tity  of  Indian  trinkets  taken  at  the  Indian  camp  which  were  of  no  value.  The 
soldiers  retained  a  few  of  these  as  trophies  ;  the  remainder  with  the  Indian 
lodges  were  destroyed. 

10th  question.  Wliat  reason  had  you  for  making  the  attack  1  What  reasons, 
if  any,  had  you  to  believe  that  Black  Kettle  or  any  other  Indian  or  Indians  in 
the  camp  entertained  feelings  of  hostility  towards  the  whites  ?  Give  in  detail 
the  names  of  all  Indians  so  believed  to  be  hostile,  with  the  dates  and  places  of 
their  hostile  acts,  so  far  as  you  may  be  able  to  do  so. 

Answer.  My  reason  for  making  the  attack  on  the  Indian  camp  was,  that  I 
believed  the  Indians  in  the  camp  were  hostile  to  the  whites.  That  they  were  of 
the  same  tribes  with  those  who  had  murdered  many  persons  and  destroyed  much 
valuable  property  on  the  Platte  and  Arkansas  rivers  during  the  previous  spring, 
summer  and  fall  was  beyond  a  doubt.  When  a  tribe  of  Indians  is  at  war  with 
the  whites  it  is  impossible  to  determine  what  party  or  band  of  the  tribe  or  the 
name  of  the  Indian  or  Indians  belonging  to  the  tribe  so  at  war  are  guilty  of 
the  acts  of  hostility.  The  most  that  can  be ‘ascertained  is  that  Indians  of 
the  tribe  have  performed  the  acts.  During  the  spring,  summer  and  fall  of  the 
year  1864,  the  Arapaho  and  Cheyenne  Indians,  in  some  instances  assisted  or  led 
on  by  Sioux,  Kio was,  Comanches  and  Apaches,  had  committed  many  acts  of  hos¬ 
tility  in  the  country  lying  between  the  Little  Blue  and  the  Rocky  mountains 
and  the  Platte  and  Arkansas  rivers.  They  had  murdered  many  of  the  whites 
and  taken  others  prisoners,  and  had  destroyed  valuable  property ,  probably  amount¬ 
ing  to  $200,000  or  $300,000.  Their  rendezvous  was  on  the  headwaters  of  the 
Republican,  probably  one  hundred  miles  from  where  the  Indian  camp  was  lo¬ 
cated.  I  had  every  reason  to  believe  that  these  Indians  were  either  directly 
or  indirectly  concerned  in  the  outrages  which  had  been  committed  upon  the 
whites.  I  had  no  means  of  ascertaining  what  were  the  names  of  the  Indians 
who  had  committed  these  outrages  other  than  the  declarations  of  the  Indians 
themselves  ;  and  the  character  of  Indians  in  the  western  country  for  truth  and 
veracity,  like  their  respect  for  the  chastity  of  women  who  may  become  pris¬ 
oners  in  their  hands,  is  not  of  that  order  which  is  calculated  to  inspire  confidence 
in  what  they  may  say.  In  this  view  I  was  supported  by  Major  Anthony,  1st 
Colorado  cavalry,  commanding  at  Fort  Lyon,  .*.nd  Samuel  G.  Golby,  United  States 
Indian  agent,  who,  as  they  had  been  in  communication  with  these  Indians,  were 
more  competent  to  judge  of  their  disposition  towards  the  whites  than  myself. 
Previous  to  the  battle  they  expressed  to  me  the  opinion  that  the  Indians  should 
be  punished.  We  found  in  the  camp  the  scalps  of  nineteen  (19)  white  persons. 
One  of  the  surgeons  informed  me  that  one  of  these  scalps  had  been  taken  from 
the  victim’s  head  not  more  than  four  days  previously.  I  can  furnish  a  child 
captured  at  the  camp  ornamented  with  six  white  women’s  scalps ;  these  scalps 
must  have  been  taken  by  these  Indians  or  furnished  to  them  for  their  gratification 
and  amusement  by  some  of  their  brethren,  who,  like  themselves,  were  in  amity 
with  the  whites. 

1 1th  qnestion.  Had  you  any,  and  if  so,  what  reason,  to  believe  that  Black 
Kettle  and  the  Indians  with  him,  at  the  time  of  your  attack,  were  at  peace  with 
the  whites,  and  desired  to  remain  at  peace  with  them  ? 

Answer.  I  had  no  reason  to  believe  that  Black  Kettle  and  the  Indians  with 
him  were  in  good  faith  at  peace  with  the  whites.  The  day  before  the  attack 
Major  Scott  J.  Anthony,  1st  Colorado  cavalry,  then  in  command  at  Fort  Lyon, 
told  me  that  these  Indians  were  hostile ;  that  he  had  ordered  his  sentinels  to 
fire  on  them  if  they  attempted  to  come  into  the  post,  and  that  the  sentinels  had 
fired  on  them  ;  that  he  was  apprehensive  of  an  attack  from  these  Indians,  and 
had  taken  every  precaution  to  prevent  a  surprise.  Major  Samuel  G.  Colby, 
United  States  Indian  agent  for  these  Indians,  told  me  on  the  same  day  that  he 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS; 


105 


had  done  everything  in  his  power  to  make  them  behave  themselves,  and  that 
for  the  last  six  months  he  could  do  nothing  with  them  ;  that  nothing  but  a 
sound  whipping  would  bring  a  lasting  peace  with  them.  These  statements  were 
made  to  me  in  the  presence  of  the  officers  of  my  staff  whose  statements  can  be 
obtained  to  corroborate  the  foregoing. 

12th  question.  Had  you  reason  to  know  or  believe  that  these  Indians  had 
sent  their  chief  and  leading  men  at  any  time  to  Denver  city,  in  order  to  take 
measure  in  connection  with  the  superintendent  of  Indian  affairs  there,  or  with 
any  other  person  having  authority,  to  secure  friendly  relations  with  the  whites  ] 

Answer.  I  was  present  at  an  interview  between  Governor  Evans  on  the  part 
of  the  whites,  and  Black  Kettle  and  six  other  Indians,  at  Camp  Weldmar, 
Denver,  about  the  27tli  of  September,  1864,  in  which  the  Indians  desired  peace, 
but  did  not  propose  terms.  General  Curtis,  by  telegraph  to  me,  declined  to 
make  peace  with  them,  and  said  that  there  could  be  no  peace  without  his  con¬ 
sent.  Governor  Evans  declined  to  treat  with  them,  and  as  General  Curtis  was 
then  in  command  of  the  department,  and,  of  course,  I  could  not  disobey  his  in¬ 
structions.  General  Curtis’s  terms  of  peace  were  to  require  all  bad  Indians  to 
be  given  up,  all  stock  stolen  by  the  Indians  to  be  delivered  up,  and  hostages 
given  by  the  Indians  for  their  good  conduct.  The  Indians  never  complied  with 
these  terms. 

13tli  question.  Were  those  Indians,  to  your  knowledge,  referred  by  the  super¬ 
intendent  of  Indian  affairs  to  the  military  authorities,  as  the  only  power  under 
the  government  to  afford  them  protection  ? 

Answer.  Governor  Evans,  in  the  conference  mentioned  in  my  last  answer,  did 
not  refer  the  Indians  to  the  military  authorities  for  protection,  but  for  terms  of 
peace.  He  told  the  Indians  “that  he  was  the  peace  chief,  that  they  had. gone 
to  war,  and,  therefore,  must  deal  with  the  war  chiefs.”  It  was  at  this  time  I 
gave  them  the  terms  of  General  Curtis,  and  they  said  they  had  not  received 
power  to  make  peace  on  such  terms,  that  they  would  report  to  their  young  men 
and  see  what  they  would  say  to  it ;  they  would  like  to  do  it,  but  if  their  young 
men  continued  the  war  they  would  have  to  go  with  them.  They  said  there 
were  three  or  four  small  war  parties  of  their  young  men  out  on  the  war  path 
against  the  whites  at  that  time.  This  ended  the  talk. 

14th  question.  Did  the  officer  in  command  of  Fort  Lyon,  to  your  knowledge, 
at  any  time  extend  the  protection  of  our  flag  to  Black  Kettle  and  the  Indians 
with  him,  and  direct  them  to  encamp  upon  the  reservation  of  the  fort  ? 

Answer.  Major  E.  W.  Wynkoop,  1st  cavalry,  Colorado,  did,  as  I  have  been 
informed,  allow  some  of  these  Indians  to  camp  at  or  near  Fort  Lyon,  and  did 
promise  them  the  protection  of  our  flag.  Subsequently  he  was  relieved  of  the 
command  of  Fort  Lyon,  and  Major  Anthony  placed  in  command  at  that  post, 
Avho  required  the  Indians  to  comply  with  General  Curtis’s  terms,  which  they 
failed  to  do,  and  thereupon  Major  Anthony  drove  them  away  from  the  post. 

15th  question.  Were  rations  ever  issued  to  those  Indians  either  as  prisoners 
of  war  or  otherwise  ? 

Answer.  I  have  been  informed  that  Major  Wynkoop  issued  rations  to  the 
Indians  encamped  near  Fort  Lyon  while  he  was  in  command,  but  whether  as  pris¬ 
oners  of  war  I  do  not  know.  I  think  that  Major  Anthony  did  not  issue  any  rations. 

16th  question.  And  did  those  Indians  remove,  in  pursuance  of  the  directions, 
instructions,  or  suggestions  of  the  commandant  at  Fort  Lyon,  to  the  place  on 
Sand  creek,  where  they  were  attacked  by  you  1 

Answer.  I  have  been  informed  that  Major  Anthony,  commandant  at  Fort 
Lyon,  did  order  the  Indians  to  remove  from  that  post,  but  I  am  not  aware  that 
they  were  ordered  to  go  to  the  place  where  the  battle  was  fought,  or  to  any  other 
place. 

yth  question.  What  measures  were  taken'  by  you,  at  any  time,  to  render  the 
attack  on  those  Indians  a  surprise  ? 

Fart  vi - 8 


106 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


Answer.  I  took  every  precaution  to  render  the  attack  upon  the  Indians  a 
surprise,  for  the  reason  that  we  had  been  chasing  small  parties  of  them  all  the 
summer  and  fall  without  being  able  to  catch  them,  and  it  appeared  to  me  that 
the  only  way  to  deal  with  them  was  to  surprise  them  in  their  place  of  rendezvous. 
General  Curtis,  in  his  campaign  against  them,  had  failed  to  catch  them  ;  General 
Mitcliel  had  met  with  no  better  success ;  General  Blunt  had  been  surprised  by 
them,  and  his  command  nearly  cut  to  pieces. 

18th  question.  State  in  detail  the  disposition  made  of  the  various  articles  of 
property,  horses,  mules,  ponies,  buffalo  robes,  &c.,  captured  by  you  at  the  time 
of  this  attack,  and  by  what  authority  was  such  disposition  made  ? 

Answer.  The  horses  and  mules  that  had  been  stolen  from  the  government 
were  turned  over  to  the  officer  who  had  been  responsible  for  the  same ;  and  the 
animals  belonging  to  Atzins  was  returned  to  them  upon  proof  being  made  of 
such  ownership.  The  animals  not  disposed  of  in  this  way  were  turned  over  to 
Captain  S.  J.  Johnson,  3d  regiment  Colorado  cavalry,  with  instructions  to  pro¬ 
ceed  with  the  same  to  Denver,  and  turn  them  into  the  quartermaster’s  department. 
After  the  command  arrived  in  Denver,  I  again  directed  Captain  Johnson  to  turn 
over  the  stock  to  Captain  C.  L.  Gorton,  assistant  quartermaster,  at  that  place.  The 
buffalo  robes  were  turned  into  the  hospital  for  use  of  the  wounded  as  before  stated. 

19tli  question.  Make  such  further  statement  as  you  may  desire,  or  which  may 
be  necessary  to  a  full  understanding  of  all  matters  relating  to  the  attack  upon 
the  Indians  at  Sand  creek. 

Answer.  Since  August,  18G3, 1  had  been  in  possession  of  the  most  conclusive 
evidence  of  the  alliance,  for  the  purposes  of  hostility  against  the  whites,  of  the 
Sioux,  Cheyennes,  Arapahoes,  Camanche  river,  and  Apache  Indians.  Their 
plan  was  to  interrupt,  or,  if  possible,  entirely  prevent  all  travel  on  the  routes 
along  the  Arkansas  and  Platte  rivers  from  the  States  to  the  Pocky  mountains, 
and  thereby  depopulate  this  country.  Pebel  emissaries  were  long  since  sent 
among  the  Indians  to  incite  them  against  the  whites,  and  afford  a  medium  of 
communication  between  the  rebels  and  the  Indians ;  among  whom  was  Gerry 
Bent,  a  half-breed  Cheyenne  Indian,  but  educated,  and  to  all  appearances  a 
white  man,  who,  having  served  under  Price  in  Missouri,  and  afterwards  becoming 
a  bushwhacker,  being  taken  prisoner,  took  the  oath  of  allegiance,  and  was 
paroled,  after  which  he  immediately  joined  the  Indians,  and  has  ever  since  been 
one  of  their  most  prominent  leaders  in  all  depredations  upon  the  whites.  I  have 
been  reliably  informed  that  this  half-breed,  Bent,  in  order  to  incite  the  Indians 
against  the  whites,  told  them  that  the  Great  Father  at  Washington  having  all 
he  could  do  to  fight  his  children  at  the  south,  they  could  now  regain  their  country. 

When  John  Evans,  governor  of  Colorado  Territory,  and  ex  officio  superin¬ 
tendent  of  indian  affairs,  visited  by  appointment  the  Cheyenne  Indians  on  the 
Pepublican  fork  of  the  Kansas  river,  to  talk  with  them  in  regard  to  their  rela¬ 
tions  with  the  government,  the  Indians  would  have  nothing  to  say  to  him,  nor 
would  they  receive  the  presents  sent  them  by  the  government,  but  immediately 
on  his  arrival  at  the  said  point  the  Indians  moved  to  a  great  distance,  all  their 
villages  appearing  determined  not  to  have  any  intercourse  with  him  individually 
or  as  the  agent  of  the  government. 

This  state  of  affairs  continued  for  a  number  of  months,  during  which  time 
white  men  who  had  been  trading  with  the  Indians  informed  me  that  the  Indians 
had  determined  to  make  war  upon  the  whites  as  soon  as  the  grass  was  green, 
and  that  they  were  making  preparations  for  such  an  event  by  the  large  number 
of  arrows  they  were  making  and  the  quantity  of  arms  and  ammunition  they 
were  collecting ;  that  the  settlers  along  the  Platte  and  Arkansas  rivers  should 
be  warned  of  the  approaching  danger ;  that  the  Indians  had  declared  their 
intention  to  prosecute  the  war  vigorously  when  they  commenced.  With  very 
few  troops  at  my  command  I  could  do  but  little  to  protect  the  settlers  except  to 
collect  the  latest  intelligence  from  the  Indians’  country,  communicate  it  to 
General  Curtis,  commanding  department  of  Missouri,  and  warn  the  settlers  of 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS, 


107 


the  relations  existing  between  the  Indians  and  the  whites,  and  the  probability 

of  trouble,  all  of  which  I  did. 

Last  April,  1864,  the  Indians,  Cheyennes,  Arapahoes,  and  others,  com¬ 
menced  their  depredations  upon  the  whites  by  entering  their  isolated  habita¬ 
tions  in  the  distant  parts  of  this  territory,  taking  therefrom  everything  they 
desired,  and  destroying  the  balance ;  driving  off  their  stock,  horses,  mules  and 
cattle.  I  sent  a  detachment  of  troops  after  the  Indians  to  recover  the  stolen 
property,  when  the  stock,  &c.,  being  demanded  of  them  they  (the  Indians) 
refused  to  surrender  the  property  so  taken  from  the  whites,  and  stated  that  they 
wanted  to  tight  the  troops.  Again,  when  a  few  weeks  after  the  country  along 
the  Platte  river,  near  Fremont's  orchard,  became  the  theatre  of  their  depreda¬ 
tions,  one  Ripley,  a  ranchman,  living  on  the  Bijon  creek,  near  camp  Sanborn, 
came  into  camp  and  informed  Captain  Sanborn,  commanding,  that  his  stock  had 
all  been  stolen  by  the  Indians,  requesting  assistance  to  recover  it.  Captain  San¬ 
born  ordered  Lieutenant  Clark  Dunn,  with  a  detachment  of  troops,  to  pursue 
the  Indians  and  recover  the  stock  ;  but,  if  possible,  to  avoid  a  collision  with 
them.  Upon  approaching  the  Indians,  Lieutenant  Dunn  dismounted,  walked 
forward  alone  about  fifty  paces  from  his  command,  and  requested  the  Indians 
to  return  the  stock,  which  Mr.  llipley  had  recognized  as  his  ;  but  the  Indians 
treated  him  with  contempt,  and  commenced  firing  upon  him,  which  resulted  in 
four  of  the  troops  being  wounded  and  about  fifteen  Indians  being  killed  and 
wounded,  Lieutenant  Dunn  narrowly  escaping  with  his  life.  Again,  about  one 
hundred  and  seventy-five  head  of  cartle  were  stolen  from  Messrs.  Irwin  and 
Jackman,  government  freighters,  when  troops  were  sent  in  pursuit  toward  the 
headwaters  of  the  Republican.  ‘They  were  fired  upon  by  the  Indians  miles 
from  where  the  Indians  were  camped.  In  this  encounter  the  Indians  killed  one 
soldier  and  wounded  another.  Again,  when  the  troops  were  near  the  Smoky 
Hill,  after  stock,  while  passing  through  a  canon,  about  eighty  miles  from  Fort 
Larned,  they  were  attacked  by  these  same  Cheyenne  Indians,  and  others,  and 
almost  cut  to  pieces,  there  being  about  fifteen  hundred  Indians.  Again,  when 
on  a  Sunday  morning  the  Kiowas  and  Camanches  were  at  Fort  Larned,  to 
obtain  the  rations  that  the  commanding  officer,  on  behalf  of  the  government, 
was  issuing  to  them,  they,  at  a  preconcerted  signal,  fired  upon  the  sentinels  at 
the  fort,  making  a  general  attack  upon  the  unsuspecting  garrison,  while  the 
balance  of  the  Indians  were  driving  off  the  stock  belonging  to  the  government, 
and  then  as  suddenly  departed,  leaving  the  garrison  afoot  excepting  about 
thirty  artillery  liorse3  that  were  saved;  thus  obtaining  in  all  about  two  hundred 
and  eighty  head  of  stock, [including  a  small  herd  taken  from  the  suttler  at  that  post. 

Again,  a  few  days  after  this,  the  Cheyennes  and  Arapahoes  Indians,  with 
whom  I  had  the  fight  at  Sand  creek,  meeting  a  government  train  bound  for  New 
Mexico,  thirty  miles  east  of  Fort  Larned,  at  Walnut  creek,  who,  after  manifest¬ 
ing  a  great  deal  of  friendship  by  shaking  hands,  &c.,  with  every  person  in  the 
train,  suddenly  attacked  them,  killing  fourteen  and  wounding  a  number  more, 
scalping  and  mutilating  in  the  most  inhuman  manner  those  they  killed,  while 
they  scalped  two  of  this  party  alive,  one  a  boy  about  fourteen  years  of  age, 
who  has  since  become  an  imbecile.  The  two  persons  that  were  scalped  alive  I 
saw  a  few  days  after  this  occurred.  Though  it  occurred  within  sight  of  Fort 
Zarah,  the  officer  commanding  considered  his  command  entirely  inadequate  to 
render  any  assistance.  But  we  think  we  have  related  enough  to  satisfy  the 
most  incredulous  of  the  determined  hostility  of  these  Indians;  suffice  it  to  say 
that  during  the  spring,  summer,  and  fall  such  atrocious  acts  were  of  almost 
daily  occurrence  along  the  Platte  and  Arkansas  routes,  till  the  Indians  becom¬ 
ing  so  bold  that  a  family,  consisting  of  a  man,  Avoman,  and  two  children,  by  the 
name  of  Hungate,  Avere-  brutally  murdered  and  scalped  Avitliin  fifteen  miles  of 
Denver,  the  bodies  beingbrouglit  toDenver  forinterment.  After  seeingAvhich,  any 
person  A\rlio  could  for  a  moment  believe  that  these  Indians  were  friendly,  to  say  the 
least,  must  have  strange  ideas  of  their  habits.  We  could  not  see  it  in  that  light 


108 


MASSACRE  OF  CHEYENNE  INDIANS. 


This  last  atrocious  act  was  referred  to  by  Governor  Evans  in  his  talk  with 
the  Cheyennes  and  Arapahoes  Indians  on  about  the  27th  day  of  September, 
1864,  at  Denver,  Colorado  Territory.  The  Indians  then  stated  that  it  had  been 
done  by  members  of  their  tribe,  and  that  they  never  denied  it.  All  these  things^, 
were  promptly  reported  to  Major  General  S.  R.  Curtis,  commanding  department, 
who  repeatedly  ordered  me,  regardless  of  district  lines,  to  appropriately  chastise 
the  Indians,  which  I  always  endeavored  to  do.  Major  General  S.  R.  Curtis 
himself  and  Brigadear  General  R.  B.  Mitchell  made  campaigns  against  the 
Indians,  but  could  not  find  them;  the  Indians  succeeded  in  keeping  entirely 
from  their  view.  Again,  Major  General  J.  P.  Blunt  made  a  campaign  against  the 
Indians ;  was  surprised  by  them,  and  a  portion  of  his  command  nearly  cutto  pieces. 

Commanding  only  a  district  with  very  few  troops  under  my  control,  with 
hundreds  of  miles  between  my  headquarters  and  rendezvous  of  the  Indians, 
with  a  large  portion  of  the  Sante  Fe  and  Platte  routes,  besides  the  sparsely 
settled  and  distant  settlements  of  this  Territory,  to  protect,  I  could  not  do  any¬ 
thing  till  the  3d  regiment  was  organized  and  equipped,  when  I  determined  to 
strike  a  blow  against  tki3  savage  and  determined  foe.  When  I  reached  Fort 
Lyon,  after  passing  over  from  three  to  five  feet  of  ,snow,  and  greatly  suffering 
from  the  intensity  of  the  cold,  the  thermometer  ranging  from  28  to  30  degrees 
below  zero,  I  questioned  Major  Anthony  in  regard  to  the  whereabouts  of  hos¬ 
tile  Indians.  He  said  there  was  a  camp  of  Cheyennes  and  Arapahoes  about 
fifty  miles  distant;  that  he  would  have  attacked  before,  but  did  not  consider  his 
force  sufficient ;  that  these  Indians  had  threatened  to  attack  the  post,  &c.,  and 
ought  to  be  whipped,  all  of  which  was  concurred  in  by  Major  Colley,  Indian 
agent  for  the  district  of  the  Arkansas,  which  information,  with  the  positive 
orders  from  Major  General  Curtis,  commanding  the  department,  to  punish  these 
Indians,  decided  my  course,  and  resulted  in  the  battle  of  Sand  Creek,  which 
has  created  such  a  sensation  in  Congress  through  the  lying  reports  of  interested 
and  malicious  parties. 

On  my  arrival  at  Fort  Lyon,  in  all  my  conversations  with  Major  Anthony, 
commanding  the  post,  and  Major  Colley,  Indian  agent,  I  heard  nothing  of  this 
recent  statement  that  the  Indians  were  under  the  protection  of  the  government, 
&c.;  but  Major  Anthony  repeatedly  stated  to  me  that  he  had  at  different  times 
fired  upon  these  Indians,  and  that  they  were  hostile,  and,  during  my  stay  at 
Fort  Lyon,  urged  the  necessity  of  my  immediately  attacking  the  Indians  before 
they  could  learn  of  the  number  of  troops  at  Fort  Lyon,  and  so  desirous  was 
Major  Colly,  Indian  agent,  that  I  should  find  and  also  attack  the  Arapahoes, 
that  he  sent  a  messenger  after  the  fight  at  Sand  creek,  nearly  forty  miles,  to 
inform  me  where  I  could  find  the  Arapahoes  and  Iviowas ;  yet,  strange  to  say, 

I  have  learned  recently  that  these  men,  Anthony  and  Colly,  are  the  most  bitter 
in  their  denunciations  of  the  attack  upon  the  Indians  at  Sand  creek.  There¬ 
fore,  I  would,  in  conclusion,  most  respectfully  demand,  as  an  act  of  justice  to 
myself  and  the  brave  men  whom  I  have  had  the  honor  to  command  in  one  of 
the  hardest  campaigns  ever  made  in  this  country,  whether  against  white  men 
or  red,  that  we  be  allowed  that  right  guarranteed  to  every  American  citizen,  of 
introducing  evidence  in  our  behalf  to  sustain  us  in  what  we  believe  to  have 
been  an  act  of  duty  to  ourselves  and  to  civilization. 

We  simply  ask  to  introduce  as  witnesses  men  that  were  present  during  the 
campaign  and  know  all  the  facts. 

J.  M.  CHIVINGTON, 

L  ieut  Col.  1st  Cavalry  of  Colorado ,  Com' d' g  Dist.  of  Colerado. 

Sworn  and  subscribed  to  before  me  this  26th  day  of  April,  1S65. 

_  n  .  ALEXANDER  W.  ATKINS, 

3  3  3  U  A  4  Notary  Public. 


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DATE  DUE 


boston  college 


3  9031  01055093 


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